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ABSTRACT 
RELIABILITY EVALUATION AND DEFENSE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT FOR 
CYBER-PHYSICAL POWER SYSTEMS 
 
 
by 
Yingmeng Xiang 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017 
Under the Supervision of Professor Lingfeng Wang 
 
With the smart grid initiatives in recent years, the electric power grid is rapidly evolving into 
a complicated and interconnected cyber-physical system. Unfortunately, the wide deployment of 
cutting-edge communication, control and computer technologies in the power system, as well as 
the increasing terrorism activities, make the power system at great risk of attacks from both cyber 
and physical domains. It is pressing and meaningful to investigate the plausible attack scenarios 
and develop efficient methods for defending the power system against them. 
To defend the power grid, it is critical to first study how the attacks could happen and affect 
the power system, which are the basis for the defense strategy development. Thus, this dissertation 
quantifies the influence of several typical attacks on power system reliability. Specifically, three 
representative attack are considered, i.e., intrusion against substations, regional LR attack, and 
coordinated attacks. For the intrusion against substations, the occurrence frequency of the attack 
events is modeled based on statistical data and human dynamics; game-theoretical approaches are 
adopted to model induvial and consecutive attack cases; Monte Carlo simulation is deployed to 
obtain the desired reliability indices, which incorporates both the attacks and the random failures. 
 iii 
 
For the false data injection attack, a practical regional load redistribution (LR) attack strategy is 
proposed; the man-in-the-middle (MITM) intrusion process is modeled with a semi-Markov 
process method; the reliability indices are obtained based on the regional LR attack strategy and 
the MITM intrusion process using Monte Carlo simulation. For the coordinated attacks, a few 
typical coordination strategies are proposed considering attacking the current-carrying elements as 
well as attacking the measurements; a bilevel optimization method is applied to develop the 
optimal coordination strategy. 
Further, efficient and effective defense strategies are proposed from the perspectives of power 
system operation strategy and identification of critical elements. Specially, a robustness-oriented 
power grid operation strategy is proposed considering the element random failures and the risk of 
man-made attacks. Using this operation strategy, the power system operation is robust, and can 
minimize the load loss in case of malicious man-made attacks. Also, a multiple-attack-scenario 
(MAS) defender-attack-defender model is proposed to identify the critical branches that should be 
defended when an attack is anticipated but the defender has uncertainty about the capability of the 
attacker. If those identified critical branches are protected, the expected load loss will be minimal. 
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1. Introduction 
 Research Motivations 
Due to the smart grid initiative, numerous emerging cyber and computer technologies are 
being applied in the modern power grid, such as wide area monitoring and control technologies 
[1], IEC 61850 based substations [2], flexible alternating current transmission system devices [3]-
[4], distributed energy storage [5], and microgrid [6], etc. These changes can allow the cyber 
attackers to get access to the hierarchical control systems and exploit the vulnerabilities to gain the 
control privilege. Typical cyberattacks include denial of service (DoS) attacks, database 
modification, replay attack, and false data injection attack. In the physical domain, the power 
system is also vulnerable to both vandalism and terrorism activities. The power system spreads 
over a wide area, and numerous transmission lines travel hundreds of miles from power generation 
to utilization sites. And these lines could easily be the targets of attackers. The substations are 
distributed over vast land, and most of them are unmanned, and physically poorly protected. They 
can easily be broken into and be damaged. 
Actually both the cyberattacks and physical attacks against the power grid are not pure 
speculations, but are serious realities. For example, in January 2015, a militant attack plunged 
more than 140 million people into darkness after a key power transmission line was disrupted [7]. 
In January 2003, the Davis–Besse nuclear power station was infected by slammer worms, which 
resulted in the nuclear power plant being out of monitoring for five hours [8]. Also, in April 2016 
the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in German was reported to be infected by computer 
viruses [9]. These incidents could evolve into serious nuclear disasters if not well managed. 
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Moreover, it was identified by the security agency that a cyberattack caused a power blackout 
outside the U.S. [10]. On December 23 in 2015, a Ukrainian electricity distribution company was 
hacked, seven substations were isolated for three hours, and the operators were forced to switch to 
the manual mode. This cyberattack induced incident caused severe power outages to 
approximately 225,000 customers for hours [11]. Up to 73 MWh of electricity demand was 
curtailed. Also, it was reported that Israeli electric power system suffered severe cyber attacks 
[12].  
Due to security and privacy reasons, insufficient details regarding these attacks were 
disclosed to the public. But it is possible that many such cyber related incidents were not revealed 
to the public, and such attacks could occur more frequently in the future with the smart grid 
initiative. It was reported that the power grid is actually under cyberattack minute-by-minute [13]. 
Furthermore, great power failures could be triggered if the attacker launches coordinated 
attacks to compromise multiple parts or functions of the power grid in cyber and physical aspects. 
And in a report by North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the coordinated attack was 
identified as one of the three representative high impact low frequency threats [14]. 
There have been some research papers studying power system vulnerabilities and attacks 
[15]-[16]. The targets and attacking methods could differ greatly. For example, the false data 
injection attack on the power gird generation control was modeled in [17], and a mitigation strategy 
was developed. A strategy to develop false data injection attacks without sufficient system 
knowledge was proposed in [18]. In [19] a cyber-physical security assessment technique 
considering both failures and malicious attacks was proposed. In [20] the vulnerabilities in the 
substations and the related attacks were studied. In [21] the authors studied how to coordinately 
switch multiple breakers to destabilize the power grid and cause large-scale cascading failures. In 
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[22] the authors investigated the cascading failure initiated by sequentially disconnecting multiple 
substations, and an attack strategy based on the sequential attack graph was proposed. In [23] the 
joint substation-transmission line vulnerability was studied, and a component interdependency 
graph based attack strategy was proposed. 
However, the influence of the attacks on cyber-physical power grid reliability and the 
efficient defense strategies are lacking and need to be further explored. 
 
 Dissertation Objectives  
This dissertation aims to study the impact of attacks on power system reliability, including 
intruding the substations, false data injection attacks as well as coordinated attacks.  Based on the 
modeling of the attacks, different defense strategies are proposed for securing the power grid when 
an attack is anticipated. Specifically, a novel power grid operation strategy is proposed, which can 
improve the power grid robustness in case of malicious attacks. Also, a novel trilevel model is 
proposed considering uncertainties regarding the attacker’s capability, the most critical branches 
that should be defended with priority is identified. 
The major contributions of this dissertation are listed as follows. 
• Proposed a holistic power grid reliability evaluation framework considering human 
dynamics based event frequency analysis and game-theoretic modeling for different 
attack cases; 
• Developed a reliability evaluation method incorporating the false data injection attacks 
against state estimation. 
• Studied several coordinated attack scenarios, and the optimal coordination strategy is 
studied with bilevel optimization. 
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• Derived a novel power system operation strategy for improving the power system’s 
robustness against man-made attacks. 
• Developed a MAS defender-attacker-defender modeling for identifying the critical 
branches with uncertainties of the attacker’s capability. 
 
 Dissertation Organization 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 studies the occurrence 
frequency of cyber attacks against power system substations, and investigates the impacts of 
different attacks scenarios on power system reliability. Chapter 3 studies the influence of false data 
injections on power system reliability. Chapter 4 studies how different attacks can be coordinated 
to maximize the damage. Chapter 5 proposes a robust power grid operation strategy for defending 
against malicious attacks. Chapter 6 proposes a MAS defender-attacker-defender model 
considering uncertainties to identify the most critical lines. Chapter 7 summarizes the dissertation 
and discusses the future research work. 
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2. Adequacy Evaluation of Power Grids Considering 
Substation Cyber Vulnerabilities   
 Introduction 
Power system adequacy evaluation aims to assess the power system’s capability of supplying 
electric power to the customers without interruption while fulfilling the operational constraints. 
Currently in the field of power system adequacy assessment, the main focus is placed on 
investigating the influences of intermittent renewable energy resources [24] and the 
communication infrastructure failures [25]-[29]. In [25]-[27], the influence of the failure of phasor 
measurement units and their optimal placement on power system adequacy were studied. In [28]-
[29], the reliability of wide-area measurement system was investigated and approaches to improve 
the reliability were explored. However, the accurate evaluation of power system adequacy requires 
taking into consideration all possible outages and uncertainties [30]. With the wider deployment 
of information technologies, it is possible that cyber attacks will happen more frequently in the 
future. Thus, it is highly necessary to incorporate the cyber attacks induced risk into power system 
adequacy evaluation.  
This chapter aims to investigate the power system adequacy incorporating substation 
cybersecurity. This research focus is associated with quantifying the impact of malicious cyber 
attacks on the overall power supply adequacy, while most of the aforementioned reliability 
assessment studies were focused on adequacy evaluation due to hardware failures. The adequacy 
analysis incorporating cyber attacks is very different from that based on random hardware failures, 
which is thus a particularly challenging task as explained in the following. 
 First, it is required to study the occurrence frequency of the cyber attack contingencies. The 
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contingencies caused by hardware failures are considered as physical contingencies, and similarly 
the contingencies caused by malicious cyber attacks can be considered as cyber attack 
contingencies. The frequency of physical contingencies is mainly determined by the hardware’s 
physical characteristics and the influence of the environment. But the frequency of cyber attack 
contingencies is mainly determined by the behaviors of malicious attackers, which involves a 
number of uncertainties. While sophisticated methods such as those based on Poisson distribution 
and state transition have been developed to study the frequency of physical contingencies, very 
little work has been conducted to statistically study the occurrence frequency of cyber attacks over 
a long time span [31]. This is primarily due to the unavailability of historical data coupled with 
privacy concerns. In this chapter, human dynamics analysis is adopted to study the occurrence 
frequency of cyber attack contingencies. 
Second, it is essential to study the consequence of each contingency. The influence of the 
physical contingencies is determined by the function and location of the hardware and the control 
strategy of the power system operator; simply speaking, it is unilaterally determined by the 
defender. However, the influence of the cyber attack contingencies is determined by the 
attacker/defender interaction. It is an interactive process and more uncertainties are involved, such 
as the strategies, rationality and available budget resources of the agents, i.e., the attacker and the 
defender. In this study, game theory is applied to model the attacker/defender’s interactive 
behaviors, and then to investigate the influence of each cyber attack contingency.  
 
 Human Dynamics Analysis for Cyber Attacks 
In order to analyze the influence of a contributing factor of power outages on the long-term 
statistic power system adequacy, it is essential to study its occurrence pattern. Conventionally, the 
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Poisson distribution is adopted to model the failure of hardware components supported with the 
historical data. While it seems acceptable to assume that the cyber attack activities against power 
system could be simulated by Poisson distribution, many individual human activity temporal 
patterns were found to follow non-Poisson distributions, such as sending text messages, browsing 
webpages, and rating movies online [32], [33]. Similar temporal characteristics have also been 
captured in many collective social behaviors, e.g., wars and terrorism attack events [34], [35]. It is 
discovered that in these human activities the interevent intervals between two consecutive events 
are obviously not uniformly distributed. The time intervals are usually short, but there are also 
some non-negligible long intervals. By statistically analyzing the intervals τ, it is found that the 
probability 𝑃(𝜏) abides by the power law distribution: 
( )P                                                            (2.1) 
where α means the exponent, and it indicates the burstiness of the events. A larger value of the 
exponent indicates the burstiness of the event is more distributed. 
a. Time sequence of Poisson distribution process
b. Time sequence of power law distribution process  
Figure 2. 1 Comparison between Poisson and power law distributions 
A comparison between Poisson distribution and power law distribution is illustrated in Fig. 
2.1. Each vertical line in the figures represents a single event, and the mean values of the interval 
time are set to be the same. The sudden burst of a huge number of events in a short time period as 
well as inactivity within a long time period under power law distribution are more obvious than 
those in the Poisson distribution. 
This study aims to develop appropriate methods instead of Poisson distribution to simulate 
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the cyber attack occurrence pattern. However, until now very limited historical data about the 
cyber attacks targeting power grids are available to the public as the electric companies and utilities 
are concerned that the cyber attackers may take advantage of the data to increase their probability 
of launching successful cyber attacks. Also they have concerns on the loss of customers’ 
confidence on their ability to provide high quality of service if these cyber incidents were released 
to the public. In this study, some real data [36] associated with the cybersecurity accidents are 
analyzed. These data record the detailed information on significant cyber attacks that occurred 
worldwide on a daily basis. The targets of attacks include electric power systems, governmental 
agencies, military units, finance sectors, transportation infrastructure, etc.  
Since the exact occurrence moments of the attacks are missing, it is assumed that the attacks 
are randomly distributed over a day period if there are multiple attacks in a day. The occurrence 
pattern from April to September in 2012 is shown in Fig. 2.2 where each vertical line represents a 
single attack. It shows that the interval time between two successive attacks varies much. 
Sometimes multiple attacks may occur in a very short time period while there could be a long 
waiting period between two attacks.  
4/1/2012 9/30/2012  
Figure 2. 2 The occurrence pattern of the cyber attacks 
The probability and the interval time between attacks are shown in Fig. 2.3 based on the real-
world data for cyber attacks from April 2012 to June 2014. It can be observed from Fig. 2.3 that 
the probability distribution of interval time between cyber attacks in real scenarios abides by the 
power law distribution. And the exponent can be obtained as 𝛼=1.68 using the curve-fitting 
technique with regression analysis.  
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Figure 2. 3 The relationship between probability and cyber attack intervals 
It is essential to investigate the social and psychological factors which drive the human 
behaviors. In order to interpret the statistical pattern of cyber attacks and to develop a mechanism 
for analyzing the cyber attack occurrence property, a human dynamics model can be built for cyber 
attacks, similar to those developed for mail communications based on queuing process in [37] and 
web access patterns using memory model in [38]. In [39], an opinion model considering memory 
effect was built to explain the pattern of terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. Considering 
cyber attacks and terrorist attacks are both malicious attack activities to harm specific targets and 
cyber attacks initiated by the terrorists can also be seen as terrorist attacks, this study deploys the 
opinion model considering memory effect [34], [39] to model the pattern of cyber attacks against 
power system substations.  
Attacker
Social 
connection
 
Figure 2. 4 Simple illustration of the cyber attacker society 
As it is not possible to quantitatively model the complex human social network considering 
every detail, in this chapter a simplified graphical model is adopted to model cyber attacker society 
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as shown in Fig. 2.4. The nodes represent attackers and the links represent social connections 
among them. Specifically, the attacker society is represented by an L×L two-dimensional lattice 
network, and every node at the conjunction represents an attacker. For the social connection, it is 
assumed that every node has certain social connections with its four neighboring nodes.  
Just like different people have different opinions in a modern society, each individual in the 
cyber attacker society has an opinion about whether it is the right time to launch a cyber attack. At 
each moment, the individual opinion is represented by a parameter 𝜎; and 𝜎 = 1 represents the 
supporting attitude while 𝜎 = −1 represents the opposing attitude. The opinions can change with 
time, which is influenced by two major factors, namely environmental effect and memory effect, 
due to the fact people’s opinions or ideas are usually influenced by his/her own memory as well 
as others’ opinions or ideas. The environmental effect is determined by the neighboring 
individuals, and at time t the environmental effect on the individual i is calculated by [34][39]  
4
1 , , 1 , 1
1
( ) ( 1, 2,3, 4)
i t i t j t
j
U j  
 

                                                    (2.2) 
Also, the memory effect is described by [34][39] 
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                                               (2.3) 
The viewpoints of individuals can be updated as time goes on due to the influence of the 
environmental effect and the memory effect. The probability of changing ones’ opinion is 
mathematically described as follows:  
1 1 2 2 1
,
2 2 1
1
exp( exp( 0
( )
exp( 0
[ ) )]
)
i t
bU b U U
P M
b U U

   

 




                                           (2.4) 
where b1 indicates the social conformity psychology, and b2 indicates the self-affirmation 
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psychology, and M indicates the social chaotic degree.  
Following the rules shown in (2.2)-(2.4), the cyber attacker society undergoes a self-
organizing evolution. The collective opinion of the society is quantified by   
2
,,2
1
( ) , { 1,1}
1
i t
L
i t
i
m t
L


                                                  (2.5) 
Analogous to the collective decision-making mechanism in the modern society, here it is 
assumed if m is higher than a critical set point mc, the individuals in the cyber attacker society will 
reach a consensus to launch a cyber attack. 
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Figure 2. 5 The influence of social conformity psychology 
Simulations are conducted to find the associated parameters for the real cyber attack data 
mentioned before. Since the social conformity psychology factor b1 is a main factor influencing 
the power law exponent [39], specify L=10, M=2, b2=0.7, mc=0.7. And it is found when b1 is 0.7, 
by applying curve-fitting the power law exponent it is obtained as 1.68, which matches the real 
data as shown in Fig. 2.5. It can be concluded that the increase of social conformity psychology 
factor b1 leads to the increase of the power exponent α, which indicates that the cyber attacks occur 
more frequently. 
To conclude, the main characteristics of the human society are incorporated in this human 
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dynamics model, such as people, individual memory, social communication, and collective 
decision-making, etc. Although this model simplifies the cyber attacker society to some degree, it 
offers a quantitative way to statistically analyze the cyber attack occurrence pattern.  
 
 Cyber Vulnerabilities of Substations 
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Figure 2. 6 Power system cyber architecture 
A typical cyber architecture of a power system consists of control centers, SCADA network 
and substations, etc., as shown in Fig. 6. The substations and power plants are geographically 
distributed in a wide area, and they are connected with the control center. The power system 
dispatchers and operators working in control center monitors the operation statuses of field devices 
and control their operations. 
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Figure 2. 7 An illustrative attack path  
As substations are critical conjunction and control nodes in the power system network, they 
are usually well safeguarded from the malicious intrusions, and various countermeasures can be 
taken to further improve their cybersecurity level [40]. For example, firewalls and intrusion 
detection system (IDS) can be installed on the substation computers and the external gateways to 
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detect the abnormal communication packets. Antivirus software can be installed to prevent the 
malware infection and propagation. Also, the vulnerabilities and holes in the operation systems, 
software, and system configurations are scanned and fixed. Password authentication, 
communication encryption and virtual private networks (VPNs) can be used to prevent 
unauthorized access and information leakage. As human is a critical part in the closed-loop system 
for enhancing the cybersecurity, employees should be trained to become more aware of the 
cybersecurity issues and strictly follow the stipulated cybersecurity regulations and policies. 
However, despite all these efforts cyber vulnerability induced risks remain in power system cyber 
networks. By exploiting the vulnerabilities in the operating system, passwords or protocols, a cyber 
attacker may successfully intrude into the substations and a possible attack path for controlling a 
breaker is presented in Fig. 2.7 [40], [41], and various detrimental activities could be performed 
such as tripping lines and shedding loads.  
IDSs play a critical role in detecting and thwarting cyber intrusions. Generally, the 
performance gain of the IDS comes with the compromise of efficiency and it is difficult to achieve 
the high efficiency and high performance simultaneously. For example, an IDS could be capable 
of detecting malicious attacks or intrusion embedded in packet. However, continuously 
monitoring, recording and analyzing the packets consumes tremendous amounts of computational 
and storage resources, but the substation computers usually have limited memories and computing 
capabilities [42]. It is even more challenging to perform real-time monitoring and detection if the 
traffic load is heavy. And this is especially true when some faults or successful attacks occur, and 
in these cases the communication traffic between the substation and control center will increase 
tremendously, and the intensive monitoring of the traffic may cause the delay of transmitting 
critical operation commands and even incur serious consequence. And apparently, the operation 
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of firewalls has the similar dilemma. So oftentimes an IDS features different operation modes: the 
lightweight mode and comprehensive mode. In the lightweight mode, only part of the packets is 
recorded and analyzed. In the comprehensive mode, all the packets in the traffic flow are analyzed. 
While the comprehensive mode features a higher probability of detecting the attack which is useful 
when an attack is ongoing, it may slow down the normal traffic for legitimate use and cause false 
positive alarms. So the IDSs usually work in the lightweight mode. 
If a substation is under threat, in order to reinforce it the security operator could run the IDS 
of this substation in the comprehensive mode, while also enabling the IDSs in the SCADA network 
to focus on analyzing the traffic transmitted to/from the reinforced substation. Besides the IDSs, 
the security operator may remotely monitor and analyze the substation traffic, and even send staff 
to locally safeguard the substation if needed. All these actions could be taken so as to temporarily 
boost the cybersecurity level of the reinforced substation. Without loss of generality, denote the 
paud as the failure probability of a substation in the face of a cyber attack when the substation is 
not reinforced; similarly, denote pad as the failure probability of a substation in the event of attack 
when the substation is reinforced. It holds true that 0< pad < paud <1 [42]. The specific values of 
paud  and  pad should be determined based on the evaluation of the experts or obtained from statistical 
cyber attack data.  
Further, the consequence of a successful cyber attack will be quantified. The circuit breakers 
located in the substations can connect or disconnect a branch, a generator, and a load demand, etc. 
Undesired tripping or closing can directly impact the power flow, and may compromise the power 
supply reliability. The consequence will be disastrous if the attacker can take over the substation’s 
human machine interface (HMI) and send false commands to trip all the breakers in the substation.  
In this case, all the lines, generators, and loads associated with the substation will be disconnected. 
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When a substation is down, the repair process will begin to recover the substation. And after a 
certain amount of repair time, the substation will recover. This repair process has an influence on 
the specific attack consequence, which is explained as follows. 
The tripping of the substation circuit breakers can cause serious problems such as load loss, 
instability, or even complete system collapse. The specific consequence mainly depends on the 
system state at the time of the attack and the response of the system operator. Roughly, if the 
system is adequate in transmission and generation resources and the system operator responds in 
a timely manner and effective measures are taken, it is easy to prevent the system collapse. If the 
system is working in a marginal state and the system operator fails to take effective measures 
timely, the system would collapse.  
From Fig. 2.1(b) and Fig. 2.2, it can be seen that in some cases certain attacks are individual 
ones as the intervals between them are quite long. A typical example of individual attacks is shown 
in Fig. 2.8. The interevent times between the attacks are more than the repair time. Prior to the 
next attack, the failed substations have recovered. At the moment of each attack, the system is 
operating with all the substations up. Also, it can be seen from Fig. 2.1(b) and Fig. 2.2 that in some 
other cases, multiple attacks burst in a short time and the interval times between them are quite 
short. These attacks are deemed consecutive attacks. A typical example of consecutive attacks is 
shown in Fig. 2.9. It can be found that the first attack occurs when no substation is down; and the 
second attack occurs when one substation is down before the down substation is restored; and at 
the moment of the third attack, two substations are down.  
If the substation is disconnected and not recovered in time before the next attack occurs, the 
system will become increasingly vulnerable due to the loss of transmission and generation 
capacities, also the system operator will be under increasingly pressure and it is difficult for the 
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operator to prevent system collapse at the moment of next attack. In summary, the consecutive 
attacks make the power system increasingly vulnerable to collapse. If this consecutive attack 
process goes on, the system will collapse at a certain time. The system collapse has been modeled 
by different methods in different studies, such as the convergence of the power flow analysis, the 
number of buses disconnected [43]. In this study, based on [43] assume that the power grid operator 
cannot prevent the system from collapsing if 10% of the substations are down. 
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Figure 2. 8 Example of individual attacks  
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Figure 2. 9 Example of consecutive attacks 
If the system does not collapse after one or more substations are brought down, the power 
system operator will take remedial measures to minimize the load curtailment in the remaining 
system. The minimum load curtailment lm in the remaining network can be calculated by 
conducting the optimal power flow (OPF) analysis as described below: 
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where Pg is generation vector; Pc is the load vector; Pd is the load demand vector; NB is the set of 
buses that have load demand; NG is the set of buses that have generation; H is the connection matrix 
describing the relationship between branch power flow F and load/generation in the remaining 
network; Fmax is the line transmission capacity vector.  
If substation i is attacked successfully, the total load curtailment ls(i) is derived by 
( ) ( ) ( )
s d m
l i l i l i                                                       (2.12) 
where ld(i) is the load demand located in that attacked substation. 
Similarly, the load curtailment can be calculated when more substations are down. Also, if 
the system collapses, the worst-case scenario will be considered where all loads will be curtailed.  
 
 A Game-Theoretic Approach 
If the attack is launched in a time step, assume that with limited resources the attacker can 
only attack one substation because the contemporary power system is a critical infrastructure with 
enforced protection. Indeed it requires some level of intelligence and sophistication as well as 
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adequate attack resources to attack the power network. On the defender’s side, similarly assume 
that at each time step, the security operator can only choose a substation to reinforce as described 
in Chapter 2.3. Since each player needs to take into consideration the others’ actions to maximize 
its payoff, the interactive optimal decision-making process is modeled based on game-theoretic 
approaches.  
It should be noted that the attacker and defender interactions over a long period of time can 
be extremely complicated, so it is not realistic to model all these scenarios. In this study, two 
typical scenarios are modeled considering the cyber attack patterns. As shown in Fig. 2.9, the 
attack and protection interaction in this consecutive attack scenario could be a Markov process as 
the failed substation could not recover in time before the next attacks, and the next interactions 
could continue to cause the failure of other more substations. Since system collapse can bring great 
reward to the attacker, it is wise for the attacker to take into consideration the payoff of future 
attacks when making decisions in the current state, trying to cause system collapse with future 
attacks. Thus, the interactions in the sudden burst of consecutive cyber attacks should be modeled 
by a Markov game. For the individual attacks shown in Fig. 2.8, due to the recovery of the 
substations, the current attack will not coordinate with future attacks to cause system collapse, so 
a static game should be used to model the behaviors of the attacker and defender in this scenario.  
 The Markov Game 
When the cyber attacker launches multiple attacks in a time period, the interaction between 
the attacker and the defender will continue with time, and this can generate a series of states which 
describes their respective optimized strategies. This series of interactions can be modeled by a 
Markov game, whose associated parameters are defined as follows [44], [45]: 
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▪ S: Set of the game states. Each single game state is a combination of the up/down statuses of 
all the related substations. When a substation goes down due to attack, it is denoted as 0; when 
it works normally, the status is denoted as 1. For example, if a small power system has 3 
substations, the game state can be {1,1,1}, {1,1,0}, {1,0,1}, {1,0,0}, {0,1,1}, {0,1,0}, {0,0,1} 
or {0,0,0}. When the number of substations in a power grid is limited, the Markov game will 
be played in a finite state space. 
▪ A: The player’s action space. At each time step the attacker can attack one up-state substation, 
and the defender can reinforce one up-state substation. The attacker’s attack action a ∈Aa 
indicates the substation chosen to hack. For the defender, the action d ∈Ad represents the 
substation that the defender chooses to reinforce.  
▪ 𝑀𝑆(𝐴): Mixed strategy set of the action set A. Each action 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑎 or 𝑑 ∈ 𝐴𝑑  is assigned with 
a probability πa or πd with which the action a or d will be performed. For the attacker, 𝑆(𝐴𝑎) =
[𝜋𝑎,1, 𝜋𝑎,2, … , 𝜋𝑎,𝑁𝑎  ]and∑ 𝜋𝑎,𝑘
𝑁a
𝑘=1
= 1 where Na is the number of the up-state substations. 
▪ T: State transition probabilities. paud is the failure probability of an unreinforced substation 
upon attack in a time step. pad is the failure probability of a reinforced substation when being 
attacked in a time step. These probabilities are modeled in Chapter 2.4. The cyber 
attack/defense interplay associated with the down-state substations is not considered. 
The usual goal of a cyber attacker is to maximize the loss while a defender will try to minimize 
the damage. Thus, they have opposite goals and the attack/defense interaction should be modeled 
by a zero-sum game. A pair of actions {𝑎, 𝑑} in state s will result in an immediate payoff to the 
players due to the game state transitions. For the attacker, the reward is quantified as the curtailed 
load. Since the state transition exhibits probabilistic characteristics described by pad and paud, the 
immediate reward is also modeled in a probabilistic manner. An expected immediate reward of the 
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attacker is defined as 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑑)  when the attacker selects action a and defender selects action d in 
state 𝑠. The attacker’s expected immediate reward is calculated by 
( , , ) ) ( ( ) ( ))( , , ,
s ss
R s a d s l s l sT s a d

                                    (2.13) 
where s′ indicates the possible next state; 𝑇(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑑, 𝑠′),T: S×Ad×Aa×S→[0, 1] is the game state 
transition probability from s to s′ when the attacker and defender take action a and action d, 
respectively. The transition probability is computed by the corresponding probabilities paud and pad, 
based on the pair of action {𝑎, 𝑑}.  The expected immediate reward of the defender is the opposite 
number of the attacker’s expected immediate reward. 
Every state transition will make the game move to a new state in which the game will 
continue. If a following state transition happens in the new state, another immediate reward will 
be given, and the game will continue. Thus, a pair of actions {𝑎, 𝑑} taken by the players in a game 
state can also have a long-term accumulated reward besides the immediate reward [44]. An 
expected long-term reward is defined as 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑑) for the action pair {𝑎, 𝑑} in state 𝑠. Specifically, 
the attacker’s expected long-term reward for the action pair {a, d} in state s is computed as follows: 
'
( , , ) ') ( ') ( , , )( , , ,
as
Q s a d s V s R s a dT s a d                            (2.14) 
where γ is the discount factor and satisfies 0≤ γ ≤1, and a small value focuses on near-term reward 
while a large value emphasizes future long-term payoff; Va (s) is the expected optimal long-term 
reward for the action pair {𝑎, 𝑑} in state s, which is defined as follows:  
                   
( )
( ) max min ( , , )
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a a
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                                            (2.15) 
Similarly, the defender’s expected optimal long-term reward in state s is represented as 
follows:  
( )
( ) min max ( , , )
d a
d
d d
MS A a A
d A
V s Q s a d


 

                                          (2.16) 
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In zero-sum games,  𝑉𝑎(𝑠) and  𝑉𝑑(𝑠) calculated by (2.15) and (2.16) are the same, and it is 
denoted as 𝑉(𝑠) =  𝑉𝑎(𝑠) = 𝑉𝑑(𝑠). The optimal solutions computed independently by the attacker 
and the defender are the best strategies. In such Nash equilibrium, no players have the incentive to 
unilaterally change their strategies. The optimal mixed strategy obtained by (2.15) is a maxmini 
strategy considering Q which can be solved by linear programming [44]:  
( )
max ( )
aMS A
V s

                                                                         (2.17) 
s. t.   ( )( , , )
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aa A
V sQ s a d 
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a
                                                                                (2.20) 
A solution method named value iteration is adopted here to calculate the optimal Q and V as 
shown below [45]. The value iteration method is based on dynamic programming, and a maxmini 
problem is solved in each iteration as shown in step 7. 
Algorithm 2.1 Value iteration algorithm 
1: Initialize 𝑉0(𝑠) = 0 for all states 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 
2: repeat 
3:     for every 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑎, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐴𝑑, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆  
4:           update the value of 𝑄 based on (2.14) 
5:     end  
6:     for every 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆  
7:          update the value of 𝑉 based on (2.15) 
8:     end  
9: until converge 
 The Static Game 
When only considering the immediate reward in (2.13) and neglecting the future reward in 
(2.14), the game is a static game. For the attacker, it could be solved by 
( )
( ) max min ( , , )
da
a
a a
d AMS A
a A
V s R s a d




                                               (2.21) 
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Similarly, for the defender, it could be solved by  
( )
( ) min max ( , , )
d a
d
d d
MS A a A
d A
V s R s a d
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
                                              (2.22) 
For the solution of the static game, it should be noted that right after the first iteration of 
algorithm 1, the obtained mixed strategy is the optimal mixed strategy for the related static game 
without accounting for future rewards, and 𝑉(𝑠)  is the reward in state 𝑠 in static game. 
 
 Power System Adequacy Evaluation 
Successful intrusion and undesired tripping of the breakers can seriously impact the power 
system operation. If such incidents happen frequently, the overall power system adequacy would 
be inevitably degraded. The impact of man-made cyber attacks on the long-term system adequacy 
is determined by the occurrence frequency of attacks over a long period of time and the 
consequence of each attack. The frequency of cyber attacks is simulated by human dynamics. The 
consequence of each attack is influenced by the defense/attack strategies and action of the 
defender/attacker, etc., which is modeled by game theoretic studies. When a cyber attack against 
the substation succeeds, the status of the components in the substation would go down due to the 
tripping of related breakers. If the attack causes a system collapse, the whole system could be 
down. When a substation becomes down due to the cyber attack, the repair process will begin and 
it will be up again after some repair time. The repair time mainly includes the time required for 
cyber forensics and the time needed for device restart [46]. The mean time to repair after attack is 
defined as MTTRA and used in the simulation in this study.  
Two essential steps to incorporate physical failures and cyber attacks in power system 
adequacy evaluation are sampling states and evaluating the sampled states. The sampling process 
is shown in Fig. 2.10, where the top line represents the occurrence pattern of the cyber attacks 
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based on the human dynamics described in Chapter 2.2, and each arrow indicates an attack is 
launched at that time step. The sampling of the generators and lines, etc. without the cyber attack 
is performed based on the reliability modeling of these physical components as in conventional 
adequacy assessment.  
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Figure 2. 10 Sampling of the attack occurrence and the component statuses 
As shown in Fig. 2.11, the evaluation of a sampled system state is conducted considering the 
original components statuses, and the consequences of the attacks as well as the repair actions, etc. 
The consequence is determined by the attack/defense actions which are further determined by the 
attack/defense strategies. As described in Chapter 2.4, the attacker and the defender need to 
anticipate whether the attack is consecutive attack or static. The consecutive attack strategy 
modeled by the Markov game takes the future reward into consideration, while the static attack 
strategy modeled by the static game only accounts for the immediate reward. The judgment should 
be made by predicting whether sufficient amounts of attacks needed to cause system collapse will 
occur during the following repair time. For example, if the consecutive failure of three substations 
can cause a system collapse, the current attack should be judged to be consecutive attack if there 
are other two attacks in the following repair time. If there are only one or no attacks in the following 
repair time, it is not possible to cause system collapse, thus the current attack should be judged as 
individual attack. It is not an easy task for the attacker and defender to precisely predict future 
attack occurrence. These predictions could be made based on some social or political 
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considerations. 
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Figure 2. 11 Evaluation of system state 
In this study, by extending conventional adequacy evaluation procedures [47], a holistic 
power system adequacy evaluation framework for integrating substation cyber vulnerabilities is 
proposed based on human dynamics analysis, game theoretic studies and sequential Monte Carlo 
Simulation (MCS). The major steps are depicted in Fig. 2.12, which are explained in more details 
as follows. 
Step 1) Model the reliability characteristics of each physical component, including generators, 
transmission lines and loads, etc. Generate a time sequence of the status of each 
generator/line with sequential MCS. 
Step 2) Generate a time sequence of cyber attacks using the opinion model considering the 
memory effect as described in Chapter 2.2. 
Step 3) Model the cybersecurity of each substation. The cybersecurity of substations is modeled 
by paud and pad, as described in Chapter 2.3.  
Step 4) Select an initial time step. 
Step 5) For the current time step, check whether a cyber attack is sampled by examining the 
corresponding status in the time sequence of the cyber attack. If no attack is sampled, go 
to step 12. 
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Figure 2. 12 A holistic adequacy assessment framework considering cyber attacks against substations 
Step 6) The attacker determines the attack type. If there are sufficient amounts of attacks within 
the repair time, the current attack should be considered as consecutive attack; or else the 
attack should be regarded as an individual attack. The attacker needs to predict future 
attacks and could make correct or wrong judgment. 
Step 7) If the attack is judged to be consecutive, calculate the attacker’s optimal strategy by 
equations (2.13)-(2.15); if it is judged to be the individual attack, calculate the attacker’s 
optimal strategy by equations (2.13) and (2.21). The strategy can be a pure or a mixed one. 
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The attacker’s action is implemented by using a random number generator to choose the 
target substation to attack. 
Step 8) Similar to step 6, the defender makes predictions about future attacks and estimates the 
attack type. The defender could make a correct or wrong judgment.  
Step 9) If the attack is judged to be a consecutive attack, calculate the defender’s optimal strategy 
by (2.13), (2.14) and (2.16); otherwise, calculate the defender’s optimal strategy by (2.13) 
and (2.22). A random number generator is utilized to choose the defense action. 
Step 10) Check whether the attack is successful or not based on both the pair of action {𝑎, 𝑑} 
obtained in step 7 and 8 and the probabilities paud and pad. The attack can succeed with a 
probability, and thus a random number generator is used to decide consequence. If the 
attack is not successful, go to step 12, otherwise, go to the next step.  
Step 11) Update the substation states corresponding to the game state. If a substation is hacked 
down, the worst-case scenario is considered, i.e., all the breakers are assumed to be tripped. 
Since a down-state substation generally requires a time period of MTTRA to recover, the 
statuses of the components affected by the down-state substation will be down in this time 
period.  
Step 12) Evaluate the physical system state. This is accomplished by performing the DC OPF 
analysis aiming at minimizing the total load curtailment at all buses. 
Step 13) Check whether the stopping criterion is met. In the simulation, the maximum number of 
iterations is used as the stopping criterion which should be adequately large to ensure the 
convergence. 
Step 14) Select the next time step since the attack/defense and repair are sequential. 
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Step 15) Calculate the final adequacy indices. In this study, the adopted reliability indices are 
LOLP and EENS. 
 
 Case Studies 
Simulations studies are carried out on the IEEE RTS79 system [48]. The RTS79 system has 
32 generators and 38 transmission lines. The total generation capacity is 3,405 MW and the peak 
load demand is 2,850 MW. For simplicity, it is assumed that each substation is related to one bus. 
There are 24 substations in the RTS79 system. Since some substations are relatively more 
important than others, they could be the main targets for the attack/defense action. In order to 
reduce the number of Markov game states and alleviate the computing burden, the top 10 
substations are chosen as the attack/defense target substations. The computational accuracy is not 
significantly affected by this because the probabilities of attacking the relatively less important 
substations are very low, which will be shown later in Fig. 2.13. The load curtailments in the 
substation are listed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2. 1 Load curtailment caused by substation failure 
Substation number 3 6 8 9 10 13 14 15 18 19 
Load curtailment (MW) 180 136 171 175 195 265 194 317 333 181 
In this simulation, the parameters for modeling the cybersecurity of all the substations are 
chosen as follows: paud=0.15 and pad=0.1. Game payoffs are calculated based on these probabilities. 
For example, when all the substations are in the up state, the payoff matrix of the static game in 
terms of MW is shown in Table 2.2 and the payoff matrix for the Markov game is illustrated in 
Table 2.3 where γ =0.7. The discount factor γ prefers a large value as the Markov game aims at 
causing system collapse.   
Table 2. 2 Payoffs of static game when all substations are up 
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 Attacked Substation 
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3 18 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
6 27 13.6 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
8 27 20.4 17.1 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
9 27 20.4 25.7 17.5 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
10 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 19.5 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
13 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 26.5 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
14 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 19.4 47.6 49.9 27.2 
15 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 31.7 49.9 27.2 
18 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 33.3 27.2 
19 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 18.1 
 
Table 2. 3 Payoffs of Markov game when all substations are up 
 
Attacked Substation 
3 6 8 9 10 13 14 15 18 19 
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3 18 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
6 27 13.6 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
8 27 20.4 17.1 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
9 27 20.4 25.7 17.5 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
10 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 19.5 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
13 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 26.5 29.1 47.6 49.9 27.2 
14 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 19.4 47.6 49.9 27.2 
15 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 31.7 49.9 27.2 
18 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 33.3 27.2 
19 27 20.4 25.7 26.3 29.3 39.8 29.1 47.6 49.9 18.1 
The strategies of the attacker and defender under different scenarios are shown in Fig. 2.13. 
It shows that when future rewards are not considered, the main targets of the attacker are 
substations 15 and 18. When future rewards are considered, the probability of attacking substation 
13 is greatly increased, and the probability of defending substation 13 is also increased 
correspondingly. In both cases, the probabilities for attacking and defending other substations are 
very small which are thus not shown in Fig. 2.13.  
The simulation for assessing the power grid adequacy is conducted and the final outcome is 
shown in Table 2.4 where the human dynamics parameters are chosen as L=10, M=2, b1=0.7, 
b2=0.7, mc=0.7 and under these parameters, the power law exponent is the same as the real data. 
The simulation is conducted in Matlab using a laptop with 8 GB memory and four cores of 2.90 
GHz. It takes 14 minutes to finish the Monto Carlo simulation to obtain the desired reliability 
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indices. For the simulation outcomes shown in Table 2.4, assume that attacker and defenders can 
always make the right judgment about the attack type. These parameters and assumptions serve as 
the baseline of the following four types of sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 2. 13 Optimal mixed strategies for the players when all substations are up 
Table 2. 4 System adequacy comparison with and without cyber attacks 
Scenario LOLP EENS (MWh) 
Without cyber attack 0.083 1.32E+05 
With cyber attack 0.100 2.28E+05 
The results in Table 2.4 show that the LOLP and EENS increase significantly considering 
cyber attacks and it demonstrates that cyber attacks may greatly compromise the overall adequacy 
of the power system.  
 Influence of the Judgment of the Attack Type 
In the step 6 and step 8 of the adequacy assessment process in Fig. 2.12, the attacker and the 
defender need to make judgments about whether the attack type is consecutive or individual. Since 
the judgments influence the strategies and thus the attack/defense actions, its influence is studied 
and several scenarios are examined. 
Scenario 1: Both the attacker and the defender can always make the right judgments. 
Scenario 2: The attacker always makes the right judgment, but the defender always treats the 
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attack type as individual one. 
Scenario 3: Both the attacker and the defender always treat the attack as individual one. 
Scenario 4: The attacker always makes the right judgment, and the defender randomly 
chooses one up-state substation to reinforce with equal probabilities. 
Since most of the attacks are individual ones, this study do not consider the scenario when 
both the attacker and the defender always treat the attacks as consecutive ones. The system 
adequacy indices in these scenarios are shown in Fig. 2.14. 
Comparing scenarios 1 and 4, it can be seen that the defender should adopt the game-theoretic 
approach to make the informed defense strategy, or else the consequence could be disastrous. 
Comparing scenarios 1 and 2, it is indicated that if the defender fails to make the right decision, 
the misjudgment and the deployment of non-optimal strategies would lead to decreased system 
adequacy. Comparing scenarios 1 and 3, it can be seen if the attacker always makes the right 
judgment, the adequacy of the power system will be degraded.  
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Figure 2. 14 Comparison of attack type judgment 
 Influence of the Human Dynamics  
The cyber attack occurrence is checked in every time step as in step 5 of the adequacy 
assessment procedure in Fig. 2.12. The human dynamics analysis determines the cyber attack 
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occurrence pattern, which is an essential factor influencing the long-term adequacy of the power 
system. To examine the influence of human dynamics, values of the social conformity psychology 
factor b1 are varied while other factors and parameters remain unchanged. The obtained results are 
shown in Fig. 2.15. 
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Figure 2. 15 Influence of social conformity psychology on system adequacy 
It shows the LOLP and EENS indices both increase with the increase of the value of social 
conformity psychology factor b1. It indicates that if some social means such as education could be 
implemented to decrease the occurrence number of cyber attacks initiated by the attackers, the 
power grid adequacy can be maintained.  
 Influence of the Cybersecurity Parameters 
The failure probabilities of the substation paud and pad describe the cybersecurity level of the 
substations, which play a key role in power grid long-term adequacy evaluation as indicated in 
steps 7, 9 and 10 of the Fig. 2.12.  
If the initial cybersecurity levels of all substations are the same, the influence of paud and pad 
on the power system adequacy is studied as shown in Fig. 2.16 and Fig. 2.17, respectively. It 
indicates that if the cyber security level of the power system is low, the power system adequacy 
will be greatly impacted as the success probability of cyber attacks is high.  
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Usually there are multiple substations in a bulk power grid. Although they are all important 
and should be safeguarded, it is crucial to identify the most critical substations to receive the budget 
which is usually limited. Thus, it is meaningful to study the influence of the cybersecurity level of 
individual substation on the overall power system adequacy for identifying the most critical 
substations. Simulations are conducted by specifying paud=0.1, pad=0.05 for a chosen substation 
while for all other substations it remains paud=0.15 and pad=0.1. The simulation results are 
displayed in Fig. 2.18. It can be seen that the cybersecurity levels of some substations are more 
critical to the overall power system adequacy than others. If the budget is limited, these security-
critical substations should be given the priority for receiving the investment resources. 
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Figure 2. 16 Influence of paud on system adequacy 
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Figure 2. 17 Influence of pad on system adequacy 
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Figure 2. 18 Influence of individual substation cybersecurity on system adequacy 
 Influence of the Repair Time 
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Figure 2. 19 Influence of MTTRA on system adequacy 
The substation repair time have a great influence on power system adequacy as indicated in 
step 11 of Fig. 2.12. If an attacked substation is soon recovered, the failure time will be less and 
thus the power loss is decreased. The influence of MTTRA on the power grid adequacy is studied 
as shown in Fig. 2.19. It demonstrates that the increased repair time leads to the degraded power 
system adequacy. The simulation results suggest that the capability of restoring the power system 
after a successful cyber attack should be enhanced through developing appropriate investment 
plans. 
 
 Conclusions  
The chapter was focused on proposing a holistic power system adequacy evaluation 
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framework to incorporate the impact of substation cyber vulnerabilities into the conventional 
power system adequacy evaluation framework. To this end, two essential studies were conducted: 
the statistical occurrence patterns of the cyber attacks were analyzed based on historical 
cybersecurity data and human dynamics analysis; the consequence brought about by the cyber 
attacks was analyzed based on game-theoretic studies, i.e., Markov game for consecutive attacks 
and static game for individual attacks. In the proposed adequacy evaluation framework for cyber-
physical power systems, the incidents caused by random physical failures and man-made cyber 
attacks were considered simultaneously. Simulation studies were conducted based on a 
representative IEEE reliability test system, and the influences of critical factors and parameters 
were analyzed. The results showed that substation cybersecurity risks should not be ignored in 
power system planning and operations.  
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3. Power System Reliability Evaluation Considering 
Load Redistribution Attacks 
 Introduction 
The reliable operation of the power system relies on not only the working status of the current-
carrying elements (such as generators, lines, transformers, buses), but also the state awareness of 
the power grid. The operator needs to be aware of the power system’s status, so that they can 
dispatch the power, and response to contingencies. The state estimation plays a key role in ensuring 
the status awareness. When measurements are sent to the control center, the state estimator will 
estimate the state of the power grid based on those measurement. 
In the past, if the cyber attacks on the measurements are not considered, the state estimation 
is usually reliable and can be trusted. However, the cyber vulnerability in the power grid is a big 
concern nowadays [49]. And it is found that by attacking multiple measurements in a coordinated 
manner, the attacker can manipulate the state estimation results. This attack is named false data 
injection attack [50]. Further, the load redistribution attack model [51] is proposed, which is more 
practical, as the generator measurements are not attacked. 
If such attacks against the state estimation becomes frequent in the future, it is possible that 
the long-term power grid reliability is severely impaired, thus, it is critical to include the load 
redistribution attacks into the power grid reliability evaluation. 
 
 Intrusion Process Modeling for MITM Attack Against State 
Estimation 
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 Attacks against Power System State Estimation 
If the attacker aims to change the outcome of the state estimation, he/she needs to manipulate 
the measurement inputs of the state estimator. Practically speaking, the attacker can alter the 
measurements in the following ways by: compromising the voltage or current meters in 
substations; attacking the remote terminal units in the substations; tampering with the 
heterogeneous SCADA network; and intruding into the control center. The meters, RTUs, SCADA 
network and EMS are where the measurements are generated, collected, transmitted and received, 
respectively. Attacking the meters or RTUs can be achieved by both physical or cyber approaches, 
but it demands compromising numerous measurements located in various substations in a 
coordinated manner to successfully alter the outcome of state estimation. This is because the 
measurement inputs of the state estimator feature redundancy and inconsistency could be detected. 
The control center is usually well safeguarded, and it is very difficult to intrude into the control 
center. The SCADA network is widely distributed over a wide area, and there can be multiple 
vulnerabilities in the system configuration and in the protocols. Thus, it is relatively more practical 
for the attacker to tamper with the measurements in their transmission process despite it is still 
difficult and requires tremendous skill and effort. 
An attack tree is illustrated in Fig. 3. 1, which consists of attacks against the substations, the 
hierarchical SCADA network and the control center. These combinations can result in a successful 
false data injection attack against state estimation. Specifically, in order to attack the SCADA 
network, three possible attack procedures should be performed by exploiting various 
vulnerabilities in devices and networks. The attacker needs to intrude into a node in the SCADA 
network, and gain the trust of the substations and the control center. In addition, if the 
communication is encrypted, cracking the encryption is needed. 
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Figure 3. 1 Attack tree for the state estimation 
 Attack against Non-encrypted SCADA Network 
The principle of altering the measurements in the transmission process can be described as 
shown in Fig. 3. 2. 
SCADA
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Figure 3. 2 Illustration of the attack 
Generally, the attack against the measurements in the cyber-physical power grid involves 
three major steps/phases, which are described as follows: 
(1) First, the attacker gains the privilege to get the access to a communication host in the 
SCADA network and installs malicious intrusion tools on it. The target host should be a critical 
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host that the transmitted measurements need to travel through, or the attacker needs to poison the 
route table to reroute the traffic. Multiple methods are available for the attacker to gain the 
privilege and control the target host, such as exploiting the vulnerabilities in the target host, 
cracking the password, or stealing the password via social engineering.  
(2) Next, the attacker gains the trust of the substations. While the substations send 
communication request to the control center, the attacker in the SCADA network keeps monitoring 
the network traffic and waits for the information sent from the substations to the control center. 
The trust can be gained by spoofing the IP address of the control center and replying fake DNS 
response to the substations. After the victim host gains the trust of the substations, the connection 
between the substation and the victim host can be established.   
(3) In order to gain the trust of the control center, the attacker establishes the connection 
between the victim host and the communication server in the control center. This can be 
accomplished by sending the fabricated certificate of the victim host to the control center. After 
completing these steps, the communication between the control center and substations can be 
monitored and maliciously modified by the attacker.  
As described above, the intrusion process consists of a series of consequential fundamental 
attack phases. The attack will not be successful until all the fundamental attack phases are 
successful. At each attack phase, the attacker needs to exploit the vulnerabilities in the SCADA 
network to improve its privilege. After a successful attack phase the system will transit to a new 
state. The power system cyber layer is protected by the cyber security countermeasures such as 
firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs). At each attack phase, if the vulnerabilities are 
detected and patched before the attacker can discover and exploit these vulnerabilities, the attack 
phase will not be successful and the system will return to the secure condition; or it will proceed 
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to the next attack phase. This attack/defense process repeats until the system state reaches one of 
the two specific states: secure state or failure state. For gaining a better understanding, the 
interaction in the intrusion process is modeled by two competing agents, the attack agent and the 
detection agent with the opposite goals. The attack agent refers to the attacker and it aims to 
compromise the state estimation outcome. The detection agent includes the comprehensive 
behaviors of the firewall, IDS and security operator and it tries to detect the attack and protect the 
system.  
G S1 S2 F
P1 P2 P3
1-P1
1-P2
1-P3  
Figure 3. 3 Semi-Markov model for attack against non-encrypted SCADA 
The semi-Markov process (SMP) model is widely used to model various stochastic intrusion 
processes [52]-[54]. An SMP is an extension of the conventional Markov process, and they share 
some similarities as they are both represented by a set of states and the associated transition 
probabilities between the states. The SMP significantly differs from the Markov process, as the 
sojourn time spent on each state, the occurrence of the state transition, and the transition 
probabilities do not need to be fixed, but can follow a probability density function [55]. Thus, the 
SMP is capable of generalizing various kinds of stochastic processes and modeling the stochastic 
process with non-exponential distributions for the state transition probabilities. 
The state transition is described by an SMP in Fig. 3.3.  As seen from Fig. 3.3, three major 
steps are required to accomplish a successful false data injection attack, which correspond to 
attacking the communication host, gaining trust for the substations and gaining trust of the control 
center, respectively.  
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By making the failure state the absorbing state [56], the time required to reach the absorbing 
state can be calculated, which is denoted as the mean time to attack (MTTA). Initially the system 
is in the secure state 𝐺 in which no attack phase is successful. The attacker needs to succeed in three 
successive steps to finally execute a successful false data injection. Depending upon the success of 
each step, the system will transit to a new state. If the attacker succeeds in step 1, the system will 
transit to state S1, and the success probability of step 1 is P1. Similarly, after step 2 is successfully 
executed, the system will transit to state S2, and the associated success probability of step 2 is P2. 
After the successful step 3, the whole attack is accomplished, and the system will move to state F. 
Thus, state F is an absorbing state which indicates the end of all the attack steps. All the other steps 
are transient states as in case the attackers fail in the step, the attack steps will restart from state G. 
In summary, in the model shown in Fig. 3.3, the failure state F is the absorbing state while all other 
states {G, S1, S2} are transient states. The resultant transition probability U can be described as the 
following general form: 
𝑈 = [
𝑄 𝐵
0 𝐼
]                                                                 (3.1) 
where submatrix Q is the transition probabilities within the transient states, and submatrix B is the 
transition probabilities from transient states to absorbing states [53]. Matrix Q is given by    
                                                                𝐺             𝑆1       𝑆2     
                   𝑄 =
𝐺
𝑆1
𝑆2
[
1 − 𝑃1 𝑃1 0
1 − 𝑃2 0 𝑃2
1 − 𝑃3 0 0
]                                                     (3.2) 
 Attack against Encrypted SCADA Network 
If the communication between the substations and the control center adopts some more secure 
protocols such as secure DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol) and IEC 61850 standards, the 
difficulty for the attacker will greatly increase. However, secured communication protocols may 
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still be compromised. Absolute security cannot be ensured for the communication between the 
substations and the control center using cryptographic signatures and passwords in the 
communication protocols. This is because vulnerabilities exist in protocols, public and private keys 
management, as well as in the cryptographic software and algorithms [57].  
Two specific examples are provided here. For example, a secure DNP3 protocol [58] termed 
DNPsec can be used to improve the security of DNP3. It adopts multiple authentication and 
encryption algorithms such as Triple Data Encryption Standard (3-DES), and keyed-Hash Message 
Authentication Code with Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). However, 3-DES and SHA-1 are seen 
as outdated and insecure algorithms [59]-[60]. If the encryption is cracked, the communication 
would become vulnerable [61]. In [62], it is experimentally verified that the deployment of 
encrypted channels and authentication methods including secured DNP is vulnerable if the master 
device is infected by malwares. Further, for instance, a number of attack schemes have been 
designed targeting encryption algorithms of the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) network, such as cipher-text-only attack on GSM encryption algorithm A5/2.  A few 
milliseconds are needed to interpret the encrypted information by the attack on A5/2, and the 
encryption key used for error correction can be recovered in one second.  By using the encryption 
attacks, the attacker could eavesdrop the communication between the mobile station and the 
network as well as insert and modify data. The false base station is embedded into a GSM network, 
and the attacker intercepts and modifies the transmitted information among the channels. As the 
attacker is able to keep the fake station connected to destination networks by broadcasting the 
network number, the fake base station can be used to resend the identity information received from 
the mobile station. With the encryption attacks such as A5/2 attack, the attacker is able to disable 
the encryption between the fake station and the targeted network as well as the encryption between 
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the mobile station and the fake station [63].  
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Figure 3. 4 Semi-Markov model for attack against encrypted SCADA 
The vulnerabilities in the encryption have been widely studied. In [64], a practical encryption 
attack which targets the cryptographic protocol is presented. The cryptographic protocol can be 
cracked within about 150 minutes with the successful rate more than 95%. Even if more advanced 
cryptographic protocols are proposed and used in encrypted communications, various 
vulnerabilities are being identified and encrypted information could be interpreted and modified 
[65]. There can be several cryptographic vulnerabilities in the secure sockets layer (SSL) in the 
SCADA communication, such as weaknesses in the generation and seeding of the random number 
and cipher weaknesses.  Theoretically, it is possible for the attacker to pass the MAC authentication 
adopted by the control center and RTUs in an SSL exchange. The attacker needs to successfully 
modify the handshake messages. The SSL can be compromised by intercepting the real key and 
substituting it with a false key during the key exchange sessions. Also, similar to other applications, 
SSL is vulnerable to viruses and worms. A typical example is the Slapper Worm [66].  
In summary, as vulnerabilities exist in the encryption, the SCADA network using the secure 
protocols or encryption can still be compromised. The influence of the secure protocols is mainly 
represented by the increase of number of steps during attacks. Due to the encryption, the attacker 
needs to spend extra effort in cracking the encryption. The attack steps are shown in Fig. 3.4 and 
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explained as follows: 
(1) The attacker intrudes into the SCADA network and compromises a host of the network. 
After this step, the attacker will be able to intercept the measurements which are being sent from 
the measurements to the control center. 
(2) The attacker needs to make effort to crack the encryption. For example, the attacker can 
use the deciphering tool to obtain the plaintext of the transmitted information.  
(3) The attacker pretends to be the control center when communicating with the substations. 
After gaining the trust, the attacker drops the measurements which are sent from the substations. 
(4) The attacker pretends to be the substations when communicating with the control center. 
After gaining the trust of the control center, the attacker could fabricate fake measurements and 
send them to the control center.  
                                                      𝐺              𝑆1      𝑆2     𝑆3       
𝑄 =
𝐺
𝑆1
𝑆2
𝑆3
[
 1 − 𝑃1 𝑃1 0  0
1 − 𝑃2 0 𝑃2 0
1 − 𝑃3
1 − 𝑃4
0
0
0
0
𝑃3
0
]                                                      (3.3) 
Steps 1, 3 and 4 in the above procedure correspond to steps 1, 2 and 3 in the procedure 
discussed in Chapter 3.2, and step 2 is related to the effort made for cracking the encryption. While 
it is not trivial to accomplish this step, an advanced, intelligent attacker could crack the encryption. 
Similar to equation (3.2), the transition probabilities in this case are obtained based on Fig. 3.4, as 
represented by equation (3.3). 
 Calculation of MTTA 
This chapter is focused on analyzing the power system reliability incorporating false data 
injection attacks. A key factor is to model the occurrence of the attacks, or the time interval between 
successful attacks. It is critical to model the overall time required to reach the final failure state, as 
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in the transient states no fake measurements can be sent to the control center. To quantify the 
security of the SCADA system, the MTTA is applied to model the mean time required to go from 
the secure state to the failure state. The MTTA refers to the statistical value of the time and it 
statistically analyze the behavior of multiple attackers and defenders within a long range of time 
while the specific time of each attack may vary. 
It is obvious that at each attack phase, the attack agent needs to spend a certain amount of time 
to obtain a new privilege. On the other side, the detection agent also needs to spend some time to 
detect the intrusion. In this study, the attack/defense time is modeled by nonnegative variables 
following a reasonable distribution. Let Xi denote the attack time needed for the attack agent to 
succeed in the i-th fundamental intrusion phase and it is assumed that Xi is a random variable 
uniformly distributed over the corresponding interval. It is described as  𝑋𝑖~𝑈[𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥, ] where 
𝑇a,i
min  and 𝑇a,i
max  are the lower and upper bounds for the attack time of the i-th attack phase, 
respectively [53].  And the density function of the attack time for the i-th attack phase is represented 
by: 
𝑓(𝑋𝑖) = {
1
𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛           𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑋𝑖 < 𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
0                                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                     (3.4) 
Similarly, let Yi denote the detection time needed for the detection agent to detect the attack 
action at the i-th attack phase. Yi is also described by a uniform distribution time interval, and this 
defense time interval should be appropriately chosen to represent the interaction between the attack 
agent and the detection agent. It is obvious that there is a nonzero probability that the detection 
agent can detect the attack before the attack phase is finished. To represent this idea, the detection 
time is represented as 𝑌i~𝑈[𝑇d,i
min, 𝑇a,i
max]. In this study, it is regarded that 0 ≤ 𝑇d,i
min < 𝑇a,i
min <
 𝑇a,i
max < +∞. At each fundamental attack phase, if the attack action is detected before it is finished, 
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the system state will return to the security state. The successful detection probability of the i-th 
attack phase could be represented as 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 < 𝑋𝑖), calculated as 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 < 𝑋𝑖) = ∫ 𝑃(
𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑌𝑖 < 𝑋𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡)𝑓(𝑋𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡)𝑑𝑡 =
𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥+𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛−2×𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛
2×(𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛)
               (3.5) 
For all the transient states, the sojourn time at each state is denoted as 𝑍𝑖 = min {𝑌𝑖, 𝑋𝑖} . The 
mean sojourn time at each state is denoted as 𝑆𝑖 and it is calculated as [53]: 
𝑆𝑖 = ∫ (1 − 𝑃(
𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑍𝑖 ≤ 𝑡))𝑑𝑡 = ∫ 𝑃(
𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 min {𝑌𝑖, 𝑋𝑖}  ≥ 𝑡)𝑑 =  
     
−(𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛)2+2(𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2+3(𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛)2+2𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥−6𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
6(𝑇𝑎,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑇𝑑,𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛)
                     (3.6) 
The MTTA from the initial secure state to the final failure state can be calculated as in [54]: 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐴 = ∑ 𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑖                                                            (3.7) 
where Vi is the expected number of times that the system is in transient state i before the system 
finally reaches the absorbing failure state and it could be calculated as [53], [54]: 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 + ∑ 𝑉𝑗𝑗 𝑄𝑗𝑖,                                                           (3.8) 
where  𝑞𝑖 indicates the probability that the SMP begins from state i. In the study, the initial state is 
the secure state G. 
The SMP model is applied to model the intrusion process, identify the transient and absorbing 
states, and finally calculate the MTTA. This study applies the uniform distribution to statistically 
model the dynamic transition probability over a time period. One might argue that the recovery 
from the failure state to the secure state as well as the development and adoption of the patches 
could be effective in preventing the next attack, which will thus affect the value of MTTA. It is true 
that a single action of recovery/patching could probably somehow increase the cybersecurity of the 
cyber network, but its influence on the final outcome of MTTA should be carefully examined. The 
MTTA is a statistical average value which models the security of the target SCADA network when 
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facing multiple trials of attacks. Its value is mainly associated with the overall cybersecurity of the 
cyber network. The influence of a single vulnerability could be rather limited. Usually there are 
multiple vulnerabilities associated with the target, also the new vulnerabilities are continuously 
being discovered.  
It should be noted that if some significant actions are taken to improve the cybersecurity (e.g., 
installing advanced intrusion detection systems, adopting the sophisticated encryption, or 
significantly upgrading the SCADA network), the semi-Markov process model or its parameters 
should be updated and thus the MTTA value could be updated accordingly. For example, when the 
encryption is enforced, the attack model should be extended from the three-step procedure to the 
four-step procedure, which will eventually influence the final outcome of MTTA.   
Obviously, the system will be in the failure state for a certain period of cyber forensic time 
until the attack is detected by the detection agent and the system will return to the secure state. 
Currently there is no real data available to estimate the detection time in the failure state. In this 
study, without loss of generality, the mean time to detect is denoted as MTTD. Considering the 
intrusion process and the detection time in the failure state, over a long period of time the attack 
probability that the cyber system is in the failure state can be calculated as: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 =
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐷+𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐴
                                                    (3.9) 
This probability can be used in the sampling of the occurrence probability of attacks when 
performing the power system reliability evaluation based on the Monte Carlo simulation method. 
 
 Regional Load Redistribution Attack Model 
The conventional LR attack model requires attacking measurement from all substations [67]. 
In practice, the power system dispatch operators are usually well trained and have rich experiences. 
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And measurements modification caused by the false data injection attack could be unknowingly 
incorporated into the training simulator environment to train the operators [68]. And when the LR 
attack passes the bad data detection, the power system operators might suspect the outcome of 
state estimation based on their experience and take actions to verify and cross-check the 
measurements, such as by reconfirming the measurements with the cyber traffic rerouted, or 
contacting the field personnel [68]. The field personnel can check the measurements locally at the 
substation and compare them with those received by the control center. If the cross-checked 
substation is included in the attack strategy, the attack would be detected and the fabricated 
measurements would be ignored. Thus, this kind of cross-checking actions could effectively detect 
the measurement modification if the attacker alters the measurements in all the substations.  Thus, 
it is reasonable and meaningful for an attacker to restrict the attack region to avoid detection which 
leads to a smaller amount of load curtailment. In addition, it is noted that cross-checking the 
measurements comes with the extra time and effort, and it is inefficient to heavily rely on it to 
detect the false date injection. Also, the number of the substations and their locations should be 
appropriately chosen and it is unrealistic to cross-check a large number of substations dispersed in 
a wide area. 
The regional LR attack can be mathematically modeled as follows [69], [70], [71]: 
                         max ∑ 𝑆𝑙
∗
𝑙                                                               (3.10) 
s.t.                                          ∑ ∆𝐿𝑙,𝑎 = 0𝑙                                                             (3.11) 
∆𝑃𝐹𝑎 + 𝑆𝐹𝑎 ∙ 𝐾𝐿𝑎 ∙ ∆𝐿𝑎 = 0                                                   (3.12) 
|∆𝐿𝑙,𝑎| ≤ 𝜏𝐿𝑙,𝑎                                                     (3.13) 
   𝐵𝑎∆𝜃𝑎 + 𝐾𝐿𝑎 ∙ ∆𝐿𝑎=0                                                       (3.14) 
  ∆𝜃𝑖 − ∆𝜃𝑗 = 0     ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛                     (3.15) 
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{𝑆∗} = min ∑ 𝑆𝑙𝑙                                                          (3.16) 
s.t.                     ∑ 𝑃𝑔 − ∑ (𝐿𝑙 − 𝑆𝑙)𝑙𝑔 = 0                                                      (3.17) 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝐾𝑃 ∙ 𝑃 + 𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝐾𝐿 ∙ (∆𝐿 + 𝐿 − 𝑆) = 0                    (3.18) 
|𝑃𝐹𝑏| ≤ 𝑃𝐹𝑏
𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                        (3.19) 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                     (3.20) 
−∆𝐿𝑙 ≤ 𝑆𝑙 − ∆𝐿𝑙 ≤ 𝐿𝑙                                                (3.21) 
where 𝑆𝑙  is the load loss at bus l; L is the load demand; ∆𝐿 is the attack on the load demand 
measurements; 𝑃𝐹 is the power flow; ∆𝑃𝐹𝑎 is the power flow change in the attack region a; ∆𝜃𝑖 
and  ∆𝜃𝑗 are voltage angles on the attack region boundary; 𝜏 is a ratio; 𝑆𝐹𝑎, 𝐾𝐿𝑎,  𝐵𝑎 and  𝐾𝑃 are 
coefficient matrixes; 𝑃𝑔 is the generation; 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 are generation limits. 
The optimization problem (3.10)-(3.21) is a bilevel problem, where (3.10)-(3.15) is for the 
upper-level attacker and (3.16)-(3.21) are for the lower-level operator. 
Regional LR attacks have a decreased probability of being detected, and this risk can be 
quantified as follows. Denote 𝑛𝐴 as the number of substations in the attack region, and 𝑛𝑇 as the 
total number of substations in the whole power system. If the power system operator chooses one 
substation to cross-check the measurements, the probability of detecting the LR attack can be 
calculated by  
𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝑇
                                                             (3.22) 
 
 Power System Reliability Modeling 
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The main steps of the non-sequential MCS method for assessing the power system reliability 
considering LR attack proposed in this study are depicted in Fig. 3.5 [47]. The basic procedures 
can be illustrated as follows. 
2. Model the MITM intrusion process and the MTTD
3. Randomly select a physical system state
6. Attack exists?
5. Evaluate the system state and get the remaining load demand
12. Update the system reliability indices
13. Stopping criteria satisfied ?
14. Calculate final reliability indices
Yes
1. Model physical components’ reliability
7. Choose an attack region
No
Yes
No
Yes
4. Physical contingency  exists ?
No
8. Operator responses?
9. Choose an substation to cross-check
11. Calculate the consequence of LR attack
10. Detection succeeds ?
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure 3. 5 Flowchart for power grid reliability assessment considering LR attacks 
Step 1) Model the reliability of the main physical components, including each generator, line and 
load demand by the reliability parameters such as mean time to repair (MTTR) and mean 
time to failure (MTTF). This step is well established in the conventional reliability 
evaluation. 
Step 2) Model the intrusion process based on the SMP, and get the MTTA and the MTTD. 
Step 3) Randomly choose a physical system state based on non-sequential MCS. 
Step 4) Check whether there is any physical failure. If not, go to step 6; or go to the next step. 
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Step 5) Evaluate the system state based on OPF. There may be some load curtailments due to the 
physical failures. After this step, the system state load curtailment caused by physical 
failures could be obtained and the remaining load demand is used as the input parameters 
for the possible LR attack. 
Step 6) Check whether there is an LR attack sampled using MCS as illustrated in (3.23). 
        𝑓𝑎 = {
0  𝑟𝑎 ≤ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
1  𝑟𝑎 > 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
                                                       (3.23) 
where ra is a random number derived from [0, 1]. If the value of fa is zero, it indicates that 
an LR attack exists and the program proceeds to the next step; otherwise it entails that there 
is no LR attack and the program goes to step 12. 
Step 7) Choose an attack region. In this study, the attack region should be of appropriate size and 
the size is measured by the number of branches in the attack region. The size of the attack 
region should not be too small so that it is possible to cause load curtailment. 
Step 8) Check whether the operator responds. If the operator suspects the measurements received 
in the control center, the measurements in a certain substation will be cross-checked; 
otherwise the program goes to step 11. Since it depends on the operator’s experience on 
whether cross-checking should be performed, the operator’s experience is modeled by a 
response probability pc and the higher value of pc indicates that the operator is more 
experienced. A random number rc is generated from [0, 1] and if rc≤ pc, the operator will 
respond; otherwise he/she will not respond. 
Step 9) Choose the substation to cross-check. It is assumed that only one substation will be cross-
checked due to the limited number of staff and time available. The substation should be 
chosen based on some reasonable strategies to increase the detection probability. 
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Step 10) Check whether the attack is detected. If the cross-checked substation is included in the 
attack region, the measurement manipulation in this time step will be found and thus the 
power system dispatch in this time step is not affected.  
Step 11) Determine the consequence of the LR attack. 
Step 12) Update the reliability index based on the load curtailment obtained both in steps 5 and 
11. 
Step 13) If the stopping criterion is not satisfied, go to step 3. In this study, the 3% coefficient of 
variation of the EENS is chosen as the stopping criterion.   
Step 14) Calculate the desired system reliability indices. 
 
 Case Studies and Simulation Results 
In this chapter, the case study is conducted based on IEEE RTS79 system [48]. The 
transmission capacity of each line is adjusted to 60% of its original value to more clearly illustrate 
the idea proposed in this study. The simulation is based on MATLAB programming. 
 MTTA of the Attack 
As discussed, the intrusion process is modeled by the SMP and it could be specified by the 
distribution of the sojourn time in each state transition. While the appropriate values of the sojourn 
times should be obtained from real statistical data, currently there is little data available. The 
accurate assessment of MTTA is particularly challenging because of the limited historical data 
available. Generally, experts require less time than novices to accomplish an attack step. In this 
case study, the range of time values varies from several hours to a few days, and the lower and 
upper bounds correspond to the time quantities needed by the experts and the novices, respectively. 
These values match the estimation in [72]. In real practices, for each SCADA system, the 
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operations, events, incidents and intrusion traces are recorded by log files, which are accessible to 
the security managers. Also, the honeypot can aid in collecting the intrusion data. The log files and 
the honeypot data can be the evidence for cyber forensics. With these data, the specific time 
associated with the attack and detection can be statistically analyzed. The realistic values can be 
obtained based on the statistical methods like those discussed in [31], [73]. 
Some example values associated with the sojourn times are given in Table 3.1 for illustrating 
the idea proposed in this study. 
Table 3. 1 Example time intervals for non-encrypted SCADA 
State Transitions 𝑇𝑑
𝑚𝑖𝑛(h) 𝑇𝑎
𝑚𝑖𝑛(h) 𝑇𝑎
𝑚𝑎𝑥(h) 
G to S1 2 20 50 
S1 to S2 2 12 30 
S2 to F 2 15 40 
 Based on the values in Table 3.1, the MTTA can be calculated as 795 hours. To demonstrate 
how the attack times might influence the MTTA, the value of 𝑇a
min in Table 3.1 is changed by 
multiplying a factor 𝛽 and the results are shown in Fig. 3.6. It shows that the increase of the attack 
time in the attack phases leads to an increased MTTA.  
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Figure 3. 6 The influence of attack time in the attack phases 
Table 3. 2 Example time intervals for encrypted SCADA 
State Transitions 𝑇𝑑
𝑚𝑖𝑛(h) 𝑇𝑎
𝑚𝑖𝑛(h) 𝑇𝑎
𝑚𝑎𝑥(h) 
G to S1 2 20 50 
S1 to S2 2 15 50 
S2 to S3 2 12 30 
S3 to F 2 15 40 
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If the communication is encrypted, the required number of steps will increase from three to 
four. If the parameters associated with each step are given as in Table 3.2, the calculated MTTA 
is 2,409 h. In this case, the MTTA is significantly larger than that when the encryption is not 
enforced. This outcome clearly demonstrates that the encryption can greatly increase the expected 
time to accomplish a successful false data injection attack.  
 Regional Load Redistribution Attack 
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Figure 3. 7 Regional load redistribution attack schemes with IEEE RTS79 system 
Fig. 3.7 depicts examples about how a regional LR attack can be constructed. The attacker 
can choose one region as the local attack region, such as the region 1. For example, the region 1 
consists of buses 6, 10, 11, 12, and 13. However, buses 6, 10, 11, 12, and 13 are all connected with 
the non-attack region. So the buses 6, 10, 11, 12 and 13 are all boundary buses in attack region 1. 
The detailed consequence of these attack regions is shown in Table 3.3. From this table, it can be 
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seen when the attacker chooses different attack regions there can be different amounts of load 
curtailment at different bus locations, and they have different probabilities of being detected. 
Table 3. 3 Examples of regional LR attacks 
Attack region Probability of being detected 
Curtailment  
(MW) 
Curtailment 
Location 
Region 1 0.208 30.61 Bus 6 
Region 2 0.375 61.98 Bus 14 
Region 3 0.583 73.12 Bus 6 and 14 
Region 4 0.750 122.67 Bus 3, 6 and 14 
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Figure 3. 8 Regional attack results 
Further, the load curtailment and the risk associated with the attack region is statistically 
analyzed as shown in Fig. 3.7. About 2,000 attack regions are randomly sampled. For each of the 
sampled attack region, the load curtailment is calculated based on (3.22)-(3.33), the probability of 
detection is obtained based on (3.34). These attack regions are grouped according to the number 
of substations in the attack region, and the average load curtailment for each group is calculated 
as shown in the top subgraph of Fig. 3.7. Also, the probability of detection of each group is 
obtained as shown in the bottom subgraph of Fig. 3.7. 
From the results shown in Fig. 3.7, it is found that the average load curtailment increases 
when the number of substations in the attack region increases. This is because the increased 
number of attacked substations provides a larger room for the attacker to compromise the state 
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estimation outcome. However, the increased number of the attacked substations comes with a 
higher probability of being detected. Hence, there is a compromise between the load curtailment 
and the risk of being detected when the attacker chooses the attack region. As a result, it is 
reasonable for the attacker to randomly choose an attack region without the knowledge about the 
cross-check strategy. 
 Reliability Modeling of Power System 
Based on the intrusion modeling and the analysis of the LR attack, the power system 
reliability evaluation considering the LR attacks is calculated. The basic parameters of the 
intrusion are shown in Tables 3.1 and Table 3.2, and the MTTD is chosen as 9 hours.  
If no cross-checking is performed, the attacker will launch the complete LR attack and the 
attack region will be the whole network. By comparing scenarios 1 and 2, it is shown that the 
influence of LR attack on the overall power system reliability is not negligible. By comparing 
scenarios 2 and 3, the influence of β is demonstrated. As the decrease of β entails less time spent 
on the attack phases, the result shows the attacker’s capability can have great influence on the 
overall power system reliability. The EENS value in scenario 4 is less than that in scenario 2, 
indicating that the encryption can greatly contribute to maintaining the power system reliability. 
Table 3. 4 Reliability evaluation with complete LR attack 
Scenario number Encryption 𝛽 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑇𝑀 EENS(MWh) 
1 No No attack 0 1.970e5 
2 No 1 0.011 2.241e5 
3 No 0.5 0.026 2.640e5 
4 Yes 1 0.004 2.069e5 
If the cross-checking is performed, it is reasonable for the attacker to launch regional LR 
attack. In this study, the attack region is randomly selected. The cross-checking probability is 
described by pc and two cross-check strategies are considered. In the random strategy, one 
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substation is randomly selected for cross-check. In the selective strategy, a substation is randomly 
selected among the top 5 substations with the highest load demands. The results are shown in Table 
3.5.  
Table 3. 5 Reliability evaluation with regional LR attack 
Scenario number 𝛽 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑇𝑀 pc Cross-check strategy EENS (MWh) 
5 1 0.011 0.3 Random 2.081e5 
6 0.5 0.026 0.3 Random 2.111e5 
7 1 0.011 0.5 Random 2.036e5 
8 1 0.011 0.7 Random 1.975e5 
9 1 0.011 0.3 Selective 1.974e5 
 By comparing scenarios 5 and 6 in Table 3.5 and scenarios 2 and 3 in Table 3.4, it is 
concluded that the cross-check can improve the power system reliability as less non-optimal power 
dispatches are performed. Be comparing the scenarios 5, 7 and 8, it is shown that the increased 
cross-check can help maintain the power system reliability, which indicates the more experienced 
and better trained operators are essential to maintain the power system reliability. By comparing 
scenarios 5 and 9, it can be found that the power system reliability can be improved if a more 
effective cross-check strategy is adopted. 
In the above analysis, the influence of various factors is examined, including β, cross-check 
probability pc, and cross-check strategy. Based on the obtained results, the defense strategy against 
LR attacks can be derived accordingly. Generally, the defense methods against LR attacks can be 
divided into two categories. The first category of methods attempts to reduce the probability of the 
successful injection of false data, based on techniques for increasing the number of steps required 
to compromise the final objective (e.g. encryption), decreasing the detection time required for each 
step, increasing the time of attack for each step, among many others. The second category of 
methods aims to detect the false data injection if the false data injection is successful, based on 
techniques for increasing the cross-check success probability, optimizing the selection of 
substations for cross-check, and so forth. It should be noted that defense methods come with extra 
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costs, such as capital investment to encrypt the communication, installing advanced intrusion 
detection software, or human resources needed for performing the cross-check task. The 
quantitative methods proposed in this chapter and the associated outcomes could provide some 
useful insights for aiding in the judicious allocation of limited budget.  
 
 Conclusions  
In this study, the malicious attack against the state estimation was modeled by SMP 
considering the major intrusion phases and the associated attack/detection time in each attack 
phase. A practical regional LR attack model was proposed to avoid the cross-check detection. 
Based on the attack model and the LR attack model, a holistic power system reliability evaluation 
framework for incorporating the LR attack was proposed based on Monte Carlo simulation. The 
simulation was conducted based on the IEEE RTS79 system and the influences of various factors 
were investigated, including the attack time in the attack phases, the cross-check probability and 
cross-check strategy.  
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4. Coordinated Attacks on Electric Power Systems in a 
Cyber-Physical Environment 
 Introduction 
Most previous research work was focused on standalone attacks, which studied how to choose 
multiple components of same kind in a certain attack scenario in order to maximize the loss. It is 
possible that the intelligent attacker may coordinate different attacking mechanisms and different 
targets of attacks in order to launch a successful cyberattack or to maximize the resultant damage. 
Indeed, the coordination between different attacking mechanisms and different targets was well 
demonstrated in the 2015 Ukrainian power grid attack. Spear-phishing emails with malware were 
used to gain the initial access; the breakers were tripped to isolate several substations; malware 
was used to destroy files in the workstation to delay the restoration; and DoS attack was launched 
against phone calls to deny customers’ blackout information. In this cyberattack, the attacker 
coordinated malware, tripping of switches, DoS attack at different stages of the attack, and it alerts 
the researchers and industrial practitioners to pay more attentions to the coordination between 
different attack scenarios. 
While the majority of existing work studied the optimal selection of possible targets of attack 
in a coordinated manner, this chapter focuses on the coordination between different attack 
scenarios. To facilitate the readers to better understanding this chapter, the schematic overview of 
the whole chapter is shown in Fig. 4.1. 
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Analysis of real attacks in the power system and motivation of studying the coordinated attacks
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elements
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DDoS attacks
3. Attacking current-carrying elements coordinating 
with false data injection attack
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Mathematical modeling
1. LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Generators
2. LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Lines
Detailed analysis of 
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coordinating with false data injection attack
Simulation results
1. LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Generators
2. LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Lines
Conclusions
 
Figure 4. 1 Schematic overview of the chapter 
 
 Power System Vulnerabilities and Coordinated Attacks 
 Analysis of Attacks against Power Systems 
The modern smart grid can be viewed as a cyber-physical human-in-the-loop system. The 
physical part, cyber part and human part are responsible for energy transmission, monitoring and 
control, and decision-making, respectively. And they are interconnected and the secure operation 
of the power grid requires the normal working of each indispensable part. The failure or 
malfunction in any part can negatively affect the power grid, or even possibly cause a catastrophic 
consequence.  
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Figure 4. 2 Attacks against electric power systems 
The power system as a critical infrastructure can be a valuable target for the attackers in war, 
terrorism and sabotage activities. While the power system could be directly attacked by physical 
means, it has been reported that the power system communication network is under constant 
cyberattacks. The power system associated personnel, especially those who are depressed or 
dissatisfied, can also intentionally or unintentionally leak critical information, or even be forced to 
take some detrimental actions. In Fig. 4.2, the attacks related to the security of power systems are 
depicted. The attacks are classified into three types: physical attack, cyberattack and human attack 
as the smart grid is a cyber-physical interconnected complex network controlled by the operators. 
The attack through or against the power system personnel was termed the “human attack”. 
Cyberattacks are classified into the attacks against the availability, integrity and confidentiality 
which are the basic requirements of a general cyber network. An attack against the availability can 
cause the loss of control of the local devices or a delayed response. An attack against the integrity 
can compromise the data and information communication in the cyber network, which can severely 
affect the normal operation of the power grid. An attack against the confidentiality can cause the 
leakage of critical information. While all the cyberattacks have negative impacts on the power 
grid, the attack against integrity would be relatively more severe. Thus, it is further divided into 
the attack against the measurements and the attack against the commands. For each attack type, 
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several specific examples are provided. It is worth noting that with the development of the smart 
grid it is quite possible that new attack methods will be endlessly developed in the coming future.  
The attacks can affect the security of the power grid in different ways.  Some attacks can 
proactively affect the working status of the current-carrying devices in the field, such as tripping 
a line by a bomb or sending fabricated control commands to the generator. Some attacks can 
mislead the power dispatch decision-making; for example, the cyberattacker can manipulate a set 
of the measurements to change the state estimation outcome and mislead the operator to make non-
optimal or even wrong dispatch decisions. Some attacks can cause the loss of control of the local 
device or control systems; for example, the attacker can infect an IED with a virus and make the 
related device unresponsive to commands; distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack can also be 
used to block the communication and cause the delay of operation commands sent to local devices 
or the measurements sent to the control center. The goal of some attacks may not be to directly 
influence the operation of the power grid, but to acquire critical information. This is also highly 
harmful as the information can be used for aiding future attacks, such as bypassing the intrusion 
detection, cracking the password, gaining the desired control privilege or designing optimal attack 
plan, etc. 
 Power System Operation and Coordinated Attacks 
The secure operation of the power grid needs to abide by several requirements, mainly 
including the normal operation of the current-carrying devices; the accurate and timely 
transmission of the measurements and alarms; sufficient situation awareness, wise decision-
making and quick response of the operator; the prompt implementation of genuine control actions; 
the correct setting and operation of the automatic control and protection devices; etc. These 
requirements are especially demanding in case of disturbances, failures or attacks.  
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The operation of the power system and how it could be affected by various kinds of attacks 
are shown in Fig. 4.3. The failures of the current-carrying devices; the absence, delay or 
manipulation of the measurements and commands transmitted in the supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) network; the wrong decision-making or late response of the operator; or the 
alteration of the setting of the automatic control and protection devices can all potentially result in 
power system economic loss, load curtailment or equipment damage. Because N-1 or even N-2 
security standards are implemented, the cyber-physical power grid has a certain inherent amount 
of resiliency in withstanding attacks or failures, therefore the possibility of suffering great losses 
is not guaranteed in cases of standalone attacks. However, if multiple parts or functions are 
attacked in coordination, the possibility of great losses would be massively increased. Thus, it is 
quite possible that a well-informed attacker can launch coordinated attacks to efficiently maximize 
damage. Several possible coordinated attack scenarios are introduced and discussed below. 
Actual power grid 
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Perceived power 
system state
SCADA network
Control decision-
making
SCADA network
Control actions 
implementation
False data injection 
attacks
Human attacks
Sending fabricated 
commands 
Physical attacks
Viruses 
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Commands
 
Figure 4. 3 Power system operation and attacks 
 (1) Simultaneously tripping multiple current-carrying elements 
A power system usually has sufficient transmission and generation capacities and the tripping 
of one line/generator will probably not result in great power failure. However, if multiple elements 
are tripped simultaneously either by a physical, cyber or human attack, great failures can easily 
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occur. This is a common plan of coordinated attacks, two examples of which are provided in Figs. 
4 and 5. 
As shown in Fig. 4.4, if an intelligent attacker chooses multiple critical lines and attacks them 
simultaneously, the sudden loss of multiple lines can cause massive power loss.  
Actual power system 
state
Physical  attacks 
against multiple lines 
Severe failure
 
Figure 4. 4 Coordinated physical attacks against lines 
If a cyberattacker intrudes into multiple substations and gains the desired control privilege, 
the attacker is able to trip the components directly connected to these attacked substations. This 
intrusion can cause a serious disturbance on the power system and lead to great failures as shown 
in Fig. 4.5. 
SCADA network
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multiple substations 
Severe failure
 
Figure 4. 5 Coordinated cyberattacks against substations 
 (2) Attacking current-carrying elements coordinated with DDoS attacks 
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Figure 4. 6 Physically tripping a line coordinating with DDoS attack 
When the physical system is disrupted, the operators’ prompt and thoughtful response is 
critical for preventing further failures. If the operators fail to take remedial actions in a timely 
manner, great failures can happen, such as the 2003 northeast blackout [74]. So an attacker can 
launch coordinated attacks to disrupt the physical system while simultaneously delaying the 
response of the operators. A representative example of this kind of coordination is physically 
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tripping a line together with a DDoS attack as shown in Fig. 4.6. When the physical operation is 
disrupted after the line is tripped, the attacker can launch a DDoS attack to delay or disrupt the 
measurements sent to the control center. This can lead to a delay in the remedial action decision 
and its implementation. Such delays may result in cascading failures. 
(3) Attacking current-carrying elements coordinating with false data injection attack 
Actual power system 
state
Cyberattack against a 
generator
SCADA network
False data injection 
attack
Operator’s non-optimal 
power dispatch
 
Figure 4. 7 Cyberattack against a generator coordinating with false data injection attack 
A failure in the physical system requires the system operator to take reasonable remedial 
actions to decrease the loss. If a failure or attack happens, and the operator takes non-optimal or 
even wrong actions, unnecessary loss can happen. Thus, the attacker can coordinate attacks to 
disrupt the physical system and mislead the power dispatch of the operator. An example of this 
kind of coordinated attacks is shown in Fig. 4.7. The attacker can disconnect a generator to disrupt 
the power grid operation and launch false data injection attack to mislead the power dispatch in 
coordination. By this way, unnecessary loss or even great failure can occur. 
(4) Attacking current-carrying elements coordinating with attacking the automatic device’s 
setting 
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Figure 4. 8 Faulting a line coordinating with changing the relay’s setting 
 65 
 
When a major physical element fails because of either physical attack or cyberattack, it can 
cause disturbance to other parts of the system. To limit the disturbance, the automatic devices need 
to react promptly; otherwise, more affected elements may fail. For example, if a line is grounded, 
the breaker at each end of the line needs to operate to trip the faulted line. If they fail to operate, 
more related parts may fail and this can easily cause greater failures. Thus, an attacker can 
coordinate the attacks to fault the physical element and disable its related automatic devices. An 
example of this kind of coordinated attacks is described in Fig. 4.8. The attacker can intrude into 
the SCADA network and change the setting of a relay and later launch a physical attack against its 
related line (e.g. connecting it to ground) and thus the breaker will not operate when the fault 
happens. In this case, the lines, generators and loads connected to the faulted line will be tripped 
and this could cause cascading failures. 
(5) Decreasing security margin coordinating with disrupting the physical system 
SCADA network
False data injection 
attack
 Wrong  dispatch and 
inadequate security margin 
SCADA network
Fabricated line tripping 
command
Line trippingCascading failure
 
Figure 4. 9 False data injection attack coordinating with tripping a line 
In power system operations, the operator needs to make wise operation decisions aided by 
various decision-making tools. Usually the power dispatch strategy should allow adequate security 
margin and stability margin [75]. If the power dispatch strategy is deliberately misled by false data 
injection attack or the operator is threatened, the power system state after the dispatch can be very 
vulnerable. The attacker can launch other attacks to directly disrupt the physical system, due to the 
limited security margin, and system instability can happen and cause a great blackout. A possible 
scenario of this kind of coordinated attacks is shown in Fig. 4.9. 
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 Principle of Coordinated Attacks 
In Chapter 4.2, multiple coordinated attack scenarios are proposed and discussed. Since it is 
difficult to mathematically model all these coordinated attack scenarios in detail in a single study, 
this chapter is focused on analyzing the coordination scenario 3 to demonstrate the potential 
damaging effects and limitations of the coordinated attacks.  
The false data injection attack modeling indicated that by manipulating well-selected 
measurements the attacker could purposely alter the final outcome of the state estimation without 
being detected [50]. While there are multiple different specific models [16] for the false data 
injection attack, the LR attack is chosen as a representative example in this study. 
The basic principles of an LR attack are described as follows [51]: 
∑ ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 = 0                                                                    (4.1) 
∆𝑃𝐹 = −𝑆𝐹 × 𝐾𝐷 × ∆𝑃𝐷                                                                       (4.2) 
−𝜏𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ≤ ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝑃𝐷,𝑖                                                                (4.3) 
where ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 is the attack on the ith load demand measurement; 𝑁𝐷 is the number of load demands; 
∆𝑃𝐹  is the attack on the line power flow measurements; 𝑆𝐹  is the shifting factor matrix 
determined by the topology and parameters of the transmission network; 𝐾𝐷 is the bus-load 
incidence matrix determined by the positions of the load demands; 𝑃𝐷,𝑖  is the ith actual load 
demand; 𝜏 is a factor indicating the limit on attack magnitude of the load demand measurements.  
The mathematical modeling of an LR attack can be described by a bilevel model as shown in 
Fig. 4.10 [67]. 
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Figure 4. 10 Bilevel modeling for the LR attack 
As a type of practical cyberattacks, an LR attack could possibly cause power loss by 
misleading the power system operators. Besides the LR attack, the power system is vulnerable to 
various attacks in both cyber and physical domains, such as shooting a generator or transmission 
line which can result in the tripping of the element. If the power grid is disrupted and the power 
dispatch is misled in coordination, the consequence might be more severe. To effectively protect 
the cyber-physical grid, it is meaningful to study how an LR attack could coordinate with other 
disruptive attacks against the current-carrying elements. This can be generally described by a 
bilevel model shown in Fig. 4.11, and it is explained as follows.  
The attacker aims to maximize the load curtailment though coordinated attacks while the 
defender aims to minimize it. Thus, the attacker needs to take the defender’s remedial actions into 
consideration when making the optimal attack plans. At the upper level the attacker tries to 
determine the measurement attack vector and current-carrying elements to be attacked. The attack 
strategy aims at achieving the maximum load curtailment under the attack constraints. At the lower 
level, the defender takes corrective actions to minimize the loss after the attacks. And the defender 
could be modeled by the optimal power flow (OPF) analysis. 
System operator: Minimize loss
s.t. Misled OPF analysis 
        with tripped elements
    Attacker: Maximize power grid loss 
       s.t. Attack constraints
Load 
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Figure 4. 11 A bilevel model for the coordination of LR attack and other attacks 
This framework can be applied to various kinds of specific cyber and physical attacks 
coordinating with an LR attack. For the attacks to trip physical current-carrying elements, different 
attack cyber or physical mechanisms can be adopted. For instance, the cyberattack methods for 
tripping a generator include infecting the generator control computer with a virus; gaining control 
privileges and sending a tripping command to the generator; and attacking the database to alter 
configurations and settings of the related protective devices. Similar methods can also be applied 
to trip transmission lines. The physical attack methods for disrupting a line/generator include 
various vandalism and terrorism activities such as shooting and explosion, etc.  
While both cyber and physical attack methods can be applied to trip generators and lines, 
generally it is relatively easier to trip a line than a generator by a physical attack, so this study 
considers cyberattacks against generators and physical attacks against lines.  
 
 LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Generators 
The attacker could first launch an LR attack. If the LR attack is successful, the power system 
operator will develop a wrong understanding of the load demands at the load points.  Then the 
attacker could trip certain generators. If the LR attack and the attack against generators are well 
coordinated, the operator’s remedial action after the attacks will be based on the false load demand 
measurements. The mathematical model for an LR attack coordinating with cyberattacks against 
generators is illustrated in the bilevel model below. 
max {∑ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖
∗𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 }                                                                      (4.4) 
subject to: 
∑ ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 = 0                                                                  (4.5) 
∆𝑃𝐹 = −𝑆𝐹 × 𝐾𝐷 × ∆𝑃𝐷                                                            (4.6) 
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−𝜏𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ≤ ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝑃𝐷,𝑖   ∀𝑖                                                         (4.7) 
∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 = 0 ↔ 𝜂𝐷,𝑖 = 0     𝜂𝐷,𝑖 ∈ {0,1}  ∀𝑖                                           (4.8) 
∆𝑃𝐹,𝑗 = 0 ↔ 𝜂𝐹,𝑗 = 0     𝜂𝐹,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}  ∀𝑗                                           (4.9) 
∑ 𝐶𝐷,𝑖 𝜂𝐷,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 + 2 × ∑ 𝐶𝐹,𝑖𝜂𝐹,𝑗
𝑁𝐹
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝐶𝐺,𝑘(1 − 𝜈𝐺,𝑘)
𝑁𝐺
𝑘=1 ≤ 𝑅𝑐   ∀𝜈𝐺,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}           (4.10) 
𝑃𝐶
∗ = arg {min ∑ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 }                                                        (4.11) 
subject to: 
∑ 𝑃𝐺,𝑘 = ∑ (𝑃𝐷,𝑖−𝑃𝐶,𝑖)
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1
𝑁𝐺
𝑘=1                                                    (4.12) 
𝑃𝐹 = 𝑆𝐹 × 𝐾𝑃 × 𝑃𝐺 − 𝑆𝐹 × 𝐾𝐷 × (𝑃𝐷 + ∆𝑃𝐷 − 𝑃𝐶)                                   (4.13) 
−𝑃𝐹,𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝐹,𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝐹,𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑗                                                       (4.14) 
𝜈𝐺,𝑘 × 𝑃𝐺,𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝐺,𝑘 ≤ 𝜈𝐺,𝑘 × 𝑃𝐺,𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑘                                             (4.15) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖 ≤ 𝑃𝐷,𝑖 + ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖  ∀𝑖                                                      (4.16) 
where the binary parameter 𝜂𝐷,𝑖 indicates the ith load demand measurement is attacked if it equals 
1; the binary parameter 𝜂𝐹,𝑗 indicates the jth line power flow measurement is attacked if it equals 
1; the binary parameter 𝜈𝐺,𝑘 indicates the kth generator is attacked if it equals 0; 𝑁𝐹 and 𝑁𝐺  are the 
number of transmission lines and the number of generators, respectively; 𝐶𝐷, 𝐶𝐹 and 𝐶𝐺 denote the 
cost required to attack the load demand measurements, the power flow measurements and the 
generators, respectively; 𝑅𝑐 is the cyberattack resource that the attacker has.  𝑃𝐷, 𝑃𝐶 , 𝑃𝐹 and 𝑃𝐺  
are the actual load demands, load curtailments, line power flows and generator active power 
outputs, respectively; and 𝐾𝑃 is the bus-generator incidence matrix. 
The attacker’s goal is to maximize the total load curtailment as described in (4.4) under the 
constraints (4.5)-(4.10). Constraints (4.5)-(4.7) are the basic constraints of an LR attack. 
Constraints (4.8)-(4.10) ensure that the attacks are within the attack resource limitation of the 
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attacker. Similar to the work in [76], constraint (4.10) uses dimensionless attack resource and 
attack cost to model the attacker’s capacity and the difficulty to attack a target, respectively.  If the 
attack resource owned by the attacker is greater than the total attack cost needed to compromise 
the selected targets, these targets will be successfully attacked. 
The defender aims to minimize the load curtailment as shown in (4.11) under the constraints 
(4.12)-(4.16). And the corrective action of the defender is described by DC OPF analysis. 
Constraint (4.12) ensures the power balance in the whole power system. Constraints (4.13) and 
(4.14) describe the line power flow limitation under the LR attack. Constraint (4.15) restricts the 
generation outputs. Constraint (4.16) indicates the load curtailment limitations.   
The actions of the attacker and the defender in this coordinated attack scenario are illustrated 
in Fig. 4.12. The attacker needs to develop the optimal attack strategy by solving the optimization 
problem represented by (4.4)-(4.16), which considers the optimal response of the defender. Then 
based on the obtained optimal attack strategy, the attacker first manipulates the measurements in 
a coordinated manner to pass the bad data detection mechanism of the state estimation, and thus 
the power system operator is misled to trust the manipulated load demand measurements. Then 
the attacker trips the generators and causes disturbance in the power system. The power system 
operator takes remedial actions trying to minimize the load demand. As the power re-dispatch 
strategy is developed based on the manipulated load demand measurements, some load demands 
may have to be curtailed. 
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2. The attacker solves the problem formulation (4.4)-(4.16), and 
obtains the measurements and generators to be attacked.
1. The cyber attacker intrudes into the target network and gains the 
desired privileges
6. The power system operator conducts the optimal power re-dispatch 
based on the results obtained from problem formulation (4.11)-(4.16)
5. The generator are tripped based on the obtained optimal attack 
strategy.
3. Based on obtained optimal attack strategy, the measurements are 
manipulated and sent to the state estimation. 
4. The power system operator is misled to trust the manipulated load 
demand measurements.
 
Figure 4. 12 Illustration of the LR attack coordinating with attacking generators 
 
 LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Lines 
Besides the generation capacity, the transmission capacity is also a critical factor in 
maintaining the power system reliability. Similar to the coordination in Chapter 4.4, the attacker 
could first launch an LR attack to mislead the operator about the load demands and then physically 
trip one or more lines. The attacker needs to carefully choose the measurement attack vector and 
target lines to maximize the damage. The mathematical model for an LR attack coordinating with 
attack against lines is shown as follows. 
max {∑ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖
∗𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 }                                                       (4.17) 
subject to: 
∑ ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 = 0                                                                    (4.18) 
∆𝑃𝐹 = −𝑆𝐹 × 𝐾𝐷 × ∆𝑃𝐷                                                          (4.19) 
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−𝜏𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ≤ ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ∀𝑖                                                        (4.20) 
∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 = 0 ↔ 𝜂𝐷,𝑖 = 0     𝜂𝐷,𝑖 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖                                          (4.21) 
∆𝑃𝐹,𝑗 = 0 ↔ 𝜂𝐹,𝑗 = 0     𝜂𝐹,𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑗                                          (4.22) 
∑ 𝐶𝐷,𝑖 × 𝜂𝐷,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 + 2 × ∑ 𝐶𝐹,𝑗 × 𝜂𝐹,𝑗
𝑁𝐹
𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑅𝑐                                       (4.23) 
∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑃,𝑗(1 − 𝜈𝐹,𝑗
𝑁𝐹
𝑗=1 ) ≤ 𝑅𝑝  ∀𝜈𝐹,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}                                        (4.24) 
𝑃𝐶
∗ = arg {min ∑ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖
𝑁𝐷
𝑖=1 }                                                       (4.25) 
subject to: 
𝑃𝐹,𝑗 = 𝜈𝐹,𝑗 ×
1
𝑥𝐹,𝑗
∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑗𝛿𝑛
𝑁𝐵
𝑛=1  ∀𝑗                                                (4.26) 
∑ 𝑃𝐺,𝑘𝑘∈𝐽𝑛 − ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑗  𝑃𝐹,𝑗
𝑁𝐹
𝑗=1 + 𝑃𝐶,𝑛 = 𝑃𝐷,𝑛 + ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑛∀𝑛                                 (4.27) 
−𝑃𝐹,𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝐹,𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝐹,𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ∀𝑗                                                         (4.28) 
𝑃𝐺,𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝐺,𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝐺,𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ∀𝑘                                                        (4.29) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖 ≤ 𝑃𝐷,𝑖 + ∆𝑃𝐷,𝑖 ∀𝑖                                                      (4.30) 
where the binary 𝜈𝐹,𝑗 indicates the jth line is attacked if it is equal to 0; 𝐶𝐹𝑃,𝑗 indicates the physical 
attack cost required to attack line j; 𝑅𝑝 is the attacker’s physical attack resource while 𝑅𝑐 is the 
cyberattack resource; 𝑥𝐹,𝑗 is the reactance of the line j; 𝛿𝑛 is the voltage phase angle (rad) of bus 
n; 𝐽𝑛 is the set of generators in bus n; 𝑁𝐵 is the number of buses;  𝐴𝑛𝑗 equals 1 if the power flow 
of line j is defined from bus n to another bus, and it equals 0 if it is from another bus to bus n. 
The attacker’s strategy is described in (4.17)-(4.24), and constraints (4.21)-(4.23) ensure that 
the cyberattack resource limitation is satisfied and constraint (4.24) ensures that the physical attack 
resource limitation is met. The defender’s strategy to minimize the load curtailment is described 
in (4.25)-(4.30). The line power flow is shown in (4.26) and the attack on lines is incorporated 
[77]. Constraint (4.27) represents the power input-output balance relationship at each bus. And the 
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limitations on the power flows, generator outputs and load curtailments are shown in (4.28), (4.29) 
and (4.30), respectively. 
The actions of the attacker and the defender in this coordinated attack scenario are illustrated 
in Fig. 4.13.  
2. The attacker solves the problem formulation (4.17)-(4.30), and 
obtains the measurements and lines to be attacked.
1. The cyber attacker intrudes into the target network and gains the 
desired privileges
6. The power system operator conducts the optimal power re-dispatch 
based on the results obtained from problem formulation (4.25)-(4.30)
5. The lines are tripped based on the obtained optimal attack strategy.
3. Based on obtained optimal attack strategy, the measurements are 
manipulated and sent to the state estimation. 
4. The power system operator is misled to trust the manipulated load 
demand measurements.
 
Figure 4. 13 Illustration of the LR attack coordinating with attacking lines 
Currently there are very few commercial solvers which can directly solve a bilevel 
optimization problem. To solve the bilevel optimization problems for obtaining the attacker’s 
optimal strategy, some transformation is needed, and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)-based 
method is applied in this study. The lower level problem represents the defender’s response to the 
attack, it is linear and convex, thus its duality problem and the Lagrange multipliers can be 
obtained. So for an LR attack coordinating with attacks against lines/generators, the original 
bilevel problem can be transformed to an equivalent mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) 
problem. In this study, the obtained MILP problem is finally solved by the CPLEX solver [78]. 
 
 Case Studies  
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In this study, the case studies are performed based on a modified IEEE 14-bus system. There 
are 20 lines in the test system. The capacity of the line from bus 1 to bus 2 is 160 MVA, the 
capacity of the line from bus 2 to bus 3 is 100 MVA, and the capacities of all other lines are 60 
MVA. Other parameters associated with the test system can be found in [79]. It is assumed that 
the power grid is fully measured and there is a power flow measurement at each end of every 
transmission line, and there is a load demand measurement at each load point. So there are a total 
of 51 attackable measurements. 
 LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Generators 
Generally, the more important a generator is, the stronger the corresponding protection is and 
thus the higher the required attack cost will be. Considering this, the attack costs for the generators 
are assigned in proportion to their generation capacities as shown in Table 4.1.  And the attack cost 
required to compromise each measurement is 1.  
If the attack magnitude limit on the load measurement is 50%, and the total cyberattack 
resource is 35, after solving the bilevel optimization problem described by (4.4)-(4.16), the attacker 
would launch an LR attack to shift the load from bus 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 to bus 4 which is already 
heavily loaded, and generator 4 would be attacked as shown in Fig. 4.14. And the system’s total 
load curtailment is 7.52 MW which is on bus 4. Although the attacker could spend all the attack 
resource to trip both generators 5 and 6, the total load curtailment in this case would be 5.15 MW, 
which is less than that caused by coordinating LR attack and tripping generators. This validates 
the speculation that coordinated attacks could be more effective than a standalone attack. 
Table 4. 1 Parameters of Generations 
Generator 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bus 1 1 2 3 6 8 
𝑃𝐺
𝑚𝑖𝑛(MW) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑃𝐺
𝑚𝑎𝑥(MW) 100 100 50 30 50 20 
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Figure 4. 14 Example of LR attack coordinating with attacking generators 
When the attack resource is 50, the attacker’s optimal strategy is to attack generators 4, 5 and 
6. And no attack resource is spent on launching an LR attack. After tripping these two generators, 
the load curtailments are 7.2 MW, 4.6 MW and 14.9 MW on buses 5, 9 and 14, respectively.  
Table 4. 2 Comparisons of different attack strategies 
Cyberattack resource Attack strategy Load curtailment (MW) 
35 
Coordinated attack 7.52 
LR attack 0 
Generator attack 5.15 
45 
Coordinated attack 22.1 
LR attack 2.4 
Generator attack 7.1 
55 
Coordinated attack 28.6 
LR attack 3.1 
Generator attack 26.4 
In order to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed coordinated attack strategy, it is 
compared with two pure attack strategies, i.e., LR attack and generator attack. The comparison 
results are provided in Table 4.2. For cases where the cyberattack resource is 35, 45 and 55, the 
load curtailment for each attack strategy is calculated. It is shown that in these conditions the load 
curtailment for the coordinated attack strategy is always the maximal, which proves that 
coordinated attack strategy is more effective than the LR attack and generator attack. 
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The sensitivity analysis for the cyberattack resource is performed to investigate the 
contribution of the LR attack as shown in Fig. 4.15. Besides the load curtailment, it also indicates 
whether the attacker’s optimal strategy is based on only attacking generators or the combination 
of attacking both generators and measurements. It is shown that when the attack resource is too 
small, no load curtailment will be caused as the power grid has certain redundancies to resist the 
weak attacks. With the increase of attack resource, the attacker could maximize the load 
curtailment, possibly by attacking only generators, or by attacking both generators and 
measurements. When the attack resource is high enough, attacking the measurements would not 
be considered in developing the optimal attack strategy. This is because although attacking 
generators is more costly, generally it is more effective than the LR attack - thus the attack against 
generators receives a higher priority. With enough attack resource, the generation capacity will be 
significantly reduced, which can cause a large amount of load curtailment. With great generation 
removing and load curtailment, the power flow on the lines will drop to the level which is far 
below the line transmission capacity. This makes it ineffective to launch an LR attack. 
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Figure 4. 15 Sensitivity analysis for the cyberattack resource 
It is obvious that the load measurement attack magnitude limit 𝜏 has a significant influence 
on the LR attack’s performance. The increase of 𝜏 will allow the attacker to have more space to 
manipulate the load measurements, which may result in more severe damage. Thus it can be 
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regarded as a parameter indicating the defense level of power system. The influence of 𝜏 on the 
power system reliability is illustrated in Fig. 4.16. It can be seen that in general the increase of 𝜏 
will facilitate the attacker to bring more load curtailment to the power grid. If the power system 
operator makes efforts to detect the abnormal load changes, the reliability of power system will be 
somehow increased in the event of coordinated attacks. Detection of load measurement attacks 
could be accomplished by comparing the loads with historical data and deploying secured load 
measurement units, etc. 
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Figure 4. 16 Influence of load measurement attack magnitude limit τ 
Table 4. 3 Influence of the security factor 
Security factor Load curtailment (MW) 
1.0 22.1 
1.1 10.5 
1.2 7.5 
1.3 5.2 
1.4 4.3 
As shown in Equation (4.10), a target of attack is associated with certain cost. The cost 
represents the difficulty of attacking that target, and more specifically it is related to the security 
level of the target. The security of the target can be improved by several approaches, such as 
conducting intrusion testing to reduce the vulnerabilities, i.e., the attack cost is improved. The 
security factor 𝜑 is introduced for analyzing the influence of the intrusion testing, and the original 
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attack costs are updated by multiplying 𝜑, which indicates that more cost is needed to attack a 
target with the intrusion testing conducted. And a more thorough intrusion test can lead to 
increased attack cost. In order to test the influence of intrusion testing, a sensitivity study is 
conducted regarding the security factor when the cyberattack resource is 45. For different values 
of the security factor, the load curtailments are calculated, and the results are shown in Table 4.3. 
It clearly shows that the load curtailment decreases rapidly with the increase of the security factor. 
It indicates the intrusion test can contribute to mitigating the consequence of attack. 
 LR Attack Coordinating with Attacking Lines 
In this part, case study is performed to illustrate the optimal strategy to coordinate LR attack 
and the attack against lines. By solving the bilevel optimization problem described by (4.17)-
(4.30), the optimal attack strategy is shown in Fig. 4.17. The associated parameters are as follows: 
the cyber and physical attack resource of the attacker is 25 and 1, respectively; the attack cost 
required to compromise each line is 1; 𝜏 is set as 50%. 
Fig. 4.17 shows that the attacker could launch an LR attack to shift the loads from buses 2, 6 
and 9 to buses 3 and 4. And in this case the line from bus 5 to bus 4 would be easily overloaded in 
the perceived state estimation. Besides the LR attack, the line from bus 1 to bus 2 will be physically 
tripped as it is the major transmission line to transfer the generation from the high-capacity 
generators located in bus 1. By tripping that line the transmission capacity is greatly reduced. The 
detailed load curtailments for the coordinated attacks are presented in Table 4.4. In order to 
demonstrate the effect of coordinated attacks, the load curtailment results are also shown in Table 
4.4 if only the line is attacked. By comparison, it is concluded that if the attacker sabotages certain 
critical lines to reduce the transmission capacity as well as manipulates the measurements to 
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mislead the operator to make uninformed power dispatch, the combined results could be more 
severe. 
Table 4. 4 Load curtailment comparison for different attack strategies 
 Bus 
number 
Coordinated 
attacks 
Only attacking 
the line 
Load 
loss 
on bus 
(MW) 
2 0 4.5 
3 5.4 13.5 
4 0 10.1 
5 0 0.2 
6 0 2.2 
9 20.7 6.2 
10 9.0 3.0 
11 3.5 1.5 
12 0 1.6 
13 0 2.8 
14 14.9 3.7 
Total load 
curtailment (MW) 
53.5 49.3 
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Figure 4. 17 Example of LR attack coordinating with tripping a line with cyberattack resource of 25 
Another case study is conducted when the attacker has cyberattack resource of 45 and 
physical attack resource of 1; it means the attacker can attack 45 measurements and trip 1 
transmission line at maximum. The coordinated attack strategy is calculated and shown in Fig. 
4.18, and it can result in 59.6 MW load curtailment. In order to demonstrate the advantages of the 
proposed coordinated attack strategy, it is compared with alternative attack strategies as shown in 
Table 4.5. From Table 4.5, it can be seen that if the attacks are not coordinated, the attacker with 
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the cyber resource of 45 and physical resource of 1 can maximally cause 51.7 MW load loss, which 
combines the loss caused by LR attack and the loss caused by line attack. That is obviously lower 
than in the coordinated attack strategy, and this proves that the coordinated attack strategy can 
result in more severe consequence. 
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Figure 4. 18 Example of LR attack coordinating with tripping a line with cyberattack resource of 45 
Table 4. 5 Comparison with different attack strategies 
Resource Attack strategy Load curtailment (MW) 
Cyber resource 45 and  
physical resource 1 
Coordinated attack 59.6 
Cyber resource 45 LR attack 2.4 
Physical resource 1 Line attack 49.3 
For the computation time and scalability of the proposed method, it is found that it takes about 
1 minute to solve the problem in the IEEE 14-bus system using a PC with four 2.9 GHz cores and 
8 GB memory. As can be seen in (4.4)-(4.16), and (4.17)-(4.30), the proposed coordinated attack 
strategy consisting LR attack and generator/line attack is first formulated as a bilevel problem. The 
bilevel problem can be transformed into a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem. 
The computation time is mainly spent on solving this MILP problem. With the increase of the size 
of the system, the size of this MILP program increases correspondingly, thus the computation time 
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will also increase. If the system size is very large, the computation speed may need to be improved 
for quickly identifying the attacker’s optimal attack strategy. The following efforts can be made: 
 (1) Improving the solution method for the bilevel problem. There are various ways to solve 
the bilevel problem, if the method for solving the bilevel problem is improved, the computation 
time can be reduced. Some papers have devoted to increase the computation speed, such as [80] 
(2) Deploying advanced computation platform. If the problem is solved using some high-
performance computation platforms, such as cloud computing, less computation time is needed. 
 
 Conclusions 
In this study, the cyber-physical security of the modern power grid was analyzed from the 
cyber, physical and human aspects. Based on the working principle of the power system, the 
representative coordinated attack scenarios were analyzed. A general bilevel framework was 
proposed to study the coordination between LR attack and other disruptive attacks. Two specific 
attack scenarios were investigated in detail: the coordination between LR attack and cyberattack 
against generators; the coordination between LR attack and physical attack against lines. The case 
studies were conducted on a representative IEEE 14-bus system and they showed that by attacking 
the critical generation or transmission elements and manipulating deliberately selected 
measurements in coordination, the operation of the power grid might be disrupted and the power 
system operator could be misled to develop an uninformed power dispatch strategy, thus the load 
curtailment could be maximized. It is suggested that effective methods should be deployed to 
prevent possible coordinated attacks. 
. 
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5. A Robustness-Oriented Power Grid Operation 
Strategy Considering Attacks 
 Introduction 
Considering the increased cyber-physical vulnerabilities of contemporary power grids, it is 
important to improve the system resiliency and robustness in the face of possible attacks. This is 
of great importance, as it is not guaranteed that the attacks can always be detected and thwarted. 
For the resiliency and robustness of electric power grids, currently there are no clear and 
universally accepted definitions for them [81], [82], and sometimes these two terms are used 
interchangeably [81], [83]. In [81], it is mentioned that the robustness focuses on the ability to 
resist disturbances while resiliency focuses on the survivability and rapid recovery. In [82], a 
systematic resiliency construct is proposed and robustness is a critical part of resiliency, as shown 
in Fig. 5.1. In this construct, the system resiliency can be divided into long-term resiliency and 
short-term resiliency, which correspond to the planning stage and the operating stage, respectively. 
Long-term resiliency is most often related to purchasing and installing new devices coupled with 
improving management strategies. Short-term resiliency includes robustness prior to an event, 
resourcefulness during an event, and rapid recovery after an event.  
Various methods can be implemented for detecting possible attacks (including cyberattacks, 
physical attacks, or coordinated cyber-physical attacks), such as firewalls and intrusion detections 
systems in the cyber network, video cameras in the substations and control centers, and the 
patrolling of the police. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the attacks could be efficiently 
detected. Considering this, it is of critical importance to make the power system operate in a robust 
state so as to resist the disturbances caused by malicious attacks. In this case, even if the 
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disturbances are successfully caused by the attacks, the undesirable consequence could be 
minimized. For example, the attacker may exploit the vulnerabilities in a substation network and 
gain the needed privilege to send fabricated commands to open all the breakers simultaneously in 
the substation and isolate this substation. This can possibly cause a great cascading failure or even 
a complete load loss if the system is not in a robust state. Rather, the load loss can be minimized 
if the power system operates in a robust state and is capable of resisting the disturbance. 
Prior to an event
Robustness
During an event After an event
Increase robustness to 
resist shocks
Manage a disruption 
with remedial actions
Return to normal 
state rapidly
Resourcefulness Rapid recovery
Installing new devicesImproving management
Short-term 
resiliency
Long-term 
resiliency  
Figure 5. 1 Resiliency construct of power systems 
In sum, generally there are two ways to defend a power system if it is under an attack or an 
attack is anticipated. One is to enhance security countermeasures, such as intensified cyber 
scanning and physical patrolling, to detect and thwart the attack [84]. The other is to adjust the 
power system operating state so as to increase the robustness of the power grid. While a number 
of research has been conducted regarding the first measure, little work has been done on how 
power system operation strategies should be adjusted so as to enable the power grid to be more 
resistant to significant attacks.  
A typical way to improve the power system’s robustness is to incorporate the security 
constraints into the operation strategy. Conventionally, to ensure the power grid’s economic and 
secure operation under both normal conditions and possible random contingencies, SCOPF 
analysis is adopted as an effective method to optimize the system’s operating state in order to 
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enable the power grid to withstand potential credible contingencies without damaging equipment 
and shedding loads. While there can be some variations in the specific formulations of SCOPF, 
however, the existing work on SCOPF with N-1 security criteria generally only considers the 
outages of a generator or a transmission line as a credible outage scenario. Obviously, this limits 
the power system’s capability of dealing with more serious contingencies, such as the loss of a 
substation and the simultaneous tripping of multiple transmission lines. These are probable 
contingencies in a cyber-physical environment that could be caused by intelligent, coordinated 
attacks. They could pose a great threat to the power system operation and should be considered. 
 
 Attacks and Resultant Impacts 
 Attack Cases  
The power system primarily consists of two parts: the physical current-carrying system and 
the cyber monitoring and control network. The power system’s cyber supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system transmits measurements, alarms and operation commands between 
the widely distributed substations and the control centers. Both the cyber and physical layers could 
be targeted and attacked. Depending on the specific targets of attacks and methods, there can be 
numerous possible attack strategies.  
For example, a capable attacker could intrude into the substation local computer by exploiting 
the vulnerabilities in the protocols or operating systems to gain the desired control privilege. Then, 
in the worst-case scenario, the attacker could send fabricated commands to trip all the breakers 
controlled by the local substation computer. This may cause a sudden isolation of the attacked 
substation and possibly trigger cascading failures. Highly capable attackers may be able to attack 
more than one substation, which might lead to even worse consequences. Another attack scenario 
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is related to the simultaneous tripping of multiple meticulously selected transmission lines. The 
unexpected tripping of these lines could bring a significant disturbance to the power system 
operation, and possibly result in second-order failures. It is also possible that the attacker could 
simultaneously attack different types of power grid components including buses and branches. 
There are usually a number of substations and transmission lines in a bulk power system, so 
it is challenging for the attacker to identify the most critical substations and lines that may lead to 
the most severe consequence if being compromised. However, it is wise for the defender to 
consider the worse-case scenario when deciding the power dispatch strategy. Thus, no matter 
whether the attacker is able to successfully identify the most valuable targets or not, it is reasonable 
for the defender to minimize the worst consequence that can be caused by the attacker, which is 
the focus of this study. 
The possible attack scenarios can be conceived by experienced operators, and they may vary 
with time, terrorism activity patterns, and geographical locations. It is expected that in the future 
imminent attacks against power grids and the corresponding risk levels would be advised ahead of 
time, similar to the existing National Terrorism Advisory System developed for enforcing 
homeland security by issuing alerts and warning notifications and elevating security levels 
according to intelligence agencies [85].  
 Impact Analysis of Attacks 
For the possible attack scenarios, the impact should be estimated for deciding the optimal 
operating strategy. The risk of attacks against power systems is determined by three factors: the 
power system operating state, the target of attack and the system configuration, as shown in Fig. 
5.2. The targets of attack can be lines, generators, and substations. The power system operating 
state is characterized by the output of each generator, the voltage at each bus, and the power flow 
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of each branch and the load demand at each load bus, etc. The system configuration contains 
information on the power system topology, the number of generators, and the number of 
transmission lines. 
The analysis of cascading failures in electric power systems is a challenging task, and multiple 
methods have been developed based on different mechanisms. In some studies, such as [86], the 
cascading failure is simulated based on pure topological analysis. The computation is fast but it 
should be applied with caution, as the flow pattern is different from that based on strict power flow 
analysis. Some work performs cascading failure simulations based on DC power flow analysis, 
such as the OPA model [87]. However, DC power flow analysis has known disadvantages as it 
cannot truly reflect bus voltage behaviors and has a poor capability to model the dynamic 
instability. The AC power flow based models such as those in [75] are computationally intensive 
and have to make assumptions when power flow analysis does not converge. Despite these efforts 
to model cascading failures, there are no cascading failure models without an obvious limitation. 
An ideal cascading failure model needs to consider all the associated cyber, physical, and human 
factors, such as power flow analysis, instability analysis, load demand uncertainties, operators’ 
response, protection failures, and cyber-physical interactions. However, such a comprehensive and 
computationally-efficient model has not been developed in the existing research thus far.  
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Figure 5. 2 Risk of attack against power system 
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As this chapter is focused on investigating the influence of operating state on the cascading 
failure risk considering different attack scenarios, the detailed modeling of cascading failures is 
outside the scope of this study. The cascading failure simulator in [43] is adopted in this study, 
whose working principle is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. 
Yes
Input power grid data
 Analyze baseline power flow
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Components overloaded?
Output the damage
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Input tripped components
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Figure 5. 3 Cascading failure simulation flowchart 
 
 Problem Formulation 
 General SCOPF Formulation  
Conventional N-1 security constraints
Objective 
function
Operation objective: Minimize the 
operation cost and the security risks
Operation constraints
Constraints
 
Figure 5. 4 Conventional SCOPF framework 
As shown in Fig. 5.4, in the conventional N-1 contingency constrained OPF analysis, usually 
the random failure of one system element is considered such as the tripping of one transmission 
line/generator caused by aging, storms, or vegetation contact. If the SCOPF only considers random 
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failures, the power system has limited resistance against well-planned attacks that could result in 
simultaneous tripping of multiple devices - the consequence could be disastrous. 
A representative formulation of the SCOPF with N-1 security consideration can be described 
as follows [88]- [89]: 
Minimize  𝑓0(𝑥0, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠0)                                                    (5.1) 
s.t.   𝑔0(𝑥0, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠0) = 0                                                        (5.2) 
ℎ0(𝑥0, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠0) ≤ ℎ𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                        (5.3) 
 𝑔𝑐
0(𝑥𝑐
0, 𝑢𝑓𝑐, 𝑢𝑠0) = 0          𝑐 ∈ 𝐶                                                     (5.4) 
ℎ𝑐
0(𝑥𝑐
0, 𝑢𝑓𝑐, 𝑢𝑠0) ≤ ℎ𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑥   𝑐 ∈ 𝐶                                                 (5.5) 
|𝑢𝑓𝑐 − 𝑢𝑓0| ≤ 𝜀𝑓𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥    𝑐 ∈ 𝐶                                                 (5.6) 
𝑔𝑐(𝑥𝑐, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠𝑐) = 0          𝑐 ∈ 𝐶                                                 (5.7) 
ℎ𝑐(𝑥𝑐, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠𝑐) ≤ ℎ𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥   𝑐 ∈ 𝐶                                               (5.8) 
|𝑢𝑠𝑐 − 𝑢𝑠0| ≤ 𝜀𝑠𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥    𝑐 ∈ 𝐶                                                 (5.9) 
where the objective function 𝑓0 represents the total generation cost in the normal state; x is the 
state variables of the power grid; u is the control variables; g and h are the equality and inequality 
constraints of the SCOPF model, respectively; and 𝜀 is the control variable adjustment limits. The 
subscripts 0 and c refer to the normal state and contingency state, respectively. The subscripts f 
and s indicate the fast corrective control and slow corrective control, respectively. C represents the 
predefined contingency set.  
Equations (5.2), (5.4) and (5.7) are the set of equality constraints for ensuring the active and 
reactive power balances at every bus. Expressions (5.3), (5.5) and (5.8) are the sets of inequality 
constraints indicating the active and reactive power generation limits, bus voltage limits, 
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transmission line power flow limits, etc. Expressions (5.6) and (5.9) are the coupling control 
variable adjustment limits, which mainly represent the active power generation ramping limits and 
other possible short-term control variable limits such as spinning reserves. 
 Extended SCOPF Formulation Considering Attacks 
In recent years, possibilities of different forms of attacks are increasing rapidly due to more 
active terrorism activities and the wider deployment of cutting-edge emerging smart grid 
technologies, especially those deployed in the cyber layer. Consequently, it is natural and pressing 
to extend the conventional SCOPF to incorporate probable attack scenarios. In this way, the power 
system should not only withstand the outage of a traditional credible contingency, but also have a 
certain degree of robustness to intelligent malicious attacks. 
Security constraints under attack
Conventional N-1 security constraints
Objective function
Operation objective: Minimize the operation 
cost and the security risks
Operation constraints
Constraints
 
Figure 5. 5 An extended SCOPF framework considering probable attack scenarios 
The framework for incorporating the attack scenarios into the SCOPF is proposed as shown 
in Fig. 5.5. The objective function is to minimize the operation cost and the security risks. The 
constraints consist of three aspects: operational limitations in the normal state; conventional N-1 
security constraints; and security constraints under well-organized attacks. The operational 
constraints can be represented by (5.2)-(5.3); the N-1 security constraints can be represented by 
(5.4)-(5.9); and the security constraints associated with the attacks can be defined by the operator. 
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The major difference between the proposed extended SCOPF and the conventional SCOPF 
is that a security constraint set related to probable attacks is added. The conventional SCOPF only 
considers random failures, such as the failure of a transmission line or a generator. Since 
simultaneous failures of multiple components could rarely happen, generally they are not 
considered in traditional power system planning and operations. However, intelligent attackers 
could make meticulous plans to trip multiple components simultaneously, which do not fall into 
the traditional category of credible contingencies. Generally, the conventional SCOPF can be 
applied under normal conditions, and the proposed SCOPF should be enforced when a potential 
imminent attack is advised by national or regional security agencies. Several issues should be dealt 
with when applying the proposed SCOPF. First, the targets of attacks should be estimated. The 
targets could be to simultaneously trip lines, generators, substations, or a combination of different 
components, etc. Second, the probability of a successful attack should be estimated. 
 Short-Term Post-Contingency Feasibility Check 
After the failure of a single element in the N-1 analysis, the power grid should be capable of 
withstanding the short-term disturbance and preventing system collapse before the corrective 
actions are taken. This is represented by (5.4)-(5.6). In this study, it is assumed that the short-term 
post-contingency feasibility is satisfied if each branch power flow does not exceed its short-term 
rating. If the power flow of a branch exceeds the short-term rating, this branch would be tripped 
shortly before the operator takes remedial actions to reduce the power flow in that branch, thus 
more second-order failures could happen. The short-term feasibility modeling could be very 
complicated when considering the fast-response operating reserves, energy storages, and 
automatic generation controls. 
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In principle, if this short-term post-contingency feasibility check is not considered, the 
operational margin of the power system can become larger, which would lead to improved results, 
i.e., reduced operation cost and/or reduced risks due to attacks. 
 Long-Term Post-Contingency Feasibility Check 
For every possible failure scenario in the N-1 analysis, if there is at least one violation (e.g. a 
line overloading), it is checked whether there exists a feasible corrective action strategy to remedy 
the situation. This is represented by (5.7)-(5.9). Specifically, this feasibility check is conducted 
based on the following long-term post-contingency optimal power flow analysis [88]. 
Minimize    𝑧𝑠𝑐 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑧𝑐)                                                          (5.10) 
s.t.   𝑔𝑐(𝑥𝑐, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠𝑐) = 0                                                       (5.11) 
ℎ𝑐(𝑥𝑐, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠𝑐) ≤ ℎ𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                      (5.12) 
|𝑢𝑠𝑐 − 𝑢𝑠0| ≤ 𝜀𝑠𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑧𝑐                                                    (5.13) 
𝑧𝑐 ≥ 0                                                 (5.14) 
where 𝑧𝑐 is the relaxation vector, and 𝑧𝑠𝑐 is the sum of all the elements in 𝑧𝑐. For each contingency 
scenario c, if the above OPF analysis does not converge or if the outcome 𝑧𝑠𝑐 is greater than zero, 
it indicates that the current solution point is infeasible for contingency c. 
 Post-Attack Impact Analysis 
Within the limited capability, the attacker usually have multiple target(s) to attack. For 
example, for a bulk power system with 𝑛𝑏 buses and 𝑛𝑙 transmission lines, the attackers can have 
(
𝑛𝑏
2
) alternative targets if they have the capability to isolate two buses. Denote a_max as the total 
number of possible targets of attacks, and in this case, a_max =(
𝑛𝑏
2
). If attackers’ capability allows 
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them to attack two transmission lines, the number of targets a_max in this case is  (
𝑛𝑙
2
). The 
number of alternative targets could be tremendous for a bulk power system, which increases 
rapidly with the increase of the attacker’s capability.  
Although the attacker could have multiple potential targets, it is reasonable for the defender 
to strive to minimize the most detrimental impact that could be caused by the attacker. Let 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎 
represent the load curtailment caused by attack scenario a. The maximum loss is denoted by  
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max (𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎)      𝑎 = 1, … , 𝑎_𝑚𝑎𝑥                              (5.15) 
In a more realistic sense, the defender may not know exactly the attacker’s capability and the 
related targets of attack when performing the power dispatch, but has to consider multiple possible 
situations, e.g., attacking one substation with a probability of 0.5 and two transmission lines with 
a probability of 0.5. Generally, assume there are M possible attack situations, and the probability 
of the attack situation m is 𝑝(𝑚), the expected loss 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = ∑ 𝑝(𝑚)𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑚)𝑀𝑚=1                                              (5.16) 
∑ 𝑝(𝑚)𝑀𝑚=1 = 1                                                       (5.17) 
According to the meaning of robustness discussed in the Introduction chapter, a power system 
operating in a robust state should have less load loss after being attacked; on the other side, a power 
system state of less robustness can result in a more serious load loss in the face of attacks. Thus, 
the load loss after attacks can indicate the power system’s robustness, which is used to 
quantitatively measure the robustness in the following analyses and case studies. 
 
 Parallel Hybrid Solution Methodology 
A hybrid strategy is proposed in this study to solve the problem defined in Chapter 5.4 [90].  
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 Computation Strategy 
1) Objective Function 
The extended SCOPF incorporating attacks considers generation cost in the normal state, the 
N-1 contingency risk and the risk of attacks. All these three aspects are considered in the objective 
function as shown below:  
𝑓 = 𝑓0(𝑥0, 𝑢𝑓0, 𝑢𝑠0) + 𝛼(∑ 𝑝𝑐 × 𝑂𝐹𝑘(𝑐)
𝑐_𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐=1 + 𝑝𝑒) + 𝑝𝐴 × 𝜋 × 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠              (5.18) 
where 𝛼 is the coefficient to penalize the conventional N-1 violations; c_max is the total number 
of N-1 contingencies; 𝑝𝑐  is the probability of contingency c; 𝑂𝐹𝑘(𝑐)  is the sum of the line 
violations; k is the selected critical contingency in the iteration;  pe is the penalty; 𝑝𝐴  is the 
probability that an attack could happen and it can be estimated by the security agency and may 
vary with time; and π is a factor to measure the impact of load loss in terms of monetary value in 
the unit of $/MW. 
2) Illustration of the Solution Method 
Table 5. 1 Illustration of the solution method 
 PSO SCOPF 
Objective function f  in Eq. (5.18) f0 in Eq. (5.1) 
Control variables 𝑃𝐺
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑢𝑓 , 𝑢𝑠 
Outcome Global solution Candidate solution 𝑃𝑘
∗ 
Decomposition 
strategy 
Globally shrink the feasible solution 
region 
Locally solve the SCOPF in the shrunk 
region 
Parallelization strategy Parallel Sequential 
The decomposition of the hybrid method is shown in Table 5.1. PSO (Particle Swarm 
Optimization) is a widely used artificial intelligence based method with the advantages of 
simplicity, global search capability, and robustness [91]. The PSO is applied to globally search the 
feasible region for the SCOPF by confining the upper bounds of control variables. In this study, 
control variables refer to the maximum generation active power outputs, and a set of them forms 
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a feasibility region. For every feasibility region found by a PSO particle, the SCOPF is solved by 
the PDIP procedure in the Matpower package [79] to derive a candidate solution 𝑃𝑘
∗ .  
3) Steady-State Security Assessment (SSSA) 
In this study, the SCOPF in each iteration includes not only the normal state but also a critical 
contingency k. After the SCOPF obtains a solution point 𝑃𝑘
∗ for the power grid operation, it is 
checked for every contingency 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 based on AC power flow analysis. The SSSA is performed 
to update the critical contingency k and check the feasibility of the obtained solution. 
For each contingency, the overloading level 𝑂𝐹𝑘(𝑐) is calculated as follows: 
𝑂𝐹𝑘(𝑐) = ∑ (𝑃𝐹𝑏
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑏=1 − 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑃𝐹𝑏(𝑐))) 𝑐 ∈  𝐶    (5.19) 
where 𝑃𝐹𝑏 is the power flow on the transmission line b; 𝑃𝐹𝑏
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the transmission line capacity 
for line b; and 𝑏_𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the total number of transmission lines. 
4) Contingency Filtering 
For every checked contingency, if there is a violation, the long-term post-contingency 
feasibility check should be conducted, which is however time-consuming. So it is desirable to 
check as few post-contingencies as possible. Here 𝑛𝑣(𝑐) is defined as the number of violations, 
and the contingency c with the least number of violations is chosen to update the critical 
contingency k. 
 Computational Procedure 
The procedure of the solution method is depicted in Fig. 5.6 and the major steps are illustrated 
as follows. 
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Step 1: Initialize the PSO parameters, especially the range of the upper bounds of active 
power generations. Each particle is defined as the set of upper bounds for the active 
generations and thus the dimension of a particle is the number of generators. 
Step 2: Randomly choose an initial critical contingency k. This is different from the 
algorithm in [90] where the initial critical contingency k is empty.  
Step 3: Solve the optimal power flow defined by each particle. The optimal power flow 
consists of expressions (5.1)-(5.3) and (5.7)-(5.9) where the contingency set C 
includes only k. If the optimal power flow calculation does not converge, the 
objective function in (5.18) is set to infinity and go to step 12; otherwise, a 
candidate solution point 𝑃𝑘
∗ is obtained and go to the next step. 
Step 4: Calculate the system state under each contingency in the contingency set C by using 
AC power flow analysis. The contingency set is predefined and it includes the 
failures of every generator and every transmission line in this study. The 
overloading level 𝑂𝐹𝑘(𝑐) is calculated for each contingency c. 
Step 5: Based on the power flow analysis results obtained in step 4, a candidate 
contingency k_c is proposed for each particle. And the candidate contingency with 
the largest occurrence time for all the particles is chosen as the contingency k.  
Step 6: Check the short-term and long-term feasibilities of each contingency as described 
in Chapter 5.4. If they are infeasible, a penalty pe is added to the objective function 
in (5.18). 
Step 7: Estimate the possible attack conditions, the probability of each condition and the 
possible targets for each attack condition. 
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Step 8: For each possible target of attack under each attack condition, its consequence is 
calculated based on the cascading failure simulator depicted in Fig. 5.3.  
Initialize the PSO parameters
Set Iter=0
Randomly select k
Calculate SCOPF
Minimize (1), s.t. (2)-(3), (6)-(9) C=k
Solution feasible?
Steady-state security assessment
Filter the contingencies  
Update k
Check the short-term feasibilities
 of conventional N-1 contingencies
Check the long-term feasibilities
 of conventional N-1 contingencies
Estimate possible targets of 
attack
Analyze the consequences of the 
possible targets
Calculate the economic and security 
combined objective value in Eq. (18)
Stopping criterion met?
Set the objective 
value to infinity
Update the best 
particle
Output the results
Update positions of 
the particles
Iter=Iter+1
N
Y
N
Parallel partr ll l rt
Initialize m as 0
m<M?
m=m+1
Calculate the expected loss in Eq. (16)
Y
Y
N
Obtain the maximum loss for 
attack condition m using (15)
 
Figure 5. 6 Procedure of the hybrid solution methodology 
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Step 9: Calculate the maximum loss under each attack scenario using (5.15). 
Step 10: Check if all the attack scenarios are considered, if not go to step 8; otherwise, 
calculate the expected loss using (5.16). 
Step 11: Update the overall objective function in (5.18) considering the operation cost, N-1 
contingencies and the expected loss caused by attacks. 
Step 12: Check whether the stopping criterion is satisfied. The stopping criterion can be the 
convergence of the PSO or the maximum number of iterations. If the stopping 
criterion is not met, go to step 13; otherwise stop the program. 
Step 13: Update the positions of particles based on the rules of the PSO algorithm, then 
return to step 3. 
 
 
 Case Studies 
The proposed SCOPF analysis incorporating attacks is verified on the IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 39-
bus and IEEE 118-bus systems. The systems’ data and parameters are derived from the Matpower 
package. The transformer off-nominal turn ratios and phase shift angles are neglected. Also, the 
bus shunt conductance and susceptance are not considered. 
In the following case studies, the short-term rating of each transmission line is assumed to be 
120% of its long-term rating. The coefficient α is set to be 1.2, and the probability for each 
contingency 𝑝𝑐  is chosen as 0.01. The penalty value pe is selected as 200. It is assumed that the 
security agent estimates the attack occurrence probability 𝑝𝐴 to be 0.05, and the factor 𝜋 is set as 
2,000 $/MW which includes not only the revenue loss but also the inconvenience brought to the 
customers. These values are chosen by referring to the existing literature [90]-[91] for performing 
case studies in this chapter. Actually, these values can be changed for different conditions. For 
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example, if the operator focuses more on the N-1 contingency risk, the value of α should be 
increased. If the power system components are aging, the probability of N-1 contingencies 𝑝𝑐 
should be increased; on the contrary, it should be decreased after a maintenance is carried out. If 
security agent alerts a highly possible attack, the attack occurrence probability 𝑝𝐴 needs to be 
increased. Also, 𝑝𝐴 can be set to zero if the power system operator does not consider the risk of 
attacks, and the proposed SCOPF problem in this case shrinks to a conventional N-1 SCOPF. 
For comparison, analyses based on multiple OPF algorithms are conducted for each test 
system including the conventional N-1 SCOPF; the SCOPF considering attacking two lines; the 
SCOPF considering attacks against two buses; the SCOPF considering attacks against one bus and 
one line; the SCOPF considering the two possible attack conditions (attacking one substation; 
attacking two branches) with corresponding probabilities. In this chapter, the abbreviation BAC-
OPF refers to the SCOPF considering attacks against one bus; and the abbreviation LAC-OPF 
refers to the SCOPF considering attacks against two lines. 
The conventional N-1 SCOPF is the baseline, which is compared with the proposed SCOPF 
to demonstrate the advantage of the proposed method. 
 IEEE 14-bus System 
The IEEE 14-bus system consists of 20 branches, 5 generation units and 14 buses. The 
transmission capacity of each branch is set to 140 MVA. So there are 25 N-1 contingencies. This 
study does not consider the contingencies that could cause an islanding. The maximum active 
power generation adjustment 𝜀𝑠𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 for each generator in the long-term post-contingency analysis 
is set to be 30 MW. 
1) N-1 SCOPF 
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If the power system operators do not consider the malicious man-made threats, the SCOPF 
considering the N-1 contingencies is applied to determine the operating state of the power system. 
Based on this strategy, the active power output of each generator is shown in Table 5.2. And the 
generation cost in this case is $8,302. 
Table 5. 2 Active power outputs based on N-1 SCOPF in IEEE 14-bus system 
Generator number Power output (MW) 
1 135 
2 37 
3 58 
4 8 
5 27 
Under this operating condition, the risk of the power system under attacks can be calculated. 
If the attacker has the capability to isolate a bus, the impact is shown in Table 5.3. The maximum 
load loss is resulted in when bus 1 is isolated, and 46% of the load will be curtailed. It indicates 
that the power system under this operating strategy is vulnerable to a bus-isolating attack. 
Table 5. 3 Loss for bus-isolating attack in 14-bus system under N-1 SCOPF 
Attacked bus Load loss ratio Attacked bus Load loss ratio 
1 0.46 8 0.06 
2 0.10 9 0.11 
3 0.36 10 0.03 
4 0.18 11 0.01 
5 0.03 12 0.02 
6 0.04 13 0.05 
7 0.06 14 0.06 
Table 5. 4 Loss for line-tripping attack in 14-bus system under N-1 SCOPF 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{1,2} 0.35 
{3,6} 0.21 
{11,16} 0.05 
{12,19} 0.02 
{16,18} 0.03 
{17,20} 0.06 
If the attackers have the capability to simultaneously trip two lines, there are 190 attack 
scenarios, and part of the high-impact results is shown in Table 5.4. The maximum load loss among 
all the 190 scenarios is caused when lines 1 and 2 are tripped, and the load loss ratio is 35%. 
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When an attack is anticipated, the informed operators can adjust the operating strategy to 
increase the robustness of the power system.  
2) SCOPF Considering Attacking One Bus (BAC-OPF) 
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Figure 5. 7 Convergence of PSO for BAC-OPF in IEEE 14-bus system 
If a bus-isolating attack is anticipated, the convergence curve of the PSO for the BAC-OPF 
is shown in Fig. 5.7. The convergence is reached after 11 iterations. And the power outputs of the 
generators are shown in Table 5.5. The total generation cost in the normal state is $8,748.  
Table 5. 5 Active power outputs based on BAC-OPF in IEEE 14-bus system 
Generator number Power output (MW) 
1 92 
2 46 
3 100 
4 0 
5 25 
Table 5. 6 Loss for bus-tripping attack in IEEE 14-bus system under BAC-OPF   
Attacked bus Load loss ratio Attacked bus Load loss ratio 
1 0.30 8 0.02 
2 0.11 9 0.11 
3 0.36 10 0.03 
4 0.22 11 0.01 
5 0.03 12 0.02 
6 0.04 13 0.05 
7 0.02 14 0.06 
By comparing Table 5.2 and Table 5.5, it can be seen that the generation is shifted from 
generator 1 to generator 3. In this case, the generation on bus 1 is reduced, and thus when bus 1 is 
attacked, the resultant impact is reduced. Under the BAC-OPF, the maximum load loss is caused 
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when bus 3 is isolated as shown in Table 5.6, which is however still smaller than that under the N-
1 SCOPF. 
To study the impact of short-term post-contingency feasibility check, when the short-term 
post-contingency feasibility is not considered, the power system operating state based on BAC-
OPF is shown in Table 5.7. The generation cost is $8,401, and the maximum load loss ratio is 
reduced to 35% when bus 1 is attacked. Compared with the BAC-OPF considering the short-term 
feasibility as shown in Table 5.6, the load loss is a bit smaller and the cost is much reduced. 
Table 5. 7 Active power outputs based on BAC-OPF without considering short-term feasibility in IEEE 14-bus 
system 
Generator number Power output (MW) 
1 117 
2 40 
3 53 
4 22 
5 31 
3) SCOPF Considering Attacks against Two Lines (LAC-OPF) 
Table 5. 8 Active power outputs based on LAC-OPF in IEEE 14-bus system 
Generator number Power output (MW) 
1 77 
2 53 
3 40 
4 31 
5 61 
Table 5. 9 Loss for line-tripping attack in IEEE 14-bus system under LAC-OPF 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{1,2} 0.12 
{1,5} 0.12 
{1,15} 0.12 
{2,4} 0.24 
{3,6} 0.12 
{7,8} 0.21 
Similarly, if a line-tripping attack is anticipated, the corresponding LAC-OPF could be 
enforced. The outputs of generators in this case are shown in Table 5.8 and the corresponding 
generation cost is $8,905. Some examples are provided in Table 5.9 to illustrate the impact of line-
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tripping attacks, and the maximum load loss among all the 190 scenarios is resulted in when lines 
2 and 4 are tripped. The amount of load loss is 24% which is lower than that in the N-1 SCOPF. 
4) SCOPF Considering Attacks against Two Buses 
Table 5. 10 Active power outputs in IEEE 14-bus system based on the proposed SCOPF considering attacks 
against two buses 
Generator number Power output (MW) 
1 83 
2 41 
3 44 
4 37 
5 57 
For the operating state obtained based on the N-1 SCOPF shown in Table 5.2, when the 
attacker is capable of attacking two buses at the same time, some most serious attack scenarios and 
the resultant consequences are shown in Fig. 5.8. The worst consequence is 95% load loss when 
buses 5 and 9 are attacked.  
For the proposed SCOPF incorporating attacks against two buses, the system state operating 
state is shown in Table 5.10, which indicates the generation cost is $8,771. Based on this operating 
state, some most severe attack scenarios and the resultant consequence are shown in Fig. 5.9. The 
worst consequence among all the possible attack scenarios is resulted in when buses 1 and 2 are 
tripped, and the load loss ratio is 55%. This value is significantly less than that in the N-1 SCOPF. 
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Figure 5. 8 Load loss ratio in IEEE 14-bus system based on the N-1 SCOPF when two buses are attacked 
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Figure 5. 9 Load loss ratio in IEEE 14-bus system based on the proposed SCOPF when two buses are attacked 
5) SCOPF Considering Two Possible Attack Conditions 
Table 5. 11 Active power outputs in IEEE 14-bus system based on proposed SCOPF considering two possible 
attack conditions 
Generator number Power output (MW) 
1 105 
2 40 
3 26 
4 35 
5 56 
For the operating state obtained based on the N-1 SCOPF, when facing two possible attack 
conditions, attacking a bus and attacking two lines, with probabilities 0.5 and 0.5, respectively, the 
expected loss is 40.5% based on the consequences in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
For the proposed SCOPF considering these two attack conditions (a bus, two lines) and the 
probabilities (0.5, 0.5), the obtained system operating state is shown in Table 5.6 and the generation 
cost is $8,541. Under this operating state, the consequences of attacks when a bus is tripped are 
shown in Fig. 5.10. The maximum load loss ratio when attacking a bus is 37% when bus 3 is 
isolated. The consequences of attacks when two lines are tripped are shown in Table 5.7. The 
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maximum load loss ratio when attacking two lines is 31% when lines 1 and 2 are isolated. Thus, 
the expected loss is 34%, which is lower than 40.5% in the N-1 SCOPF. 
Table 5. 12 Load loss ratio in IEEE 14-bus system based on the proposed SCOPF incorporating two attack 
conditions when two lines are tripped 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{1,2} 0.31 
{3,6} 0.24 
{1,14} 0.09 
{17,20} 0.06 
{11,16} 0.05 
{16,18} 0.03 
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Figure 5. 10 Load loss ratio in IEEE 14-bus system based on the proposed SCOPF incorporating two attack cases 
when a bus is tripped 
By comparing the above N-1 SCOPF and the four SCOPF analyses considering attacks, the 
operational costs in the normal state for the SCOPF analyses considering attacks go higher than 
that in the N-1 SCOPF, but the load loss ratios are always lower than those in the N-1 SCOPF. It 
shows the robustness of the power system under the proposed SCOPF incorporating attacks is 
clearly improved as the load losses in the optimized cases are less. By comparing the operation 
cost and the load loss, it is concluded that the increase of robustness comes at the cost of decreased 
economy. 
 IEEE 39-bus System 
 105 
 
1) Comparison of N-1 SCOPF, BAC-OPF and LAC-OPF 
The IEEE 39-bus system consists of 46 branches, 10 generators and 39 buses. The branch 
capacities are set to 125% of the values in Matpower. The maximum active power generation 
adjustment 𝜀𝑠𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 for each generator in the long-term post-contingency analysis is set to be 30% of 
the maximum generation. Similar to the IEEE 14-bus system, three kinds of OPFs are analyzed 
and the active power output of the power system under these three conditions are shown in Table 
5.8. It clearly shows that the generations are different when different attack scenarios are 
considered. For the N-1 SCOPF, the generation cost in the normal state is $41,886, and the 
generation cost in the normal state is increased to $43,618 for the BAC-OPF assuming the attacker 
has the capacity to attack one bus, and $44,997 for the LAC-OPF assuming the attacker has the 
capacity to simultaneously attack two lines.  
Table 5. 13 Active power generation comparison for IEEE 39-bus system (MW) 
Generator number N-1 SCOPF BAC-OPF LAC-OPF 
1 673 848 695 
2 646 575 646 
3 672 725 632 
4 652 614 652 
5 508 508 356 
6 663 687 481 
7 580 466 406 
8 555 395 564 
9 657 606 865 
10 692 867 998 
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Figure 5. 11 Comparison of the impact of bus-isolating attack in IEEE 39-bus system 
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The system risks in the face of bus-isolating attacks using different operating strategies are 
compared in Fig. 5.11. When operating based on N-1 SCOPF, the impact of the attack can be rather 
serious, and the worst impact is caused when bus 39 is tripped and 47.6% of the load will be lost. 
Besides this worst-case scenario, there are multiple very serious scenarios. For example, 41.4% of 
the load will be lost if bus 6 is isolated, and 28.3% of the load will be lost if bus 1 is isolated. The 
risk due to attacks is greatly reduced if the power system operates based on the BAC-OPF and the 
maximum load loss is 28.3% when bus 26 is isolated.   
Table 5. 14 Loss in line-tripping attack based on N-1 SCOPF in IEEE 39-bus 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{35, 23} 1 {1, 19} 0.38 
{38, 23} 1 {23, 2} 0.38 
{35, 3} 0.47 {10, 15} 0.36 
{35, 1} 0.47 {13, 1} 0.33 
{38, 2} 0.47 {10, 2} 0.28 
{1, 28} 0.47 {3, 1} 0.28 
Table 5. 15 Loss in line-tripping attack based on LAC-OPF in IEEE 39-bus 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{42, 23} 0.52 {19, 44} 0.38 
{10, 12} 0.52 {12, 11} 0.31 
{3, 23} 0.52 {10, 42} 0.19 
{35, 38} 0.46 {11, 1} 0.19 
{19, 18} 0.42 {45, 44} 0.12 
{23, 11} 0.42 {12, 15} 0.04 
In Fig. 5.11, comparing the results based on N-1 SCOPF and BAC-OPF, it can be seen that 
the load loss ratio for an individual bus may increase or decrease. However, the average loss among 
all the 39 attack scenarios for the N-1 SCOPF is 8.74%, and the average loss for the BAC-OPF is 
8.49%. It can be seen not only the maximum load loss in the BAC-OPF is less than in the N-1 
SCOPF, but also the average load loss in the BAC-OPF is less than that in the N-1 SCOPF, which 
validates the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
For the line-tripping attack, it is assumed that the attacker is able to simultaneously disconnect 
two transmission lines. If the power system operates based on the N-1 SCOPF, the impact of the 
attack could be rather serious, and the most significant impact can be 100% load loss if 
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transmission branches {35, 23} or {38, 23} are tripped, as shown in Table 5.14. But for the LAC-
OPF, the maximum load loss ratio is 52%, which is significantly reduced as compared with the 
previous case, as shown in Table 5.15. This proves that the LAC-OPF can contribute to reducing 
the risk of line-tripping attacks. 
2) SCOPF Considering Attacks Against One Bus and One Line Simultaneously  
In a more general sense, the attacker may attack different kinds of components to initiate a 
cascading failure, and in this chapter a case study is considered when attacking one bus and one 
line simultaneously. For the operating state obtained based on the N-1 SCOPF, the consequences 
of attacks are depicted in Fig. 5.12. In several scenarios, such as attacking bus 13 and line 28, bus 
14 and line 35, as well as bus 21 and line 23, the load loss ratio is 1, which means all the load 
demands in the system are lost. 
 
Figure 5. 12 Load loss ratio in IEEE 39-bus system based on N-1 SCOPF 
For the proposed SCOPF incorporating attacking one bus and one branch, the system state 
operating state is shown in Table 5.16, and the generation cost is $42,097. The consequences of 
attack for all the 1794 possible scenarios are shown in Fig. 5.13. Among all these possible 
scenarios, the worst consequence is 82% load loss when bus 5 and line 35 are attacked.  By 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Attacked bus numberAttacked line number
L
o
a
d
 l
o
s
s
 r
a
ti
o
 108 
 
comparing with the N-1 SCOPF, the maximum load loss ratio is reduced by 18%, which 
demonstrates that the proposed method can also be applied to cases when different kinds of 
components are attacked simultaneously. 
Table 5. 16 Active power outputs in IEEE 39-bus system considering attacks against one bus and one line 
simultaneously 
Generator number Output Generator number Output 
1 709 6 687 
2 646 7 570 
3 580 8 528 
4 652 9 690 
5 508 10 728 
 
Figure 5. 13 Load loss ratio in IEEE 39-bus system based on the proposed SCOPF considering attacks against 
one bus and one line simultaneously 
 IEEE 118-bus System 
The IEEE 118-bus system has 186 transmission lines, 54 generations and 118 buses. The 
transmission capacity of each branch is set to 200 MVA and 𝜀𝑠𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 for each generator is set to be 
30% of the maximum generation. If the power system is faced with bus-isolating attacks and the 
attacker has the capability to trip one substation, there are 118 possible targets of attack. Also, if 
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the power system is faced with line-tripping attacks and the attacker has the ability to 
simultaneously trip two branches, there can be 17,205 possible targets. 
Table 5. 17 Active power generation in IEEE 118-bus system 
Generator 
number 
Output (MW) 
Generator 
number 
Output (MW) 
N-1 
SCOPF 
BAC-
OPF 
LAC-
OPF 
N-1 
SCOPF 
BAC-
OPF 
LAC-
OPF 
1 52 50 53 28 355 246 369 
2 16 21 17 29 346 247 246 
3 36 39 36 30 448 403 403 
4 10 17 11 31 1 15 9 
5 201 201 201 32 4 6 6 
6 89 89 89 33 3 11 8 
7 42 46 43 34 25 41 34 
8 32 35 33 35 29 49 39 
9 39 42 40 36 0 6 0 
10 0 0 0 37 436 460 448 
11 160 160 204 38 0 1 0 
12 207 283 207 39 4 4 4 
13 34 24 30 40 504 369 506 
14 7 7 7 41 0 23 0 
15 37 30 34 42 0 8 0 
16 19 33 25 43 0 0 0 
17 23 36 28 44 0 0 0 
18 57 69 62 45 233 244 176 
19 46 68 56 46 38 40 39 
20 19 20 20 47 0 16 12 
21 196 152 201 48 7 23 20 
22 50 51 51 49 30 39 37 
23 37 65 50 50 8 18 16 
24 38 68 53 51 35 36 36 
25 151 158 155 52 37 42 41 
26 149 158 130 53 14 16 14 
27 0 2 0 54 0 0 0 
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Figure 5. 14 Comparison of the impact of bus-isolating attack in IEEE 118-bus system 
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Table 5. 18 Loss in line-tripping attack based on N-1 SCOPF 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{94, 33} 0.33 {38, 141} 0.24 
{93, 33} 0.33 {38, 94} 0.24 
{38, 69} 0.29 {38, 93} 0.24 
{31, 69} 0.29 {96, 33} 0.24 
{38, 116} 0.27 {141, 31} 0.24 
{31, 116} 0.27 {94, 31} 0.24 
For the bus-isolating attack, the performances of BAC-OPF and N-1 SCOPF are compared in 
Fig. 5.14. For the N-1 SCOPF, the worst-case scenario for the bus-isolating attack is 39.2% load 
loss if bus 89 is isolated; while for the BAC-OPF, the worst-case scenario is 13.6% load loss when 
bus 27 is attacked. The average loss among all the 118 attack scenarios for the N-1 SCOPF is 
3.31%, and the average loss for the BAC-OPF is 1.85%. By comparison, it is concluded that the 
average load loss in the BAC-OPF is less than that in the N-1 SCOPF. The maximum load loss 
and the average load loss both demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed in minimizing the 
consequence of attack. 
Table 5. 19 Loss in line-tripping attack based on LAC-OPF in 118-bus system 
Attacked lines Load loss ratio Attacked lines Load loss ratio 
{38, 98} 0.22 {31, 66} 0.21 
{38, 105} 0.22 {96,66} 0.21 
{31, 99} 0.22 {33, 67} 0.21 
{33, 98} 0.22 {8, 31} 0.19 
{33, 105} 0.22 {38, 36} 0.19 
{38, 66} 0.21 {51, 33} 0.19 
For the line-tripping attack, the performance of the N-1 SCOPF is shown in Table 5.18. The 
most severe impact is 33% load loss when lines {94, 33} are attacked. For the LAC-OPF, the 
maximum load loss is 22% as shown in Table 5.19, which is significantly reduced.   
It should be noted that the number of combinations of attacked components can increase 
rapidly if the attacker is capable of attacking a number of components. For example, if the attacker 
is able to attack five buses in the IEEE 118-bus system, the number of combinations exceeds 
1.7 × 105. If the attacker is able to attack five lines, the number of combinations is more than 
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1.7 × 109. This tremendous amount of combinations leads to high computational burden. Thus, in 
these cases, efficient methods for quickly identifying the most valuable targets should be deployed. 
 
 Conclusions  
In this study, the conventional SCOPF considering N-1 contingencies was extended to 
incorporate probable attack scenarios. The proposed SCOPF model considered the generation 
operation cost in the normal state, conventional N-1 contingencies as well as the risk of malicious 
attacks. The possible attack scenarios and their probabilities were incorporated into the objective 
function of the proposed SCOPF model. An improved solution method was investigated based on 
PSO for conducting the global search as well as on PDIP for finding the local SCOPF solution. 
And parallel computing for speeding up the calculation was used in this study. The mathematical 
model and the computational strategy were verified based on three representative test systems. The 
simulation results demonstrated that the proposed SCOPF model is able to provide increased 
robustness to the power grid in the face of predictable cyberattacks. 
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6. An Improved Defender-Attacker-Defender Model 
for Transmission Lines Defense Considering 
Offensive Resource Uncertainties  
 Introduction 
Conventionally, to ensure the power grid’s reliable and secure operation the N-1 or even N-2 
criteria are implemented in power grids for maintaining the desired power supply capability in the 
face of random equipment failures and different forms of disturbances [92]. But they are 
insufficient to protect the power systems against malicious attacks, which usually target multiple 
critical components simultaneously. In this regard, some research was devoted to studying the 
vulnerabilities of the power systems and identifying the critical components for protection. For 
example, in [43] the random chemistry algorithm was adopted to identify the combination of 
critical components whose failures can incur a disastrous cascading failure. The critical scenarios 
were detected by a proposed principal component analysis and the maximum power flow analysis 
in [93]. In [76] and [94], bilevel attacker-defender models were developed. In these models, it is 
assumed that the attacker tries to maximize the damage considering the corrective action taken by 
the defender against the disturbance. These attacker-defender models can be solved by a bilevel 
max-min optimization technique. 
Based on the vulnerability analysis which can identify the critical components or weakness 
of the network, it is meaningful to develop strategies to wisely allocate the limited defensive 
resources (including budgets, security-related human resources, etc.) to efficiently safeguard the 
power grid. In [94] and [95], a trilevel defender-attacker-defender model was studied, and the 
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defenders include the security personnel who harden some well-selected components before the 
attack occurs and the power system operator who re-dispatches the power after the attack takes 
place in order to minimize the damage. For this trilevel model, the implicit enumeration algorithm 
[94] and the C&CG algorithm were adopted [96]. Besides the trilevel modeling, game-theoretical 
approaches were also widely adopted. For example, in [97], when assuming both the attacker and 
the defender take actions without knowing the action of the other, a two-player game theoretic 
approach was developed for selecting the critical components for protection. When the interaction 
between the attacker and the defender involves multiple rounds, Markov game could be adopted 
[98]. 
The trilevel model is being more widely adopted in recent power system defense studies. In 
the trilevel model [99], the defender at the top-level determines the elements to be protected under 
the constraint of the budget; the attacker at the middle-level disrupts the selected elements subject 
to the limitation of the offensive resources. The defender at the bottom-level typically refers to the 
power system operator, who takes corrective power re-dispatch actions to alleviate the overloading 
and minimize the impact. The offensive resources can have different meanings for different types 
of attacks. For example, in physical attacks they may mean the number of attackers and the 
weapons/tools used. In cyber-attacks, they can refer to the skill sets, capabilities, privileges of the 
cyber attacker. The offensive resources possessed by the attacker determine the number of the 
components that attacker can disrupt. This chapter focuses on the development of defensive 
strategies which can be applied to both physical attacks and cyber-attacks. For simplicity, the 
number of lines that the attacker can disrupt is used to denote the offensive resources; similarly, 
the number of lines that the defender can protect denotes the defensive resource; the offensive 
resource uncertainty is denoted by a probabilistic distribution of the number of lines that the 
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attacker can disrupt. In real practices, professional security agents and experts can help estimate 
the numbers of elements that the attacker is capable of disrupting based on the information on the 
potential attacks. For example, the homeland security agency could estimate how many power grid 
elements that the terrorists can attack given the number of terrorists and the tools they use. The 
cyber network security experts are able to estimate the capability of the cyber intruders by 
performing cyber forensics and checking the logs.  
However, in real-world scenarios, the decision-making for the allocation of the defensive 
resource often involves a number of uncertainties, as it is extremely difficult for the defender to 
obtain accurate and complete information about the attacker. For example, the security agency 
often could not accurately know the offensive resources that the attacker has when making the 
decision on the defensive strategy; in other words, the defender is confronted with the problem of 
developing defense strategies without a clear understanding of the number of components which 
might be affected by the attack. In this study, the defensive strategy specifically refers to 
identifying the critical lines for defense; also, the attack strategy means determining the lines that 
should be attacked.  
This study aims to solve this defensive strategy development problem considering the 
offensive resource uncertainties. Specifically, an MAS defender-attacker-defender model is 
proposed, where the uncertainties in the offensive resource are modeled as a set of attack scenarios 
with corresponding probabilities, and the max-min defender-attacker interaction in each attack 
scenario is considered. The proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model is solved by a 
method combining both robust optimization and stochastic programming.  
 
 Problem Formulation 
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 Conventional DAD Model 
Objective: Minimize the damage
Control variables: Components to defend
Constraints: Limitation of the defense resource
Objective: Maximize the damage
Control variables: Components to attack
Constraints: Limitation of the attack resource
Objective: Minimize the damage
Control variables: Generator outputs, load shed, etc.
Constraints: Power flow constraints, etc.
Defended components
Out-of-service components
Attacker
System security 
personnel
System 
operator
Attacker-defender model
 
Figure 6. 1 Conventional defender-attacker-defender model 
As shown in [94] and [95], a trilevel defender-attacker-defender model was found to be 
suitable for developing defensive strategies against malicious attacks. This trilevel model is shown 
in Fig. 6.1, which involves three agents acting in sequence: (a) at the top-level, the power system 
security personnel identify the critical components, aiming to minimize the consequence caused 
by the attacker; (b) at the middle-level, the attacker seeks to maximize the consequence by 
attacking the judiciously-selected targets; (c) at the bottom-level, the power system operator takes 
remedial actions to minimize the consequence after the attacker disrupts the targeted components. 
The middle-level and the bottom-level form a typical attacker-defender model, which describes 
the attacker’s decision-making to identify the components to attack. This attacker-defender model 
is a bilevel optimization problem, in which the offensive resource is often involved and has a great 
impact on the consequence of the attack. In this study, similar to [100] the offensive resource is 
quantitatively represented by the maximum number of components that the attacker is able to 
successfully trip. Once the offensive resource is known, the bilevel attacker-defender optimization 
problem can be solved. This is the basis for solving the trilevel problem depicted in Fig. 6.1, as 
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this trilevel model assumes that the security personnel at the top-level have the complete and 
accurate information about the offensive resource. 
The mathematical representation of the defender-attacker-defender model is briefly 
introduced as follows. 
min
𝑤∈𝑾
max
𝑣∈𝑽
min
{𝛿, 𝑃𝑔,
𝑃𝑓,∆𝑃𝑑}
∑ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑
𝑛∈𝑵                              (6.1) 
s.t. ∑ 𝑤𝑙𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑟
𝑑         ∀𝑤𝑙 ∈ {0,1}                            (6.2) 
∑ (1 − 𝑣𝑙)𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑟
𝑎  ∀𝑣𝑙 ∈ {0,1}                        (6.3) 
𝑃𝑙
𝑓 = (𝑤𝑙 + 𝑣𝑙 − 𝑤𝑙𝑣𝑙)
𝛿𝑜(𝑙)−𝛿𝑑(𝑙)
𝑥𝑙
    ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳               (6.4) 
         ∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
𝑗∈𝑱𝑛 − ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
𝑙|𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛 + ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
𝑙|𝑑(𝑙)=𝑛    +∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑 = 𝑃𝑛
𝑑     ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵       (6.5) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
      ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱                          (6.6) 
−𝑃𝑙
𝑓
≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓 ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
      ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳                         (6.7) 
0 ≤ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑 ≤ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑      ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                        (6.8) 
The variables and constants are explained as follows: 𝑟𝑑  and 𝑟𝑎 are the defensive resource 
and the offensive resource, respectively, i.e., the number of components the defender can protect 
and the number of components the attacker can disrupt; 𝑤 and 𝑣 indicate the defensive resource 
allocation vector and offensive resource allocation vector, respectively; 𝑾 and 𝑽 are the feasible 
sets for 𝑤 and 𝑣, respectively; δ,  𝑃𝑔, 𝑃𝑓, ∆𝑃𝑑 mean the bus voltage angle vector, generator power 
output vector, transmission line power flow vector, and load demand curtailment vector, 
respectively; 𝑵, 𝑱 and 𝑳 are the set of buses, the set of generators, and the set of transmission lines, 
respectively; Subscripts n, j, l denote indices of the buses, generators and transmission lines, 
respectively; 𝑥𝑙 , 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
, 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
and 𝑃𝑛
𝑑  are the reactance of line l, maximum generation of generator j, 
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power flow limit of transmission line l, and load demand at bus n, respectively; 𝑜(𝑙) and 𝑑(𝑙) are 
the origin bus and the destination bus of line l, respectively. 
As shown in the objective function (6.1), the security personnel allocate the limited defensive 
resource to defense certain lines, aiming to minimize the load curtailment considering the optimal 
attack strategy made by the intelligent attackers, in which the power re-dispatch carried out by the 
operator is incorporated. Constraint (6.2) captures the limitation of the offensive resource. 𝑤𝑙 is a 
binary decision variable, if its value is 1, it means line l is protected.  Similarly, constraint (6.3) 
shows the limitation of the defensive resource. 𝑣𝑙 is a binary decision variable; when its value is 
0, it means line l is attacked. Constraints (6.4)-(6.8) are related to the optimal power flow analysis. 
Constraint (6.4) calculates the power flow on the transmission lines, and the status of line l is 
obtained by 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑣𝑙 − 𝑤𝑙𝑣𝑙. A line will be out of service only when it is attacked and it is not 
being protected. Constraint (6.5) ensures the power inflow and outflow balance at each bus. 
Constraint (6.6) ensures that the generation output of each generation does not exceed its maximum 
capacity. It is indicated in (6.7) that the line power flow is restricted within the allowed range 
[−𝑃𝑙
𝑓
, 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
]. The non-negativity constraint (6.8) guarantees that the load loss is less than the nominal 
demand. 
Note that in the conventional model the offensive resource 𝑟𝑎 in (6.3) is a given value, which 
indicates that the defender knows the capability of the attacker before the attack is launched. This 
can be a strong assumption in real applications. 
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Figure 6. 2 Proposed Multiple-Attack-Scenario defender-attacker-defender model 
 Modeling of Uncertainties 
In a more realistic sense, the security personnel are often not able to obtain the exact 
information about the offensive resource. In other words, the security personnel has to develop the 
defensive strategy with uncertain information about the offensive resource, although the offensive 
resource is well known to the attacker. In this study, the uncertainty of the offensive resource is 
modeled by a probability distribution over a set of offensive resources. For each offensive 
resource, an attacker-defender model should be built, which corresponds to the middle and bottom 
levels in Fig. 6.1. Thus, each offensive resource is studied with an associated attack scenario, and 
an attack scenario is characterized by its offensive resource. A specific example of the offensive 
resource set and the probability distribution is given here. For example, if the security personnel 
estimate the attacker may have the capability to disconnect two lines, three lines, four lines or five 
lines with probabilities 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.1, respectively, the attack scenario set is {two lines, three 
lines, four lines, five lines}, and the probability distribution is {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1}. The security 
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personnel’s objective is to allocate the defensive resource optimally to defend the power grid 
considering all these four attack scenarios and the corresponding probabilities, neither the attack 
scenario {two lines} with probability 1, nor the attack scenario {four lines} with probability 1.  
The possible attack scenarios and the related probabilities can vary with time, the activity 
pattern of the adversaries, and weather, etc. It is beyond the scope of this study to accurately 
estimate the uncertainty when an attack is imminent. It is believed in the future that the power 
system defenders and operators will be warned of the possible attacks ahead of time with the aid 
of intrusion detection systems, experienced security administrators, and even intelligence services 
like the National Terrorism Advisory System. 
The focus of this chapter is on the decision-making support to determine which lines should 
be defended, which can be applied to both cyber-attacks and physical attacks. The detailed methods 
to defend the lines can be different in different types of attacks, such as enhanced communication 
traffic scanning for defending against cyber-attacks, and intensified patrolling or installing 
surveillance video equipment for deterring physical attacks, among many others. 
 Proposed DAD Model Considering Uncertainties 
The MAS defender-attacker-defender model is proposed in Fig. 6.2. At the top-level, the 
security personnel make decisions to identify the components to defend in order to minimize the 
expected damage considering all the possible attack scenarios and their corresponding 
probabilities. In each scenario with a certain amount of offensive resources given, the attacker 
determines the components to attack whereas the corrective power re-dispatch performed by the 
power grid operator is considered. In this proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model, from 
top to bottom three kinds of agents are involved: the security personnel, the attacker, and the 
operator. The top-level agent is interacting with multiple middle-level agents. This is different 
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from the conventional defender-attacker-defender model, in which the top-level agent interacts 
with only one middle-level agent. It should be noted that this MAS defender-attacker-defender 
model can easily shrink to the conventional defender-attacker-defender model, which only 
considers one single attack scenario. 
For the sake of clarity and brevity, the transmission lines are assumed to be the only assets 
that can be defended by the security personnel and disrupted by the attacker. Also, the damage is 
characterized by the load curtailment caused by the attacker. 
The mathematical problem for the proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model is 
represented by an equivalent optimization problem as follows. 
min
𝑤∈𝑾
𝐸Ω(𝑺)[ max
𝑣(𝑠)∈𝑽(𝑠)
min
{𝛿(s), 𝑃𝑔(𝑠),
𝑃𝑓(𝑠),∆𝑃𝑑(𝑠)}
∑ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑
𝑛∈𝑵 (𝑠)]          (6.9) 
s.t. ∑ 𝑤𝑙𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑟
𝑑         ∀𝑤𝑙 ∈ {0,1}                              (6.10) 
∑ (1 − 𝑣𝑙(𝑠))𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑟
𝑎(𝑠)  ∀𝑣𝑙 ∈ {0,1}   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺      (6.11) 
𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠) = (𝑤𝑙 + 𝑣𝑙(𝑠) − 𝑤𝑙𝑣𝑙(s))
𝛿𝑜(𝑙)(𝑠)−𝛿𝑑(𝑙)(𝑠)
𝑥𝑙
    ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳  ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺      (6.12) 
∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔(𝑠)𝑗∈𝑱𝑛 − ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠)𝑙|𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛 + ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠)𝑙|𝑑(𝑙)=𝑛   +∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝑠) = 𝑃𝑛
𝑑     ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵  ∀𝑠 ∈
𝑺      (6.13) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
      ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺                       (6.14) 
−𝑃𝑙
𝑓
≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
      ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺                     (6.15) 
0 ≤ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑      ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵  ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺                     (6.16) 
where s is an attack scenario, and S is the set of attack scenarios, Ω is the probability distribution 
of S. 𝐸Ω(𝑠) is the expected value of load curtailment considering the probability distribution Ω of 
the attack scenario set S. 
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There are great differences between the proposed MAS defender-attack-defender model and 
the conventional defender-attack-defender model, and the proposed model is more practical and 
complicated as explained in the following. (a) The objective function of the proposed MAS 
defender-attack-defender model in (9) is to minimize the expected loss considering all the possible 
attack scenarios, while the conventional defender-attack-defender model only considers a single 
known attack scenario. (b) In the proposed model, for each possible attack scenario the decision-
making of the attacker and the related optimal power flow analysis based remedial re-dispatch 
should be incorporated in the defender’s defensive strategy development, as shown in constraints 
(6.11)-(6.16). Compared with the conventional model, the proposed model offers a more flexible 
approach for the defender to allocate the limited resource to safeguard the power grid considering 
multiple possible attack scenarios. 
In the proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model, there are three agents at different 
levels, i.e., the security personnel at the top level, the attacker at the middle level, and the operator 
at the bottom level. The action sequence of them is explained as follows. The security personnel 
first takes actions to protect a few deliberately selected critical lines. The decision of selecting 
critical lines is made considering the offensive resource uncertainties as well as the subsequent 
optimal decision-making of the attacker and the operator. After the security personnel makes 
efforts to protect the selected lines, the attacker takes actions to attack certain deliberately-chosen 
lines. The decision-making of the attacker takes into account the following response of the 
operator. After the attack is launched and the attacked lines are tripped, the power system operator 
takes corrective actions to minimize the load curtailment. It should be noted that in the decision-
making process of the security personnel, there are uncertainties about the number of lines that the 
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attacker can disrupt. But in the decision-making process of the attacker, the attacker has a clear 
understating of the number of lines she/he can disrupt.  
In the decision-making process of the middle-level attacker, the attacker needs to take the 
response of the bottom-level operator into consideration. This means that the attacker needs to 
consider the variable physical and functional features of the power system, as shown in (6.12)-
(6.16). For example, the voltage angles of the buses and the impedances of the lines are considered 
for calculating the transmission line power flows in (6.12). The power balance at each bus is 
modeled in (6.13). The capacity of each generator/line is considered in (6.14)-(6.15). The 
maximum load loss at each bus is accounted for in (6.16). In sum, the middle-level offensive 
resource allocation is modeled at the system level considering the characteristics and functions of 
the major elements, aiming to maximize the load loss. And the load loss in the objective function 
(6.9) indicates the technical and economic impacts. 
 
 Solution Method 
This chapter presents the solution method for the MAS defender-attacker-defender problem 
formulated in (6.9)-(6.16) in Chapter 6.2.  
The solution method is based on the C&CG algorithm. The trilevel MAS defender-attacker-
defender problem is transformed to an upper-level problem (ULP) and a lower-level problem 
(LLP) in order to implement the C&CG algorithm. In the ULP, the security personnel determine 
the defensive resource allocation considering a set of offensive strategy combinations while each 
offensive strategy combination consists of attack strategies for all possible attack scenarios. The 
ULP generates the lower bound for the MAS defender-attacker-defender problem. In the LLP, for 
each attack scenario, the attack strategy is modeled by a bilevel optimization problem and the 
optimal offensive plan for each attack scenario is obtained. These obtained offensive strategies for 
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all attack scenarios form an offensive strategy combination, which will be added to the set of 
offensive strategy combinations if the convergence is not met. The expected value of load loss for 
all the attack scenarios forms the upper bound for the MAS defender-attacker-defender problem. 
The ULP and the LLP will be calculated iteratively until the lower bound and upper bound merge, 
which means that the convergence is achieved and the obtained value is an optimal solution.  
The ULP and the LLP are explained in detail as follows. 
 Upper-Level Problem 
In the ULP, the security personnel determine the optimal allocation of the defensive resource 
to minimize the expected damage caused by a given set of offensive strategy combinations ?̂?. 
?̂? = [?̂?1, ⋯ ?̂?𝑖 , ⋯ ?̂?𝑘]                                                        (6.17) 
where k is the number of offensive strategy combinations, and the sign ̂   means the value of a 
variable is given or known. Denote the dimension of S as 𝑛𝑆 , thus 𝑛𝑆  is the number of attack 
scenarios. For the example given in Chapter 6.2 𝑛𝑆  is 4. Each offensive strategy combination 
consists of 𝑛𝑆  offensive strategies, and each offensive strategy corresponds to certain known 
offensive resource. Thus,  
?̂?𝑖 = {𝑣𝑖(𝑺1), ⋯ , 𝑣
𝑖(𝑺𝑛𝑆)}          ∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘                               (6.18) 
The ULP is constructed as follows: 
min 𝜉                                                            (6.19) 
𝜉 ≥ ∑ {Ω(𝑠)[∑ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑,𝑖
𝑛∈𝑵 (𝑠)]}𝑠∈𝑆         ∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘                                (6.20) 
∑ 𝑤𝑙𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑟
𝑑          ∀𝑤𝑙 ∈ {0,1}                                          (6.21) 
𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠) = [𝑤𝑙 + 𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠) − 𝑤𝑙𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠)]
𝛿𝑜(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠)−𝛿𝑑(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠)
𝑥𝑙
  ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,  ∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘        
(6.22) 
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∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔,𝑖(𝑠)𝑗∈𝑱𝑛 − ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠)𝑙|𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛 + ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠)𝑙|𝑑(𝑙)=𝑛 + ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑,𝑖(𝑠) = 𝑃𝑛
𝑑        ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵,  ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,
∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘      (6.23) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔,𝑖(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺, ∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘                               (6.24) 
−𝑃𝑙
𝑓
≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
   ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳,  ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,   ∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘                               (6.25) 
0 ≤ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑,𝑖(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑   ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,   ∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘                             (6.26) 
In the objective function (6.19), the security personnel try to minimize 𝜉 , which is the 
maximization of the expected damages in k offensive strategy combinations. The remedial power 
re-dispatch at the bottom-level is considered for each attack scenario and each offensive strategy 
combination, thus 𝛿𝑜(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠), 𝛿𝑑(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠), 𝑃𝑗
𝑔,𝑖(𝑠), 𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠) and  ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑,𝑖(𝑠) are calculated for each attack 
scenario s and each offensive strategy combination i.  
As there are nonlinear terms in the constraint (6.22), the big-M method is adopted to linearize 
it, as shown below [101], [102]-[103]. 
𝑥𝑙𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠) − [𝛿𝑜(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠) − 𝛿𝑑(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠)] ≤ 𝑀[1 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠) + 𝑤𝑙𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠)]    ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,  
∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘       (6.27) 
𝑥𝑙𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠) − [𝛿𝑜(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠) − 𝛿𝑑(𝑙)
𝑖 (𝑠)] ≥ −𝑀[1 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠) + 𝑤𝑙𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠)]    ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,  
∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘       (6.28) 
−𝑃𝑙
𝑓
[𝑤𝑙 + 𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠) − 𝑤𝑙𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠)] ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓,𝑖(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
[𝑤𝑙 + 𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠) − 𝑤𝑙𝑣?̂?
𝑖(𝑠)]     ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺,  
∀𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘      (6.29) 
where M is a sufficiently large number. 
As can be seen in (6.20)-(6.26), each possible offensive resource scenario s and its probability 
Ω(s) is considered to minimize the expected load loss using stochastic programming.  
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 Lower-Level Problem 
The LLP calculates the expected damage ζ caused by the attacker in all the attack scenarios, 
which are represented as follows. 
ζ = ∑ [Ω(𝑠)𝜂 (𝑠)]𝑠∈𝑺                                                  (6.30) 
where 𝜂 (𝑠) is the damage in scenario s. 
Note that in each attack scenario with a given offensive resource, the attacker tries to 
maximize the damage considering the power system operator’s response to minimize the damage. 
In each scenario, the interaction is modeled as a max-min bilevel problem which is illustrated as 
follows. 
η (s) = max
𝑣∈𝑽(𝑠)
min
{δ(s), 𝑃𝑔(𝑠),
𝑃𝑓(𝑠),∆𝑃𝑑(𝑠)}
∑ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑
𝑛∈𝑵 (𝑠)                                          (6.31) 
∑ (1 − 𝑣𝑙(𝑠))𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑟
𝑎(𝑠)    ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺    ∀𝑣𝑙 ∈ {0,1}                                  (6.32) 
𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠) = (?̂?𝑙 + 𝑣𝑙(𝑠) − ?̂?𝑙𝑣𝑙(s))
𝛿𝑜(𝑙)(𝑠)−𝛿𝑑(𝑙)(𝑠)
𝑥𝑙
∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺       (𝜇𝑙(𝑠))                   (6.33) 
∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔(𝑠)𝑗∈𝑱𝑛 − ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠)𝑙|𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛 + ∑ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠)𝑙|𝑑(𝑙)=𝑛 + ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝑠) = 𝑃𝑛
𝑑    ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵, ∀𝑠 ∈
 𝑺   (𝜆𝑛(𝑠))            (6.34) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺 (𝛾 𝑗(𝑠))                                  (6.35) 
−𝑃𝑙
𝑓
≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
     ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺 (∅𝑙(𝑠), ∅𝑙(𝑠))                              (6.36) 
0 ≤ ∆𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝑠) ≤ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑    ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑺 (𝛼𝑛(𝑠))                             (6.37) 
In this bilevel optimization, the lower-level (33)-(37) represents the power re-dispatch after 
certain lines are tripped due to the attack. As strong duality exits for the lower-level, the bilevel 
optimization is transformed into a single level maximization problem using the duality principle. 
The dual variables for each of the constraints (33)-(37) are given following the constraints, 
 126 
 
including 𝜇𝑙(𝑠), 𝜆𝑛(𝑠), 𝛾 𝑗(𝑠), ∅𝑙(𝑠), ∅𝑙(𝑠) and  𝛼𝑛(𝑠). The obtained single level problem is 
shown as follows. For brevity, the sign (s) denoting the attack scenario is omitted. 
η= max
{𝑣𝑙,𝑧𝑙, 𝑧𝑙
−,𝑘𝑙,𝜇𝑙,𝜆𝑛,𝛾 𝑗,∅𝑙,∅𝑙,𝛼𝑛}
{∑ 𝛾 𝑗𝑗∈𝑱 𝑃𝑗
𝑔
+ ∑ (∅𝑙 − ∅𝑙)𝑙∈𝑳 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
+ ∑ (𝜆𝑛 + 𝛼𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵 𝑃𝑛
𝑑}        (6.38) 
∑ (1 − 𝑣𝑙)𝑙∈𝑳 ≤ 𝑠                                      (6.39) 
∑
𝜇𝑙(?̂?𝑙+𝑣𝑙−?̂?𝑙𝑣𝑙)
𝑥𝑙
𝑙|𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛 = ∑
𝜇𝑙(?̂?𝑙+𝑣𝑙−?̂?𝑙𝑣𝑙)
𝑥𝑙
𝑙|𝑑(𝑙)=𝑛  ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵  (6.40) 
𝜆𝑛 + 𝛼𝑛 ≤ 1                 ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵      (6.41) 
𝜆𝑛|𝑗∈𝑱𝑛 + 𝛾 𝑗 ≤ 0                  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱       (6.42) 
𝜇𝑙 − 𝜆𝑛|𝑛=𝑜(𝑙) + 𝜆𝑛|𝑛=𝑑(𝑙) + ∅𝑙 + ∅𝑙 = 0  ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳       (6.43) 
𝛾 𝑗 ≤ 0                  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱       (6.44) 
∅𝑙 ≥ 0                ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳       (6.45) 
∅𝑙 ≤ 0                ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳      (6.46) 
𝛼𝑛 ≤ 0               ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵      (6.47) 
As there is a nonlinear term 𝜇𝑙𝑣𝑙 in constraint (6.40), the big-M method is adopted to linearize 
this constraint: 
∑
𝜇𝑙?̂?𝑙+(1−?̂?𝑙)𝑚𝑙
𝑥𝑙
𝑙|𝑜(𝑙)=𝑛 = ∑
𝜇𝑙?̂?𝑙+(1−?̂?𝑙)𝑚𝑙
𝑥𝑙
𝑙|𝑑(𝑙)=𝑛   ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                    (6.48) 
𝑚𝑙=𝜇𝑙𝑧𝑙                    ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                          (6.49) 
𝑚𝑙 ≥ −𝑀𝑧𝑙               ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                          (6.50) 
𝑚𝑙 ≤ 𝑀𝑧𝑙                   ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                         (6.51) 
𝑚𝑙 ≥ 𝜇𝑙 + 𝑀𝑧𝑙 − 𝑀     ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                        (6.52) 
𝑚𝑙 ≤ 𝜇𝑙 − 𝑀𝑧𝑙 + 𝑀     ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                        (6.53) 
 Overall C&CG Algorithm 
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The proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender problem is decomposed into an ULP and an 
LLP as described previously. The C&CG algorithm is adopted to solve the overall MAS defender-
attacker-defender problem based on the ULP and the LLP. The basic idea to implement the C&CG 
algorithm is shown in Fig. 6.3.  
Solve the ULP
Converged?
Output the optimal solution results
No
Solve the LLP
Yes
Initialize the solution
 
Figure 6. 3 Overview of the C&CG algorithm 
The implementation of the C&CG algorithm is explained in detail as follows [94]-[96]. 
Step [1]. Initialize the upper bound and lower bound as 𝑈𝐵 = ∞ and 𝐿𝐵 = −∞, respectively. 
Initialize the set of offensive strategy combinations ?̂? with a random feasible offensive 
strategy combination. Set the iteration index k=1. 
Step [2].  Solve the ULP with (6.17)-(6.29) to get 𝜉  and ?̂?𝑙. As the ULP is a MILP problem, it can 
be resolved with solvers like CPLEX. Update UB with the obtained 𝜉. 
Step [3]. Solve the LLP, which involves two sub-steps. In the first sub-step, the optimization 
problem consisting of (6.30)-(6.53) is solved with the ?̂?𝑙 obtained in step [2], η (s) and 
𝑣𝑘(𝑠) are obtained. This calculation should be performed for 𝑛𝑆 times until all the attack 
scenarios are analyzed. In the second sub-step, ζ is calculated with (6.30), also ?̂?𝑘  is 
obtained using (6.18) by combining all 𝑣𝑘(𝑠) 𝑠 ∈ 𝑺. Update LB with ζ. Importantly, add 
?̂?𝑘to ?̂?. 
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Step [4]. If UB and LB are equal, the convergence is reached, go to next step; otherwise, k=k+1, 
go to step [2]. 
Step [5]. Output the optimal values, including 𝜉 which is the optimal expected damage, ?̂?𝑙 which 
is the optimal defensive resource allocation, and 𝑣𝑘(𝑠) which is the optimal offensive 
strategy in attack scenario s.  
The C&CG method can converge within a finite number of iterations. As can be seen from 
the above descriptions on the solution method, the overall solution method is the C&CG method 
that solves the ULP and LLP iteratively until convergence is achieved; while in the ULP the 
stochastic programming is applied and in the LLP the primal-dual method is used. 
 
 Case Studies 
The case studies are carried out on the two test systems, the IEEE RTS79 system [48] and the 
IEEE 57-bus system. The case studies are performed based on the Matlab simulation environment 
and IBM CPLEX [78].  
 IEEE RTS79 system 
The IEEE RTS79 system has 24 buses, 12 generation units, and 38 lines. Each line is denoted 
by the combination of its origin and destination buses. If there are parallel transmission lines with 
the same origin and destination buses, they are regarded as individual lines. 
A) Benefits of the Proposed Model 
Case study 1: The power grid is vulnerable to cyber intrusions launched by determined and 
skilled cyber attackers. Attackers may exploit the vulnerabilities in the SCADA network and/or 
the substations, and send false commands to trip the lines after gaining the privileges needed. It is 
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not a trival task to hack the power system, and the cyber attacker usually has long-time 
reconnaissance to seek the access points and discover the vulnerabilities, as shown in the 2015 
Ukraine power grid cyber- attack. As the cyber network activities are monitored by firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs), the attacker’s abnormal activies can be possibly detected by 
the IDSs, which generate alarms to notify the power system administrator. The administrator needs 
to make efforts to prevent the intrusion, such as intensified scanning. Although the alarms can 
warn the attacker of the intrusions, it is very hard to accurately know the capabilities of the attacker. 
Attackers of different skill levels could disrupt different numbers of lines; for example, an expert 
attacker usually has the skill to trip more lines than a novice attacker.  
Table 6. 1 Simulation results for case 1 
Variables Result 
Expected load loss (MW) 386.4 
Defended lines 14-16, 16-19 
Attacked lines in attack scenario 1 (Offensive resource is 3) 15-21, 15-21, 16-17  
Attacked lines in attack scenario 2 (Offensive resource is 5) 3-24, 9-11,10-11, 12-13, 12-23 
Load loss in attack scenario 1 (MW) 212 
Load loss in attack scenario 2 (MW) 648 
As an example, if based on the cyber forensics information, the cybersecurity experts estimate 
that the attacker has a probability of 0.6 to be a novice capable of attacking 3 lines, and a probability 
of 0.4 to be an expert attacker capable of attacking 5 lines. Then, the possible attack scenario set 
is 𝑺 = {3, 5} with the corresponding probabilities Ω = {0.6, 0.4}. Also, it is assumed that the 
security operator can protect only two transmission lines.  
Using the proposed mathematical model and solution method, the results are shown in Table 
6.1. The two lines to be defended are 14-16, 16-19, and this decision is made by considering the 
possible consequences of the two attack scenarios, and the expected load loss is minimized. The 
computation is conducted using an ordinary laptop with 8 GB memory and four 2.9 GHz cores, 
and it takes 380 seconds to complete the computation. 
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To demonstrate the benefit of the proposed MAS DAD model over the conventional DAD 
model, comparative studies are provided. In the conventional model, if the security personnel only 
consider scenario 1, the defended lines are {15-21, 20-23}. It is noted here that robust optimization 
usually considers the worst-case scenario, thus if it is applied to this problem, only the worst-case 
scenario would be considered which is scenario 2. Similarly, the defended lines are {9-12, 12-23} 
if only scenario 2 is considered. For each defense strategy, the load losses in scenario 1 and 
scenario 2, as well as the expected load loss which considers the attack scenario set {3, 5} and 
related probabilities {0.6, 0.4} are given in Table 6.2. 
Table 6. 2 Comparative studies for case 1 
Defended lines Load loss (MW) 
Attack scenario 1 Attack scenario 2 Expected 
14-16, 16-19 212 648 386.4 
15-21, 20-23 194 842 453.2 
9-12, 12-23 309 617 432.2 
It can be seen that for the proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model, although the 
load loss in certain single attack scenario may not be the least, the expected load loss for multiple 
attack scenarios is the least. Thus, although the conventional defender-attacker-defender model 
can be used to develop the optimal strategy for defending against a presumed single attack, the 
performance of its obtained defensive strategy is compromised when an attack scenario different 
from the presumed one occurs. Rather, the proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model is 
suitable for developing an optimal defensive strategy when there are uncertainties related to the 
attacker, i.e., when multiple presumed attack scenarios need to be considered. By comparison, the 
expected load loss with the proposed model and solution method is 386.4 MW, which is smaller 
than the value of 432.2 MW obtained by the robust optimization. Thus the benefit of the approach 
is demonstrated.  
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Case study 2: Besides cyber intrusions, the transmission lines are also vulnerable to physical 
attacks. Assume a possible future scenario, the power system administrators receive warning from 
the homeland security agency that a group of terrorists are preparing to launch an attack and disrupt 
the transmission lines. The homeland security agency does not have the accurate information about 
the number of terrorists, thus the number of lines they can trip. But the homeland security agency 
estimates that the number of terrorists is between two to five, and the probabilities are assessed as 
{0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1}. Based on the information from the security agency, the proposed method can 
be adopted to decide the transmission lines to be hardened. If the power company has a limited 
budget and security personnel can patrol only three lines, the defended lines are 14-16, 15-21 and 
16-19. The detailed results are shown in Table 6.3, and the attacked lines for each specific attack 
scenario is given in Fig. 6.4.  
This case study involves more attack resource possibilities, and the calculation time is 1,097 
seconds. It can be seen that the calculation time increases with the increase of the possibilities of 
offensive resources. 
As a comparison, the defense strategy can be developed based on the most serious scenario 
(i.e., attacking five lines) or the most likely scenarios (i.e., attacking four lines), or others. To 
demonstrate the benefit of the proposed method, the defended lines and the consequence for these 
alternative strategies are studied and compared. The optimal defensive strategy is to protect lines 
{4-9, 6-10, 14-16}, {11-14, 16-17, 16-19}, {11-13, 14-16, 15-21} and {10-12, 12-23, 14-16} for 
defending against single attack scenarios 1 (offensive resource is 2), scenarios 2 (offensive 
resource is 3), scenarios 3 (offensive resource is 4), scenarios 4 (offensive resource is 5), 
respectively. Similar to Case 1, comparative study results are provided to show the performance 
of different defensive strategies under different attack scenarios, as shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6. 3 Simulation results for case 2 
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Variables Result 
Expected load loss (MW) 282.8 
Defended lines 14-16, 15-21, 16-19 
Table 6. 4 Comparative studies for case 2 
Defended lines 
Load loss (MW) 
Attack scenario 1 Attack scenario 2 Attack scenario 3 Attack scenario 4 Expected 
14-16, 15-21, 16-19 136 180 342 648 282.8 
4-9, 6-10, 14-16 71 309 387 648 326.5 
11-14, 16-17, 16-19 136 180 516 842 371.8 
11-13, 14-16, 15-21 136 309 322 648 314.5 
10-12, 12-23, 14-16 136 309 387 448 319.5 
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Figure 6. 4 Illustration of the attack and defense strategies for case 2 
By comparing the expected load losses, it can be concluded that the value of the expected 
load loss obtained based on the proposed model is the least. Thus it is concluded that the proposed 
MAS defender-attacker-defender can minimize the expected load curtailment considering a set of 
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multiple offensive resources, and the performance of the proposed method is better than the robust 
optimization. 
B) Sensitivity Study of the Attack Scenario Probabilities 
{0, 
1}
{0.1, 
0.9}
{0.2, 
0.8}
{0.3, 
0.7}
{0.4,    
0.6}
{0.5, 
0.5}
{0.6, 
0.4}
{0.7, 
0.3}
{0.8, 
0.2}
{0.9, 
0.1}
{1, 
0}
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Attack scenario probabilities
L
o
ad
 l
o
ss
 (
M
W
)
 
 
Expected
Offensive resource 3
Offensive resource 5
 
Figure 6. 5 Consequences for the sensitivity study of the attack scenario probabilities 
In order to check the impact of the attack scenario probabilities, i.e., the uncertainty related 
to the offensive resource, case studies are performed by assuming two attack scenarios, i.e., 
attacking three lines and attacking five lines. The defensive resource is 3, i.e., the defender can 
harden three lines. The probabilities of these two attack scenarios vary from {0, 1} to {1, 0} with 
the step 0.1, and there are total 11 cases. By solving the proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender 
model, the defensive strategy and the associated offensive strategy for each attack scenario in each 
case are shown in Table 6.5. Also, the expected load loss and the load loss for each attack scenario 
in each case are shown in Fig. 6.5.  
It is shown in Table 6.5 that the defensive strategy can change with the probabilities of the 
attack scenarios. For example, the defended lines are {10-12, 12-23, 14-16} when the probabilities 
are {0.1, 0.9} while the defended lines are {14-16, 16-17, 16-19} if the probabilities are {0.7, 0.3}. 
Also, it is found that in some cases the defensive strategy is sensitive to these probabilities: a small 
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variation of these probabilities can result in different defense strategies; while in some other cases, 
it is not that sensitive. For example, the defended lines for the probabilities {0.7, 0.3} are different 
from those for the probabilities {0.6, 0.4} and the probabilities {0.8, 0.2}. The defended lines for 
the probabilities {0, 1} are the same for those for the probabilities {0.1, 0.9}, which indicates in 
this case the defensive strategy will not be affected by a small error in the estimation of the 
probabilities.  
Table 6. 5 Defensive and offensive strategies for the sensitivity study of the attack scenario probabilities 
Probabilities of scenarios Defended lines 
Attacked lines 
Offensive resource 3 Offensive resource 5 
{0,  1} 10-12, 12-23, 14-16 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.1,  0.9} 10-12,  12-23, 14-16 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.2,  0.8} 9-12,  12-23, 14-16 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.3,  0.7} 9-12,  12-23, 14-16 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.4,  0.6} 3-24, 14-16, 15-24 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.5,  0.5} 10-12, 12-23, 14-16 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.6,  0.4} 3-24, 14-16, 15-24 16-19, 20-23, 20-23 11-14, 15-16, 16-17, 20-23, 20-23 
{0.7,  0.3} 14-16, 16-17, 16-19 1-3, 3-9, 3-24 3-24, 9-11, 9-12, 10-11, 10-12 
{0.8,  0.2} 14-16, 15-21, 16-19 1-3, 3-9, 3-24 3-24, 9-11, 10-11, 12-13, 12-23 
{0.9,  0.1} 14-16, 15-21, 16-19 1-3, 3-9, 3-24 3-24, 9-11, 10-11, 12-13, 12-23 
{1,  0} 11-14, 16-17, 16-19 1-3, 3-9, 3-24 3-24, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16 
As for the resultant consequences related to these probabilities, it is shown in Fig. 6.5 that the 
expected value of the load loss decreases with the increasing probability of attacking 3 lines and 
the decreasing probability of attacking 5 lines.  
C) Impact of the Defensive Resource 
In this part, case studies are carried out to check the impact of the defensive resource on the 
optimal defensive strategy development. Under a given offensive resource set {2, 3, 4, 5} with the 
corresponding probabilities {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1}, the defensive resource varies from 1 to 5 with the 
step 1. The defensive and offensive strategies are presented in Table 6.6, and the corresponding 
consequences are shown in Fig. 6.6. From Table 6.6 and Fig. 6.6, it is demonstrated that with the 
increase of the defensive resource, some critical lines which are targets of attacks will be protected, 
leading to decreased expected load loss. It should be noted that the consequence caused by a 
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specific attack scenario does not necessarily decrease with the increase of the defensive resource. 
For example, in Fig. 6.6 the load loss caused by the scenario of attacking two lines is the least 
when the defensive resource is 4, and that is less than the corresponding load loss when the 
defensive resource is 5. This is because the proposed model aims to minimize the expected load 
loss considering all the possible attack scenarios and their related probabilities. 
Table 6. 6 Defensive and offensive strategies for the impact of the defensive resource 
Defensive 
resource 
Defended lines 
Attacked lines 
Offensive 
resource 2 
Offensive 
resource 3 
Offensive 
 resource 4 
Offensive  
resource 5 
1 14-16 2-6, 6-10 
16-19, 20-23, 
20-23 
7-8, 15-21, 15-
21, 16-17 
3-24, 9-11, 10-11, 
12-13, 12-23 
2 14-16, 20-23 2-6, 6-10 
15-21, 15-21, 
16-17 
7-8, 15-21, 15-
21, 16-17 
9-12, 10-12, 11-13, 
11-14, 15-24 
3 
14-16, 15-21, 16-
19 
2-6, 6-10 1-3, 3-9, 3-24 
9-12, 10-12, 11-
13, 15-24 
3-24, 9-11, 10-11, 
12-13, 12-23 
4 
2-6, 14-16, 16-17, 
16-19 
2-4, 4-9 
1-3, 3-9, 15-
24 
11-13, 12-13, 
12-23, 15-24 
3-24, 9-12, 10-12, 
11-13, 11-14 
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Figure 6. 6 Consequences for the impact of the defensive resource 
In addition, this kind of sensitivity analysis for the defensive resource can provide information 
about the amount of defensive resource needed to maintain a certain security level. For example, 
it is demonstrated in Fig. 6.6 that the minimum defensive resource required is 3 in order to ensure 
the expected load loss below 300 MW.  
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 IEEE 57-bus system 
In order to further illustrate the computation time of the proposed approach, more simulation 
studies are conducted based on a larger system, i.e., the IEEE 57-bus system.  This test system has 
57 buses, 80 transmission branches, and 7 generation units. The capability of each transmission 
line is set to 110 MVA, and more detailed information can be found at [79].  
As an example, the cyber security expert receives intrusion alarm from the IDS and estimates 
the attacker may be capable of attacking 2 or 3 lines with the probabilities of 0.8 and 0.2, 
respectively. The defense strategy is to defend line 1-16, 1-17, and 7-29 if the defender has the 
resource to defend three lines. The expected load loss is 42.6 MW as shown in Table 6.7. As a 
comparison, if assuming the most possible offensive resource, i.e., 2 lines, the obtained defense 
strategy can lead to the expected load loss of 54.2 MW; if assuming the worst-case offensive 
resource, i.e., 3 lines, the expected load loss is 43.9 MW. By comparison, it shows that the 
proposed approach is the most effective one. 
Table 6. 7 Comparative studies for IEEE 57-bus system 
Defended lines 
Load loss (MW) 
Attack scenario 1 Attack scenario 2 Expected 
1-16, 1-17, 7-29 39 57 42.6 
1-16, 1-17, 32-33 35.8 128 54.2 
1-15, 3-15, 7-29 43 47.6 43.9 
The calculation time is 1,354 seconds. Compared with the calculation time for the RTS79 
system, it can be shown that the calculation time increases with the system size. 
 
 Conclusions 
Considering the fact that the defender often faces uncertainties related to the offensive 
resource of the attacker when making defense plans, this chapter proposes an MAS defender-
attacker-defender model, which captures the uncertainties of the attacker’s offensive resource as 
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well as the interaction between the security personnel, the attacker, and the power system operator. 
The MAS defender-attacker-defender model is decomposed into an ULP and an LLP. The C&CG 
algorithm is implemented based on the ULP and the LLP to solve the overall MAS defender-
attacker-defender problem, while stochastic programming technique is applied in the ULP. Case 
studies are performed based on representative IEEE test systems, and different offensive resources 
and defensive resources are considered in the case studies. The comparative studies validate that 
the proposed MAS defender-attacker-defender model can minimize the expected load loss 
considering a group of attack scenarios which represents the uncertainty related to the attacker. 
This proposed approach has the potential to be implemented in the decision-making part of the 
defensive system of the transmission system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter concludes the whole dissertation and provides future research directions. 
 Conclusions 
This dissertation studies the impacts of various kinds of attacks on power system reliability, 
and proposes defense methods against the attacks. The work in each chapter is summarized as 
follows. 
 Chapter 2 is focused on quantifying the impact of substation cyber vulnerabilities on power 
supply adequacy. The temporal occurrence pattern of cyber attacks is statistically analyzed 
based on the human dynamics theory. Also, the attack/defense interactions of intelligent 
attackers and defenders are modeled by static and Markov games in different attack scenarios. 
A novel power system adequacy evaluation framework is proposed by incorporating both 
physical failures and cybersecurity risks. Simulation studies are performed on a typical IEEE 
reliability test system, and the influences of critical factors related to cybersecurity are 
carefully investigated. These quantitative studies show that implementing effective cyber 
security measures and making informed decisions about the allocation of limited resources are 
beneficial to enhancing the overall adequacy of contemporary cyber-physical power systems. 
 Chapter 3 quantifies the influence of load redistribution attack on the long-term power supply 
reliability. The intrusion process for manipulating the measurements is modeled by the semi-
Markov models. Considering the practical cross-check for suspicious measurements, the 
regional load redistribution attack model is proposed. A holistic framework incorporating the 
physical failures and the LR attack is proposed for cyber-physical power system reliability 
evaluation. The simulation is carried out on the IEEE RTS79 system. The influences of critical 
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factors and strategies are analyzed. It is concluded that the LR attacks have a non-negligible 
impact on the power system reliability. 
 Chapter 4 studies coordinated attacks against power systems; in this chapter the cyber-physical 
security of the power system is analyzed and probable coordinated attack scenarios are 
proposed. Two typical attack coordination examples are studied in detail: the coordination 
between load redistribution attack and attacking generators; and the coordination between LR 
attack and attacking lines. They are formulated as bilevel optimization problems, where the 
attacker at the upper level aims to maximize the load curtailment while the defender at the 
lower level makes an effort to reduce the load curtailment. The case studies conducted based 
on a modified IEEE 14-bus system demonstrate the potential damaging effects of the 
coordinated attacks. And it is shown that coordinated attacks could cause higher load 
curtailment than the standalone attacks.  
 Chapter 5 studies power system robust operation strategy;  a holistic robustness framework is 
proposed by extending the conventional security-constrained optimal power flow analysis to 
incorporate the risk caused by attacks. The corresponding solution methodology is proposed 
by combining particle swarm optimization and primal-dual interior point methods. Case 
studies conducted based on several test systems demonstrate that the proposed SCOPF model 
is able to reduce the consequence of attacks. This study can provide some insight into 
improving the power system operation robustness in the face of significant attacks. 
 Chapter 6 addresses the allocation of the defensive resource to minimize the damage when 
there are uncertainties regarding the resource that the attacker has. A Multiple-Attack-
Scenario defender-attacker-defender model is proposed by extending the conventional trilevel 
defender-attacker-defender model. The proposed model considers the uncertainties related to 
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the offensive resource and the interactions involving the security personnel at the top-level, 
the attacker at the middle-level, and the power system operator at the bottom-level. The 
Column-and-Constraint Generation algorithm is implemented by decomposing the MAS 
defender-attacker-defender model into an upper-level problem for the security personnel, and 
a lower-level problem for the attacker involving the optimal power flow analysis-based 
corrective power re-dispatch implemented by the power system operator. Case studies are 
performed based on the IEEE RTS79 and 57-bus systems, and the results validate that the 
proposed method is able to minimize the damage when uncertainties are involved in the 
offensive resource.  
 
 Future Work 
The future work can be explored in such directions as described as follows. 
 Analyzing the impact of more types of attacks on power system reliability; 
 Studying the occurrence frequency of attacks considering more statistical data and more 
advanced human dynamics models; 
 Investigating the cyber intrusion paths in more detail; 
 Developing power system robust optimization against false data injection attacks; 
 Identifying the critical substations, generators, measurements in case of attacks with 
uncertainties. 
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